

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION  
OF OREGON**

**UE 180/UE 181/UE 184**

**STAFF PREHEARING BRIEF**

**October 27, 2006**

1 **I. Introduction.**

2 Staff agrees with Portland General Electric Company (“PGE”) and other parties  
3 regarding the appropriate resolution of many of the issues presented by PGE’s requests for a  
4 general rate increase (Docket No. UE 180), a rate increase to include Port Westward costs  
5 (Docket No. UE 184), and to update to its Resource Valuation Mechanism (“RVM”)(Docket No.  
6 UE 181). Staff, PGE and other parties have entered into four stipulations that address several  
7 revenue requirement, direct access, rate spread, and rate design issues as well as issues related to  
8 PGE’s 2007 RVM filing.<sup>1</sup> The disputed issues presented to the Commission concern PGE’s cost  
9 of capital; net variable power costs (“NVPC”); the rate treatment of PGE’s new generating  
10 facility, Port Westward; PGE’s proposed Annual Update and Annual Variance mechanisms;  
11 PGE’s Schedule 76R; street lighting; PGE’s service restoration priority; whether PGE should  
12 provide an annual report of all practical and prudent tax planning methods it has employed to  
13 minimize the currently payable income tax burden imposed on ratepayers under SB 408; whether  
14 PGE acted imprudently by not converting to a LLC prior to redistributing its stock to Enron’s  
15 creditors; and whether PGE should credit customers for certain income taxes previously included  
16 in PGE’s rates and certain cash payments made by PGE to Enron under the PGE/Enron oral and  
17 written Tax Allocation Agreements.

18 **II. PGE’s Requests.**

19 In its original filing in Docket No. UE 180, PGE asked the Commission to increase its  
20 revenues by \$25 million, on an annual basis. PGE increased this request by \$73 million in  
21 Docket No. UE 181, and by \$45 million in Docket No. UE 184. However, PGE proposes that  
22 the effective date of the Port Westward-related increase be the date the plant comes on line,  
23 expected to be March 1, 2007. The company’s original requests added up to an increase of  
24 approximately \$143 million, a 9.3 percent increase from current rates.<sup>2</sup>

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>1</sup> The Commission has approved the stipulations related to PGE’s 2007 RVM filing and Direct  
Access. A brief description of the stipulations is attached to this brief as an appendix.  
<sup>2</sup> Staff/400, Owings 2-3.

1 The Company has modified its requests by entering into stipulations resolving several  
2 revenue requirement and annual RVM-related issues. Currently, PGE asks the Commission for a  
3 pre-Port Westward increase in its revenue requirement of approximately \$70.6 million, coupled  
4 with a post-Port Westward increase of approximately \$42 million.

5 **III. Staff recommendation.**

6 Staff recommends that the Commission increase PGE's pre-Port Westward revenue  
7 requirement by \$11.6 million. This recommendation includes adjustments stipulated to by staff  
8 in the revenue requirement and RVM stipulations and staff's proposed power cost and cost of  
9 capital adjustments and represents a rate increase of approximately 1.6 percent. Staff  
10 recommends that the Commission increase PGE's revenue requirement when Port Westward  
11 comes on-line, by an additional \$37.1 million, on an annual basis. This would increase the  
12 overall rate increase to 5.6 percent.

13 **IV. Disputed Issues.**

14 **a. Staff's power cost adjustments.**

15 Staff recommends that the Commission make four additional adjustments to PGE's  
16 proposed NVPC for the forced outage rates for PGE's Boardman and Colstrip plants, the sale of  
17 ancillary services, and the extrinsic value of PGE's flexible resources. The following tables  
18 summarize PGE's forecasts of 2007 power costs and staff's proposed adjustments:

19 ///

20 ///

21 ///

22 ///

23 ///

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

1 **Table 1: PGE's Power Cost Forecasts**

	<b>Power Cost (\$000)</b>
<b>2007 RMV Filing (UE 181)</b>	<b>813,786</b>
Include Schedule 125 Part B Load	+50,854
Include Monet Changes	-7,671
<b>2007 GRC Filing (UE 180)</b>	<b>856,968</b>
Include Port Westward	-9,648
<b>2007 Port Westward Filing (UE 184)</b>	<b>847,321</b>

11 **Table 2: Staff's Power Cost Adjustments**

	<b>Power Cost (\$000)</b>
<b>PGE's UE 180 Forecast</b>	<b>856,968</b>
Boardman Forced Outage Rate Adjustment	-6,592
Colstrip Forced Outage Rate Adjustment	-6,255
Ancillary Services Sales Revenue Adjustment	-1,532
Extrinsic Value Adjustment	-12,353
Coal Loss Adjustment ( <i>no longer at issue</i> )	-354
<b>Staff's Adjustment Forecast</b>	<b>829,883</b>

22 **1. Forced Outage Rate for Boardman Colstrip Plants**

23 To determine test period power costs for ratemaking, the Commission uses a "forced  
 24 outage rate" to determine normalized generating unit availability. A forced outage is an  
 25 unplanned failure of a generating unit. The forced outage rate is the proportion of forced outage  
 26 hours to total hours a unit is capable of providing service on an annual basis. The Commission

1 uses forced outage rates to reflect normal generating unit availability in its determination of test  
2 period power costs.<sup>3</sup> Since 1984, the Commission has generally used a four-year rolling average  
3 of actual unit forced outage rates to determine a unit's normal forced outage rate.

4 Staff recommends that the Commission abandon its practice of using actual forced outage  
5 rates to determine a unit's normal forced outage rate. Using actual forced outage rates gives too  
6 much weight to extreme events, resulting in unrealistic forced outage rates. Staff recommends  
7 that the Commission determine "normal" forced outage rates based on industry-wide averages  
8 from the North American Electric Reliability Council ("NERC").

9 Using a five-year average equivalent forced outage rate for the NERC peer group  
10 appropriate for the Boardman plant in place of the forced outage rate proposed by PGE results in  
11 a downward adjustment to PGE's net variable power costs of \$7.366 million. However, staff  
12 recommends modifying this adjustment to account for "forced maintenance outages." This  
13 modification reduces the downward adjustment to \$6.592 million.<sup>4</sup>

14 Using the five-year average equivalent forced outage rate for the NERC peer group  
15 appropriate for the Colstrip plant in place of the forced outage rate proposed by PGE results in a  
16 downward adjustment to PGE's NVPC of \$7.45 million. Again, staff recommends modifying  
17 this adjustment to account for "forced maintenance outages." This modification reduces the  
18 downward adjustment to \$6.255 million.<sup>5</sup>

## 19 2. Ancillary Services

20 Ancillary services are defined by NERC as services necessary to support the transmission  
21 of capacity and energy from the resources to the loads while maintaining reliable operation of the  
22 provider's transmission system in accordance with good utility practice.<sup>6</sup> PGE began selling  
23 ancillary services in January 2005 and includes the costs of ancillary service sales in its 2007 test

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>3</sup> Staff/100, Galbraith/4.

26 <sup>4</sup> Staff/100, Galbraith/11-12.

<sup>5</sup> Staff/100, Galbraith/13-14.

<sup>6</sup> Staff/200, Wordley/2.

1 year NVPC, but not the corresponding revenues. This results in a mismatch of costs and  
2 benefits. Staff recommends correcting this mismatch by including ancillary service sale  
3 revenues in the 2007 test year revenue requirement, as well as the costs, which results in a  
4 downward adjustment to PGE's NVPC of \$ 1.532 million.

5 **3. Extrinsic Value**

6 Extrinsic value is the dollar value produced by the flexibility of a power resource to  
7 operate profitably in a wholesale power market characterized by volatile and correlated natural  
8 gas and electricity prices. This flexibility is also called optionality. The value of optionality is  
9 realized through profitable opportunities that present themselves with economic dispatch of the  
10 company's flexible resources in the uncertain market. Although PGE has acknowledged the  
11 extrinsic value of its resources in its IRP and RFP evaluations, PGE does not include this value  
12 in its forecasted NVPC.

13 Resources not used to full capacity in a forecasted period have extrinsic value. For the  
14 2007 test year in this case, two of PGE's power plants and three purchase power contracts have  
15 unused capacity. To estimate the extrinsic value of the two power plants and one of the  
16 contracts, staff used estimates of extrinsic value PGE developed for the evaluation of alternative  
17 bids in response to the company's 2004 RFP for resource capacity. The remaining two power  
18 purchase contracts were evaluated in the RFP. Accordingly, staff used PGE's extrinsic value  
19 estimates for those contracts.<sup>7</sup> Including the extrinsic value of these resources in PGE's NVPC  
20 results in a downward adjustment to NVPC of \$12.353 million.

21 **b. Power-cost-related issues.**

22 **1. Port Westward**

23 Staff's will include its final recommendation regarding the prudence of Port Westward in  
24 its post-hearing briefs.

25 ///

26 

---

<sup>7</sup> Staff/200, Wordley/11-12.

1           **2. PGE's proposed Annual Update and Annual Variance mechanisms.**

2           PGE asks the Commission to replace PGE's annual RVM with the Annual Update  
3 mechanism, which is a prospective automatic adjustment clause that would forecast normalized  
4 NVPC each year. PGE also asks the Commission to adopt an Annual Variance mechanism to  
5 track differences between actual NVPC and the NVPC reflected in its rates through the Annual  
6 Update mechanism. Specifically, the Annual Variance mechanism would:

- 7           • Track the difference between actual unit NVPC and the unit NVPC reflected in  
8 rates;<sup>8</sup>
- 9           • Determine the Annual Variance by multiplying the difference between unit  
10 NVPC by the actual loads from the variance period;
- 11           • Place ninety percent of the Annual Variance in a balancing account for later  
12 offset or amortization;
- 13           • Employ an earnings test prior to amortization of any deferred amounts; and
- 14           • Share with customers fifty percent of any earnings exceeding an updated return  
15 on equity (ROE) by more than 100 basis points.<sup>9</sup>

16           PGE's proposed Annual Variance mechanism would shift nearly all of PGE's power cost  
17 risk to customers. Staff recommends that the Commission not adopt the radical change in  
18 ratemaking proposed by PGE and reject the Annual Variance mechanism, as well as the Annual  
19 Update mechanism.

20           In Order No. 05-1261, the Commission specified that a hydro-related PCA should be (1)  
21 limited to unusual events; (2) revenue neutral; (3) long-term; and should (4) preclude  
22 adjustments if overall earnings are reasonable.<sup>10</sup> Although the Commission identified these  
23 criteria for a hydro-related PCA, staff sees no reason to depart from these guidelines for the  
24 general PCA mechanisms proposed by PGE.

25           <sup>8</sup> Unit NVPC is defined as NVPC divided by loads (i.e., NVPC per KWh).

26           <sup>9</sup> Staff/800, Galbraith 5.

<sup>10</sup> OPUC Order No. 05-1261 at 8.

1 PGE's proposed Annual Variance mechanism does not meet the Commission's design  
2 criteria. PGE's Annual Variance mechanism is not limited to unusual events. Instead, PGE's  
3 mechanism would shift to customers \$0.90 of each \$1.00 of NVPC variation. Furthermore, it  
4 would shift these costs to customers even if PGE's overall earnings were reasonable.

5 PGE's Annual Update mechanism would be cumbersome and time consuming and it is  
6 unclear whether its benefits would outweigh the regulatory burden it would impose.

7 Accordingly, staff recommends the Commission reject this proposed mechanism as well.

8 Staff's proposed Power Cost Adjustment ("PCA") mechanism satisfies the Commission's  
9 design criteria. Staff recommends a long-term retrospective PCA mechanism that would:

- 10 • Track the difference between the actual unit NVPC and the unit NVPC  
11 reflected in rates;
- 12 • Determine the annual variance amount by multiplying the difference between  
13 unit NVPC by the normalized loads reflected in rates;
- 14 • Use a power cost deadband equal to plus and minus 150 basis points of ROE to  
15 exclude normal variation from triggering the mechanism;
- 16 • Place ninety percent of all amounts exceeding the power cost deadband in a  
17 balancing account for later offset or amortization;
- 18 • Use an earnings test with a deadband equal to plus or minus 100 basis points of  
19 ROE to override any surcharges (surcredits) when the company's earnings are  
20 above (below) the bottom (top) of a reasonable range; and
- 21 • Apply any surcharges or surcredits to customers that were charged cost-of-  
22 service rates during the PCA year.

21 The primary purpose of a PCA is to protect the utility from major increases in net  
22 variable power costs. Staff's proposed mechanism does this, and also incents the utility to  
23 minimize NVPC, does not incent direct access eligible customers on their choice to elect direct  
24 access or remain with the company and also, overrides any surcharges or surcredits triggered by  
25 large variability in NVPC if PGE's earnings are above or below a reasonable range.

26 ///

1           **3. Stochastic power cost modeling.**

2           Staff recommends that the Commission indicate a preference for stochastic power cost  
3 modeling. PGE's current power cost modeling fails to adequately capture the uncertainty  
4 associated with, and interaction of, system loads electricity and natural gas market prices,  
5 hydroelectric generation and thermal unit availability. Stochastic modeling does, and therefore  
6 provides a more realistic simulation of PGE's actual power system operations.

7           PGE previously committed to work with staff to evaluate stochastic modeling of power  
8 costs for ratemaking purposes and as a result of that agreement, hired a consultant to study the  
9 potential of, and issues surrounding, stochastic power cost modeling. Additional work is needed,  
10 however, and it is unclear whether PGE will continue efforts toward stochastic power cost  
11 modeling without the Commission indicating its desire for PGE to do so.

12           **b. Cost of capital.**

13           Staff's recommends a 6.31 percent cost of debt and 9.4 cost of equity ("COE") based on a  
14 capital structure of 50 percent debt and 50 percent equity, for a 7.86 percent overall rate of  
15 return.

16           **1. Cost of Debt.**

17           To arrive at its recommendation for a 6.31 percent cost of long-term debt, staff made the  
18 following adjustments to PGE's cost-of-debt analysis, which reduced PGE's proposed 6.826  
19 percent cost of debt to the 6.31 percent recommended by staff:

- 20           1. Recalculated the internal rate of return (IRR) because PGE's calculation  
21           appeared to be in error.
- 22           2. Substituted the actual amount of a \$100 million issuance PGE plans to issue for  
23           mid-2007 for the average gross proceeds (\$54 million), PGE used to calculate the  
24           IRR.
- 24           3. Removed losses on reacquired debt.
- 25           4. Re-priced PGE's pro forma debt issuance to reflect updated interest rates and  
26           spreads.

1           5. Re-priced six issuances negatively affected by Enron's ownership of PGE.

2           The first four of these adjustments are standard adjustments to ensure that the cost of debt  
3 determined by the Commission reflects the actual cost of debt during the period that rates will be  
4 in effect. The fifth adjustment is needed to address the negative impact of Enron's ownership of  
5 PGE on PGE's cost of debt.

6           PGE agreed, as a condition of the Commission's approval of its request to re-distribute its  
7 stock to Enron's creditors, not to seek recovery of increases in its costs of capital due to Enron's  
8 ownership.<sup>11</sup> Statements made by PGE in certain financing applications filed with the  
9 Commission from late 2001 through 2003, the nature of those applications and certain statements  
10 by PGE's Chief Financial Officer to the Commission in 2001, demonstrate that PGE did in fact  
11 experience financial pressure as a result of Enron's bankruptcy and its failed attempt to sell PGE  
12 to Northwest Natural Gas Company. To ensure that the impact of Enron's ownership on PGE's  
13 cost of debt is excluded from PGE's rates, staff re-priced six debt issuances that it identified as  
14 negatively affected by Enron's ownership of PGE.

15           **2. Cost of Equity.**

16           Staff recommends a 9.4 percent COE. Staff applied single and multi-stage discounted  
17 cash flow ("DCF") models to a carefully selected sample group of twelve companies. Then,  
18 staff conducted sensitivity analyses on the range of results produced by the models, including an  
19 analysis that assumed growth rates higher than those actually recommended by staff, and staff's  
20 reconciliation produced a cost of equity range slightly narrower than that produced by the  
21 models.

22           Staff's recommended COE assumes a capital structure of 50 percent common equity and  
23 50 percent debt, which mirrors the common equity ratio of the companies in staff's sample group  
24 and is consistent with PGE's target capitalization structure. PGE's COE will be either too high  
25 or too low if the Commission adopts a COE based on an analysis of comparable companies but

26           

---

<sup>11</sup> Order No. 05-1250.

1 assumes a capital structure that differs from the average structure of the comparable companies.  
2 Accordingly, staff recommends the Commission determine PGE's COE and overall rate of return  
3 based on an assumed capital structure that is similar to that of the sample group of companies  
4 used by staff to estimate PGE's COE.

5 In Docket No. UE 115, the Commission adjusted the PGE's cost of equity downward to  
6 account for the difference between PGE's capital structure and that of comparable companies on  
7 which PGE's COE was based.<sup>12</sup> The Commission noted it is "well understood" that the cost of  
8 equity drops as the percentage of common equity in the capital structure increase. In this docket,  
9 staff recommends that the Commission simply determine PGE's COE using the same capital  
10 structure found in the sample of comparable companies staff used to determine PGE's COE,  
11 rather than assume a different capital structure and adjust the COE.

12 The disparity between the cost of equity estimates provided by the Company in its direct  
13 testimony and those provided by staff is due largely to differences in the long-term growth rates  
14 used in the different multi-stage DCF models applied by staff and PGE. A multi-stage DCF  
15 model requires a current stock price, an initial dividend and estimates of dividend growth for  
16 different stages. While a single-stage model assumes that growth is steady and stable, multi-stage  
17 models contemplate the growth rate will change over time ("stages"), and ultimately resolve into  
18 a final constant growth rate (also called "terminal" or "horizon" growth rate). Staff and PGE  
19 generally agree regarding growth rates in the near term, but differ regarding the final long-term  
20 growth rate to use in the models.

21 Staff's analysis is based on application of two different multi-stage DCF models in  
22 addition to a single-stage DCF model. In direct testimony, PGE witnesses explain that PGE's  
23 proposed COE is based on application of a two-stage DCF model applied to three different  
24 comparable samples of proxy companies, as well as a risk positioning model. PGE introduced a  
25 new witness in its rebuttal testimony, however, who discussed additional models, including a

26 <sup>12</sup> See OPUC Order No. 01-777 at 36.

1 single-stage DCF model based on a sample of six water utilities and two different risk premium  
2 analyses.

3 Staff assumed long-term growth rates of 4.0 to 5.0 percent and used three different  
4 methods to obtain these assumptions: (1) analysis of market consensus growth rates (financial  
5 analysts' forecasts); (2) sustainable growth; and (3) historical utility growth rates.

6 The Company also used three methods to estimate long-term growth: (1) a "sustainable  
7 growth" rate method similar to what staff used, which obtained an average estimate of 4.78; (2) a  
8 forecast of GDP growth, which obtained an estimate of 5.01 percent; and (3) a 40-year average  
9 calculation of historical GDP growth, which obtained a long-term growth rate estimate of 6.76  
10 percent. The Company's 4.78 and 5.01 percent assumptions are similar to the assumptions used  
11 by staff, but PGE's long-term growth rate assumption based on a 40-year calculation of historical  
12 GDP is unrealistically high, and should be rejected.

13 More specifically, the growth rate produced by the 40-year calculation of historical GDP  
14 is more than two hundred basis points higher than the estimates obtained by PGE using different  
15 methods, is greater than PGE or the electric industry has experienced on average, is based only  
16 on nominal GDP, is higher than PGE's own long-term growth goal and also, disregards analyst  
17 estimates, sustainable growth rate calculations and historic growth rates.<sup>13</sup> When the Company's  
18 DCF model results that rely on the historic GDP growth estimates are discarded, the DCF results  
19 discussed in PGE's opening testimony appear to be within a reasonable range and are consistent  
20 with the results of staff's analysis.<sup>14</sup>

21 The new models discussed in PGE's rebuttal testimony do little to inform the  
22 Commission regarding the appropriate COE for PGE. First, no evidence demonstrates that the  
23 water utilities analyzed in the first new model, a single-stage DCF model, are comparable to  
24 PGE. Furthermore, the terminal growth rate in the model is higher than the growth in the overall  
25

---

26 <sup>13</sup> Staff/1000, Morgan/17.

<sup>14</sup> Staff/1000, Morgan/23.

1 economy. A basic tenet of economics is that companies cannot grow faster than the economy.  
2 Accordingly, the results of the first model are questionable at best.

3 The second new model is a risk premium analysis using the years 1986 to 2006, and is  
4 based on the assumption that Value Lines reported short-term growth is a reasonable proxy for  
5 perpetual growth in the overall market. The model reflects the sample group growing at a rate of  
6 12.68 percent, which is an untenable level of growth in light of the tenet identified above.

7 The third new model is also a risk-premium analysis based on a sample of what are  
8 described as “Moody’s Electric Utility” companies. This model has several weaknesses,  
9 including (1) use of a very broad base of companies, including those that are not purely rate  
10 regulated; (2) use of general corporate bond rates, not the actual rates of the sample companies;  
11 (3) a failure to address an overall decrease in risk premiums; and (4) a failure to identify the  
12 appropriate holding period assumptions.<sup>15</sup>

13 **PGE’s risk positioning model.**

14 In addition to a two-stage DCF model and the models introduced in its rebuttal testimony,  
15 PGE employs what it refers to as a “risk positioning model” to obtain a COE estimate. Staff  
16 recommends that the Commission reject PGE’s analysis based on its risk positioning model for  
17 several reasons. First, the Commission has previously rejected this model and PGE provides no  
18 explanation as to why the Commission should nonetheless accept it in this docket.

19 Second, PGE’s modeling has several infirmities, including the omission of relevant variables.

20 Third, PGE provides no foundation for the model’s assumption of a deterministic relationship  
21 between Treasury rates and public utility COEs.

22 ///

23 ///

24 ///

25

---

26 <sup>15</sup> Staff/1400, Morgan/37.

1           **c. Schedule 76R – Economic Replacement Power.**

2           Partial requirements customers who want energy supply from PGE take service under  
3 Schedule 75. Schedule 75 customers have the option to take “Economic Replacement Power”  
4 service under Schedule 76R. Economic Replacement Power is interruptible energy prescheduled  
5 to replace some, or all, of the consumer’s on-site generation. The point is to allow the customer-  
6 generator to reduce or shut down on-site generation when market prices are low and buy power  
7 at market prices from the utility (or, under Schedule 575, an alternative Electricity Service  
8 Supplier (“ESS”). It is an adjunct service to Schedule 75, which provides customers that have  
9 on-site generation with: 1) supplemental power, which is the energy normally supplied by PGE  
10 when the consumer’s generator is operating, and 2) backup power during scheduled maintenance  
11 and forced outages.

12           Under Schedule 76R, customers buy Economic Replacement Power at market prices.  
13 Currently, however, Economic Replacement Power is priced in Schedule 76R at the Dow Jones  
14 Mid-Columbia (“Mid-C”) Hourly Price Index, plus a 5% adder, plus wheeling and losses. The  
15 hourly price index is a real-time price that is not known until after the fact. Accordingly, it is  
16 difficult for partial requirements customers to determine when buying Economic Replacement  
17 Power is in fact economic.<sup>16</sup>

18           ICNU proposes three modifications to Schedule 76R:

- 19           • Replace the daily pricing option in 76R with the daily pricing option proposed in  
20 Schedules 83/89 (and currently available under Schedule 83), which is composed of  
the daily on-peak and off-peak Mid-C Firm Price Index, plus wheeling and losses.
- 21           • Allow partial requirements customers to receive Economic Replacement Power from  
22 an Electricity Service Supplier (“ESS”) (to the extent the replacement power is above  
baseline demand).
- 23           • Allow partial requirements customers who qualify to participate in Schedule 87  
24 (Experimental Real Time Pricing) for their load in excess of Baseline Demand.<sup>17</sup>

25  
26 <sup>16</sup> Staff/1700, Schwartz/2.

<sup>17</sup> ICNU/200, Iverson-Wolverton/15-16.

1 Staff does not oppose ICNU's first recommendation. However, the Schedule 83/89 daily  
2 pricing option does not provide day-ahead notice of prices. Staff therefore recommends that the  
3 parties consider PacifiCorp's daily pricing option for pre-scheduled Economic Replacement  
4 Power. PacifiCorp's daily pricing option for Economic Replacement Power requires pre-  
5 scheduling, take or pay, and other provisions that protect the utility against risks.

6 Staff also supports the intent of ICNU's third recommendation, which is to allow partial  
7 requirements customers to choose an interruptible rate option based on hourly, market-based  
8 prices, with day-ahead notice of those prices. Schedule 87 provides a Commission-approved  
9 methodology for deriving such prices and notice provisions.<sup>18</sup> That methodology could be  
10 incorporated into Schedule 76R such that the partial requirements customer would not have to  
11 take service under Schedule 87 in order to have the option of day-ahead hourly prices. PGE  
12 could propose additional risk mitigation measures beyond those in Schedule 87 to address  
13 concerns about hour-to-hour load variations.<sup>19</sup>

14 Staff is considering the merit of ICNU's second recommended change to Schedule 76R,  
15 which is to create a split-service option under which PGE would supply power for the partial  
16 requirements customer up to its Baseline Demand, and an ESS would supply Economic  
17 Replacement Power above Baseline Demand. Staff will consider any evidence regarding this  
18 proposal that may be introduced at the hearing and will make a final recommendation in its post-  
19 hearing briefs.

20 **d. Advanced Metering Infrastructure.**

21 PGE has withdrawn its requests relating to Advanced Metering Infrastructure from these  
22 consolidated proceedings.<sup>20</sup>

23 ///

24 ///

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>18</sup> Staff/1700, Schwartz/5-6.  
<sup>19</sup> PGE/2900, Kuns-Cody/22-23.  
<sup>20</sup> PGE/3000, Carpenter-Tooman/1-3.



**Stipulations.**

- **Stipulation Regarding RVM Issues:** PGE, ICNU, CUB and staff agree that rates imposed pursuant to PGE's 2007 RVM filing will only be effective from January 1 to January 16, 2007, at which time rates from PGE's general rate case will be effective. The parties to this stipulation agree that for the purpose of calculating the 2007 annual update pursuant to Schedule 125, PGE will adjust its annual net variable power costs downward by \$8.588 million. The stipulating parties also agree regarding the treatment of gas transportation costs in the event the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") issues rate orders prior to the final power cost updates in Docket No. UE 181 and that power cost issues raised by the parties in Docket No. UE 181 will be addressed in the general rate case.
- **Stipulation Regarding Direct Access Issues:** PGE, ICNU, Fred Meyer Stores ("Fred Meyer"), the City of Portland, Constellation NewEnergy, Inc., EPCOR Merchant and Capital (US) Inc., and Sempra Global agree that PGE will delete its proposal to provide 3- and 5-year fixed price options under Schedule 489; the customer eligibility requirements of Schedules 483 and 489 as set out in the schedules will remain as filed; Schedule 84 split load option should be approved as filed; PGE will offer three new quarterly direct access enrollment windows in addition to the annual November election window; the Schedule 130 Shopping Incentive Rider will be extended through 2009, with some modifications; PGE will provide a short-term power supply transition adjustment to customers who as of January 1, 2006 elected the Schedule 125 "Part B Opt-Out" for the 2007 service year; and PGE will file and include in its tariff a direct access equivalent to Schedule 38 (Schedule 538).
- **Stipulation Regarding Revenue Requirement Issues:** PGE, ICNU, CUB, Fred Meyer and staff agree regarding the proper resolution of all revenue requirement issues except cost of capital, power costs, treatment of Port Westward, and Advanced Metering Infrastructure.
- **Stipulation Regarding Rate Spread and Rate Design Issues:** PGE, Fred Meyer, CUB, ICNU, and staff agree regarding the resolution of all rate spread/rate design and partial requirements issues raised by these parties, except issues regarding Schedule 76R, Economic Replacement Power. (Staff, ICNU, and PGE have filed testimony regarding the Schedule 76R issues.) The parties agree to support the rate spread/rate design proposal filed by PGE with certain changes relating to the pricing for Schedule 102 Regional Power Act Exchange Credit; Schedules 85/583-S and 85/583-P, Schedule 83; Schedule 75; and the Customer Impact Offset ("CIO").

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

2  
3 I certify that on October 27, 2006, I served the foregoing upon all parties of record in this  
4 proceeding by delivering a copy by electronic mail and by mailing a copy by postage prepaid  
5 first class mail or by hand delivery/shuttle mail to the parties accepting paper service.

6 **JIM DEASON - CONFIDENTIAL**  
7 ATTORNEY AT LAW  
8 1 SW COLUMBIA ST - STE 1600  
9 PORTLAND OR 97258-2014  
10 jimdeason@comcast.net

11 **ROBERT VALDEZ**  
12 PO BOX 2148  
13 SALEM OR 97308-2148  
14 bob.valdez@state.or.us

15 **AF LEGAL & CONSULTING SERVICES**  
16 ANN L FISHER - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
17 ATTORNEY AT LAW  
18 PO BOX 25302  
19 PORTLAND OR 97298-0302  
20 energlaw@aol.com

21 **BOEHM KURTZ & LOWRY**  
22 KURT J BOEHM - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
23 ATTORNEY  
24 36 E SEVENTH ST - STE 1510  
25 CINCINNATI OH 45202  
26 kboehm@bkllawfirm.com

**MICHAEL L KURTZ - CONFIDENTIAL**  
36 E 7TH ST STE 1510  
CINCINNATI OH 45202-4454  
mkurtz@bkllawfirm.com

**BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION**  
GEOFFREY M KRONICK LC7 - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
PO BOX 3621  
PORTLAND OR 97208-3621  
gmkronick@bpa.gov

**CRAIG SMITH**  
PO BOX 3621--L7  
PORTLAND OR 97208-3621  
csmith@bpa.gov

**BRUBAKER & ASSOCIATES INC**  
JAMES T SELECKY - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
1215 FERN RIDGE PKWY - STE 208  
ST. LOUIS MO 63141  
jtselecky@consultbai.com

**CABLE HUSTON BENEDICT ET AL**  
TAMARA FAUCETTE  
1001 SW 5TH AVE STE 2000  
PORTLAND OR 97204  
tfaucette@chbh.com

**CHAD M STOKES**  
1001 SW 5TH - STE 2000  
PORTLAND OR 97204  
cstokes@chbh.com

**CITIZENS' UTILITY BOARD OF OREGON**  
LOWREY R BROWN - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
UTILITY ANALYST  
610 SW BROADWAY - STE 308  
PORTLAND OR 97205  
lowrey@oregoncub.org

**JASON EISDORFER - CONFIDENTIAL**  
ENERGY PROGRAM DIRECTOR  
610 SW BROADWAY STE 308  
PORTLAND OR 97205  
jason@oregoncub.org

**COMMUNITY ACTION DIRECTORS OF OR**  
**JIM ABRAHAMSON - CONFIDENTIAL**  
COORDINATOR  
PO BOX 7964  
SALEM OR 97303-0208  
jim@cado-oregon.org

**CONSTELLATION NEWENERGY INC**  
WILLIAM H CHEN  
REGULATORY CONTACT  
2175 N CALIFORNIA BLVD STE 300  
WALNUT CREEK CA 94596  
bill.chen@constellation.com

**DANIEL W MEEK ATTORNEY AT LAW**  
**DANIEL W MEEK - CONFIDENTIAL**  
ATTORNEY AT LAW  
10949 SW 4TH AVE  
PORTLAND OR 97219  
dan@meek.net

1 **DAVISON VAN CLEVE PC**  
S BRADLEY VAN CLEVE - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
2 333 SW TAYLOR - STE 400  
PORTLAND OR 97204  
3 mail@dvclaw.com

4 **EPCOR MERCHANT & CAPITAL (US) INC**  
LORNE WHITTLES  
MGR - PNW MARKETING  
5 1161 W RIVER ST STE 250  
BOISE ID 83702  
6 lwhittles@epcor.ca

7 **GRESHAM CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE**  
DAVID R RIS  
SR. ASST. CITY ATTORNEY  
8 CITY OF GRESHAM  
1333 NW EASTMAN PARKWAY  
9 GRESHAM OR 97030  
david.ris@ci.gresham.or.us

10 **GRESHAM CITY OF**  
JOHN HARRIS -**CONFIDENTIAL**  
11 TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS  
SUPERINTENDENT  
12 1333 NW EASTMAN PKWY  
GRESHAM OR 97030  
13 john.harris@ci.gresham.or.us

14 **KAFOURY & MCDUGAL**  
LINDA K WILLIAMS - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
ATTORNEY AT LAW  
15 10266 SW LANCASTER RD  
PORTLAND OR 97219-6305  
16 linda@lindawilliams.net

17 **LEAGUE OF OREGON CITIES**  
ANDREA FOGUE - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATE  
18 PO BOX 928  
1201 COURT ST NE STE 200  
19 SALEM OR 97308  
afogue@orcities.org

20 **MCDOWELL & ASSOCIATES PC**  
KATHERINE A MCDOWELL  
ATTORNEY  
21 520 SW SIXTH AVE - SUITE 830  
PORTLAND OR 97204  
22 katherine@mcd-law.com

23 **W**  
**NORTHWEST ECONOMIC RESEARCH INC**  
24 LON L PETERS - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
607 SE MANCHESTER PLACE  
25 PORTLAND OR 97202  
lpeters@pacifier.com

26

**NORTHWEST NATURAL**  
ELISA M LARSON - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL  
220 NW 2ND AVE  
PORTLAND OR 97209  
elisa.larson@nwnatural.com

**NORTHWEST NATURAL GAS CO**  
ALEX MILLER - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
DIRECTOR - REGULATORY AFFAIRS  
220 NW SECOND AVE  
PORTLAND OR 97209-3991  
alex.miller@nwnatural.com

**PACIFICORP**  
LAURA BEANE  
MANAGER - REGULATORY  
825 MULTNOMAH STE 300  
PORTLAND OR 97232  
laura.beane@pacificorp.com

**W**  
**PORTLAND CITY OF - OFFICE OF CITY ATT**  
BENJAMIN WALTERS - **CONFIDENTIAL**  
DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY  
1221 SW 4TH AVE - RM 430  
PORTLAND OR 97204  
bwalters@ci.portland.or.us

**W**  
**PORTLAND CITY OF - OFFICE OF**  
**TRANSPORTATION**  
RICHARD GRAY  
STRATEGIC PROJECTS MGR/SMIF  
ADMINISTRATOR  
1120 SW 5TH AVE RM 800  
PORTLAND OR 97204  
richard.gray@pdxtrans.org

**W**  
**PORTLAND CITY OF ENERGY OFFICE**  
DAVID TOOZE  
SENIOR ENERGY SPECIALIST  
721 NW 9TH AVE -- SUITE 350  
PORTLAND OR 97209-3447  
dtooze@ci.portland.or.us

**PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC**  
RATES & REGULATORY AFFAIRS  
RATES & REGULATORY AFFAIRS  
121 SW SALMON ST 1WTC0702  
PORTLAND OR 97204  
pge.opuc.filings@pgn.com

**DOUGLAS C TINGEY - CONFIDENTIAL**  
121 SW SALMON 1WTC13  
PORTLAND OR 97204  
doug.tingey@pgn.com

1 **PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP**  
HARVARD P SPIGAL  
222 SW COLUMBIA ST STE 1400  
2 PORTLAND OR 97201-6632  
hspigal@prestongates.com

3 **SEMPRA GLOBAL**  
THEODORE E ROBERTS  
4 101 ASH ST HQ 13D  
SAN DIEGO CA 92101-3017  
5 troberts@sempra.com

**SEMPRA GLOBAL**  
LINDA WRAZEN  
101 ASH ST HQ8C  
SAN DIEGO CA 92101-3017  
lwrazen@sempraglobal.com

**SMIGEL ANDERSON & SACKS**  
SCOTT H DEBROFF  
RIVER CHASE OFFICE CENTER  
4431 NORTH FRONT ST  
HARRISBURG PA 17110  
sdebroyff@sasllp.com

6  
7 

8 Neoma Lane  
9 Legal Secretary  
10 Department of Justice  
Regulated Utility & Business Section  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26