

August 23, 2005

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Filing Center  
Oregon Public Utility Commission  
550 Capitol Street NE #215  
PO Box 2148  
Salem, OR 97308-2148

Re: ARB 665 – Testimony of Ron Vidal, Timothy Gates, and Rogier Ducloo on  
Behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC

Dear Sir or Madam:

Enclosed for filing in the above-referenced docket is Testimony of Rogier Ducloo, Timothy Gates, and Ron Vidal on Behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC. This filing is being resubmitted with corrected formatting, including markings on the testimony and exhibits. No other changes have been made. Please contact me with any questions.

Very truly yours,



Jessica A. Gorham

Enclosures

cc: ARB 665 Service List


**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  
ARB 665**

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of **TESTIMONY OF RON VIDAL, TIMOTHY GATES, AND ROGIER DUCLOO ON BEHALF OF LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC** was served via U.S. Mail on the following parties on August 23, 2005:

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ATER WYNNE, LLP

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Jessica A. Gorham

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION  
OF OREGON  
ARB 665**

In the Matter of  
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, INC's  
Petition for Arbitration Pursuant to Section  
252(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as  
amended by the Telecommunications Act of  
1996, and the Applicable State Laws for Rates,  
Terms, and Conditions of Interconnection with  
Qwest Corporation

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RON VIDAL ON BEHALF OF LEVEL 3  
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC**

**August 12, 2005**

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**I. INTRODUCTION.....1**  
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**I. INTRODUCTION**

**Q. Please state your name, title, and business address for the record.**

A. My name is Ron Vidal. I am Group Vice-President of Emerging Opportunities for Level 3 Communications, LLC (“Level 3”). My business address is 50 Fremont Street, Suite 2203, San Francisco, CA, 94105.

**Q. Please describe your responsibilities for Level 3.**

A. As Vice-President of Emerging Opportunities, my responsibilities including identifying, analyzing and evaluating new technology and business models including wireless, optical networking and other advanced communications technologies that may impact Level 3 globally over the next five years.

**Q. Please describe your educational background and professional experience.**

A. I received a Bachelor of Science from Drexel University. Prior to being Group Vice-President of Emerging Opportunities, I served Level 3 as the head of New Ventures and Investor Relations, where I worked on over \$12 billion of capital markets transactions in the equity, debt and convertible debt markets .

Before joining Level 3 I was Vice-President of New Ventures for MFS WorldCom and MFS Communications. I have led technical and operational due diligence teams on over \$18 billion in telecommunications mergers & acquisitions (M&A) transactions including MFS’s acquisition of UUNET Technologies, MFS’s acquisition of Centex Telemanagement, WorldCom’s acquisition of MFS and WorldCom’s acquisition of Brooks Fiber. I have also worked on integration teams for these transactions post closing. The companies in these transactions were all significant parts of the competitive telecommunications industry and also represented the largest Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLEC) in MFS Communications, the largest Internet Protocol (IP) backbone network in UUNET Technologies and one of the largest Interexchange Carriers

1 (IXC) in WorldCom. Additionally at MFS, my team developed and introduced the first  
2 commercial DSL service for high speed Internet access.

3 **Q. Have you ever testified before this Commission?**

4 A. No.

5 **Q. On whose behalf was this testimony prepared?**

6 A. This testimony was prepared on behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC. (“Level 3”).

7 **II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY**

8 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

9 A. The purpose of my testimony is to identify and discuss the key regulatory, competitive  
10 and technology policies that should guide the Commission in resolving the issues  
11 identified in the Level 3 Petition for Arbitration (“Petition”).<sup>1</sup> This testimony relates  
12 generally to all of the issues in this proceeding, and I provide comments on each one.  
13 That said, Mr. Gates and Mr. Ducloo provide specific, detailed testimony addressing each  
14 issue as well.

15 **Q. Why is policy-oriented testimony necessary in the context of this proceeding?**

16 A. A clear focus on the policies underlying the 1996 Act and related regulatory rulings will  
17 be helpful in assessing the parties’ claims on specific issues. It will probably turn out that  
18 some of the issues are governed by binding FCC rules and rulings. Level 3’s attorneys  
19 will present those matters in its briefing. However, on some issues, this Commission will  
20 have a certain range of discretion in how it will decide. It is therefore helpful to identify  
21 the policy considerations that the Commission should consider in exercising its  
22 discretion. Moreover, a discussion of the policies underlying this case makes it easier to  
23 understand the practical application of those legal and regulatory provisions. These  
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25 <sup>1</sup> See, Petition of LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC for Arbitration of an Interconnection  
26 Agreement with Qwest Corporation, pursuant to Section 252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996;  
filed on May 13, 2005 (“Petition”).

1 policy considerations “put meat on the bones” of sometimes fairly generally-stated legal  
2 and regulatory requirements.

3 **Q. What are some of the areas where the Commission must “put meat on the bones” of**  
4 **legal and regulatory requirements?**

5 A. First, several of the key issues separating the parties relate to interconnection of their  
6 networks, under Section 251(a)(1) and Section 251(c)(2) of the Communications Act.  
7 Section 251(c)(2) in particular requires that terms and conditions of interconnection be  
8 “reasonable.” That is a relatively open-ended standard, so it is helpful to articulate some  
9 specific policy considerations that should guide the Commission in determining what is  
10 and is not “reasonable.”

11 Second, other issues in this case relate to the appropriate level of intercarrier  
12 compensation to apply in certain circumstances. Section 252(d) of the Act requires such  
13 rates to be “reasonable,” again calling for some elaboration.

14 Third, under Section 251(d)(3) of the Act, the Commission is entitled to impose  
15 requirements regarding interconnection that are not specified in the Act, as long as those  
16 additional requirements are “consistent with the requirements of” Section 251. In  
17 considering the question of whether a particular obligation not literally set forth in the  
18 Act is “consistent with the requirements” of Section 251, to understand the policies and  
19 objectives that underlie that Section.

20 Basically, there are some things that the law will require the Commission to do,  
21 and some things that the law will forbid the Commission from doing. But as the  
22 Commission bears down on the different issues, it will almost certainly be the case that  
23 one party or the other will be asking the Commission to do something that it *can* do, but  
24 does not *have to* do. At that point in its decision making, the Commission should apply  
25 the policies and goals that underlie the Act, in order to render a decision that contributes  
26 to accomplishing those goals.

1 **Q. At a very high level, what policy considerations should guide the Commission's**  
2 **decisions in this case?**

3 A. As noted above, the Commission must, of course, follow binding legal and regulatory  
4 requirements.

5 Beyond that, however, there are three high-level policies that should guide the  
6 Commission's rulings. In the nature of things, these three high-level policies overlap to  
7 some degree, but stating them separately is helpful in considering the issues at hand.

8 First, the entire purpose of the 1996 Act is to encourage competition in  
9 telecommunications markets. The Commission, therefore, should in each case ask  
10 whether deciding for or against Level 3 would encourage the development of  
11 competition. In this regard, the Commission must focus on decisions that will benefit the  
12 development of competition in the market as a whole, not the short-run, private interest of  
13 either party.

14 Second, the Commission should make decisions that encourage development and  
15 deployment of new technology and innovative, new services. The history of the  
16 telecommunications industry is one of sustained — one might even say unrelenting —  
17 technical and service-oriented innovation. On some level, each decision the Commission  
18 makes here will either facilitate and encourage such innovation, or will tend to preserve  
19 the *status quo*. The 1996 Act is not about preserving the *status quo*. It is about bringing  
20 new and innovative services to all segments of the industry.

21 Third, the Commission should promote and encourage the unfettered growth of  
22 the Internet. Section 230 of the Communications Act, and any number of FCC  
23 pronouncements, embody a clear policy to promote the growth and development of the  
24 Internet and consumer access to it. We are now so accustomed to contacting friends by  
25 email, finding information from Google or Yahoo or MapQuest, and downloading our  
26 favorite music from iTunes or RealNetworks, that it is easy to forget that these and other

1       incredibly useful services and applications did not just magically appear, and the  
2       environment in which they grew and developed was not some stroke of luck. To the  
3       contrary, the wide-open environment that made these services possible was the result of  
4       conscious policy choices to keep regulation away from the Internet. Frankly, as Internet  
5       applications such as Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) services are beginning to hit  
6       the incumbents where they live, so to speak, the policy of keeping the Internet  
7       unregulated is coming under increasing assault. The Commission, however, should not  
8       lose sight of the prize: an unregulated, competitive market in which firms are free to  
9       innovate without having to pay homage to regulatory monuments set up in the last  
10      Century to accommodate old technologies and old industry structures.

11 **Q.    At a high level, how do these policies relate to each other?**

12 A.    While they may conflict in some situations, on the whole these policies are mutually  
13       reinforcing. Promoting competition creates an environment in which firms are free to  
14       innovate and deploy new technology, free from unfair attacks by entrenched monopolists  
15       and unnecessary regulatory restrictions. The development and deployment of new and  
16       innovative technology, of course, stimulates and enables competition. And the flexible,  
17       advanced capabilities of the Internet simultaneously depend on and enable both  
18       competition and technical innovation.

19 **Q.    Please provide an overview of where Level 3 fits into the communications industry.**

20 A.    Level 3 is not a traditional competitive local exchange carrier (“CLEC”).

21               In broad terms, many of the CLECs that were created following the 1996 Act had  
22       a business model that boiled down to, “do what the incumbent does, only 5% better.” As  
23       the regulatory authorities have come to appreciate the need to encourage competition  
24       based on investment in competing facilities, this business model has become increasingly  
25       unviable. Many of the CLECs that have gone into bankruptcy or been acquired by rivals  
26       had placed key reliance on this now-superseded business model.

1           Level 3, however, takes a very different approach. Level 3’s business focuses  
2 not only on the traditional public switched telephone network (PSTN), but also — in fact,  
3 even more directly — on the Internet. Level 3’s entire network architecture arose out of  
4 the architecture of the Internet, which, as Mr. Ducloo notes, evolved as a scientific,  
5 educational and military network outside the PSTN. The Internet uses packet switching,  
6 developed in the 1970s, as opposed to circuit switching, developed, essentially, in the  
7 1870s. (When the original, 19<sup>th</sup> Century forebear of “Ernestine the Operator” plugged a  
8 line into her circuit board, she was doing just what circuit switches do today: creating a  
9 dedicated path between two customers for the duration of their call.)

10           While Level 3 certainly functions as a “local” exchange carrier, in fact Level 3’s  
11 operations are nationwide, and more, in scope. Level 3 has billions of dollars invested in  
12 its network, which consists of an all fiber-optic backbone connected to 68 markets in the  
13 U.S. and 17 markets in Europe. Level 3 has over 16,000 route miles of fiber in the US  
14 and an additional 3600 route miles in Europe. Riding on this fiber backbone, Level 3  
15 maintains a separate, private IP network, composed of high-speed links (carried over the  
16 fiber optic facilities) and core routers (which direct enormous volumes of packetized  
17 traffic to the appropriate destinations). The Level 3 IP backbone is connected to the  
18 public Internet by means of hundreds of peering arrangements with other large Internet  
19 entities, located in approximately 30 different metropolitan areas.

20           Level 3 is extensively interconnected with other networks. Its central offices are  
21 state-of-the-art facilities in the heart of 70 major metropolitan areas, which, as Mr.  
22 Ducloo explains, range in size from 50,000 to 550,000 square feet of equipped floor  
23 space. In these locations, Level 3 terminates both local and intercity fiber networks, as  
24 well as locates its high-speed transmission equipment, routers, and Softswitch equipment.  
25 (Softswitch technology bridges the gap between legacy circuit-switched technology and  
26 more advanced IP-based networks.)

1 Level 3 believes that, while other entities in the communications business — such  
2 as, frankly, Qwest — struggle to adapt to change, Level 3, to quote a former President, *is*  
3 the change.

4 **III. KEY ISSUES IN THIS CASE**

5 **Q. Broadly speaking, how does Level 3’s approach to the industry relate to the key**  
6 **policies at issue in this case?**

7 A. Level 3’s network embodies innovation and new technology. Its services facilitate and  
8 encourage access to and development of the Internet. And, it provides competition across  
9 a wide spectrum of telecommunications markets. From Level 3’s perspective, its entire  
10 business plan is consistent with, and dependent on, the policies underlying the 1996 Act.

11 **Q. Please identify the key issues in this case that you address.**

12 A. I address four main issues in this case.

13 First is the issue of network interconnection architecture. Level 3 wants to be  
14 able to interconnect with Qwest at a single POI in each LATA, with each party  
15 responsible for the costs of its facilities on its side of the POI. Qwest wants to be able to  
16 force Level 3 to deploy uneconomic facilities to establish multiple physical  
17 interconnections, and to offload some of Qwest’s network costs onto Level 3.

18 Second is the issue of separate trunking. Level 3 wants to send traffic to Qwest  
19 switches using high-capacity trunk groups that combine different regulatory “types” of  
20 traffic in an efficient manner. Qwest wants to require Level 3 to incur unnecessary  
21 network costs, and degrade efficiency, by breaking the traffic bound for a particular  
22 switch into smaller, less efficient, separate trunk groups.

23 Third is the question of intercarrier compensation for so-called “VNXX” traffic.  
24 This is traffic that is dialed by end users, routed through the network, and billed exactly  
25 like traditional “local” traffic, but that Qwest wants to exempt from the normal  
26 compensation regime applicable to such traffic. Indeed, Qwest wants to *charge* Level 3

1 for the privilege of receiving calls that Qwest's customers make to entities served by  
2 VNXX arrangements, despite the fact that these arrangements are technically identical to  
3 those applicable to local calls.

4 Fourth is the question of the delivery by Level 3 of VoIP traffic. This type of  
5 traffic is the latest of many inroads that the Internet has made over the years into the  
6 traditional preserve of the PSTN. Qwest, understandably, wants to suppress or at least  
7 slow down the growth of VoIP — at least VoIP not provided by Qwest — and so  
8 requests that this information-service traffic be assessed full, subsidy-laden access  
9 charges (which will of course tend to make the service less viable). Level 3 believes that  
10 the development of VoIP should be encouraged, and so believes that termination of VoIP  
11 traffic should be at the same low rate applicable to so-called "Section 251(b)(5) traffic."

12 Mr. Gates and Mr. Ducloo provide detailed discussion of these issues from the  
13 perspective of economics and technology. In the remainder of my testimony I address  
14 them from the perspective of the broad policy goals and objectives outlined above.

15 **Q. How do the policies you identified above apply to Level 3's right to interconnect**  
16 **using a single POI?**

17 A. Each of the policies identified above supports allowing Level 3 to interconnect by means  
18 of a single POI until and unless Level 3 itself believes additional POIs are needed. For  
19 this issue, the primary policy is the promotion and encouragement of competition.  
20 Although Level 3, as noted above, has invested billions of dollars in its advanced, fiber-  
21 optic, IP-based network, that does not mean that it can or should be called upon to mirror  
22 or duplicate the local network architecture of the ILECs with which it interconnects and  
23 competes. To the contrary, it would be extraordinary to conclude that a competitor like  
24 Level 3 would have any rational interest in duplicating the incumbent's network  
25 architecture.  
26

1           The essence of Level 3’s local business plan is to identify customers with high  
2 levels of Internet-based communications, either incoming, outgoing, or both, and provide  
3 highly efficient links for such customers both “upstream” to the Internet itself and  
4 “downstream” to the PSTN. Level 3 has no independent business reason to try to re-  
5 create Qwest’s local network architecture. Instead, what Level 3 primarily needs from  
6 Qwest in order to serve its customers is efficient, seamless interconnection between Level  
7 3’s network and Qwest’s network. It seems plain that efficient interconnection of this  
8 type will be degraded if Level 3 is subject to regulatory obligations to establish multiple  
9 physical interconnections with Qwest, above and beyond those that are necessary to  
10 Level 3’s business and that Level 3 will put into place itself.

11           As Mr. Ducloo notes, Level 3 is not averse to establishing multiple physical  
12 points of interconnection in a LATA when traffic levels and other factors so warrant; but  
13 *requiring* Level 3 to interconnect at multiple points on Qwest’s network really boils  
14 down to punishing Level 3 — in the form of needless mandated capital expenditures —  
15 for not having the same network, the same customer base, and the same business plan as  
16 Qwest. This is contrary not only to the policy of encouraging competition, but also to the  
17 policy of encouraging the deployment of new, innovative services and network  
18 architectures.

19           Clearly, as a policy matter, Qwest is simply wrong in insisting that Level 3 should  
20 have to establish more than one physical POI within a LATA.

21 **Q.   What about Qwest’s proposal to require Level 3 to pay Qwest for facilities on**  
22 **Qwest’s side of the POI?**

23 **A.**   Competition between networks is facilitated when each network is fully responsible for  
24 its own operations and for the costs generated by its own customers’ activities. The 1996  
25 Act provides that each parties is entitled to payment when the other party delivers traffic  
26 for termination — so called “intercarrier compensation.” Other than these legally-

1 mandated intercarrier compensation payments, however, there should not be any charges  
2 between the parties for their respective network facilities and operations. Instead, the  
3 parties should work cooperatively to efficiently exchange traffic, with each party  
4 responsible for its own costs in doing so, other than the intercarrier compensation noted  
5 above. Any Qwest proposal that has the economic effect of shifting its own network  
6 costs to Level 3 is inappropriate as policy matter.

7 **Q. How do the policies you identified above apply to establishing separate trunks for**  
8 **different “types” of traffic?**

9 A. On this issue, Qwest is trying to drag Level 3 back into the past. Level 3 proposes to  
10 deliver traffic to each Qwest switch on a single, efficient, combined trunk group. As Mr.  
11 Ducloo explains, all of the traffic that Level 3 will deliver on this single trunk group is  
12 technically identical. That is, each call will arrive properly formatted for delivery on the  
13 PSTN by Qwest, with the appropriate call identification information, signaling data, etc.  
14 (This is not to say that no calls will ever be delivered without completely accurate  
15 signaling. No system of call identification is perfect. It is to say that only small amounts  
16 of traffic will not be properly identified.)

17 Qwest, however, is not concerned about technical efficiency. Instead, because it  
18 thinks that different kinds of traffic fall into different regulatory buckets, it wants those  
19 types of traffic sent on separate trunk groups. This is anticompetitive, because it will  
20 impose needless costs on Level 3. It is also contrary to the development and  
21 encouragement of new services, in that it forces Level 3 to classify traffic in accordance  
22 with the old, existing service classifications with which Qwest seems most comfortable.  
23 And, particularly in the case of VoIP traffic, the inefficiencies imposed by Qwest’s  
24 suggested a requirement of separate trunking for different “types” of traffic will act to  
25 directly suppress the development of this exciting Internet-based innovative service.

26 The only conceivable legitimate factor supporting Qwest’s position is the fact that

1 under current regulatory rules, different “types” of traffic are, indeed, subject to different  
2 charging regimes (*i.e.*, access charges versus reciprocal compensation). So, if there were  
3 no practical way to apply those different charging regimes without separate trunks,  
4 Qwest’s position might be entitled to some consideration. In fact, however, as Mr.  
5 Ducloo explains, combining different “types” of traffic onto a single, efficient combined  
6 trunk group does not interfere with proper billing. If Qwest has implemented a fully  
7 functional, robust recording, billing, and mediation system, the industry-standard call  
8 signaling and identification data that Level 3 will transmit will allow Qwest to properly  
9 bill on a call-by-call basis. If Qwest has not done so, then Level 3’s proposal to use  
10 periodically updated factors to allocate total traffic among the different billing regimes is  
11 a practical and fully adequate solution.

12 **Q. How do the policies you identified above apply to the treatment of VNXX traffic?**

13 A. This is a classic situation in which the incumbent is trying to use regulatory  
14 gamesmanship to suppress competition that arises from a competitor’s use of a  
15 technological arrangement that the incumbent did not originally choose to offer. Not  
16 only is it anticompetitive, but, because the main users of VNXX arrangements are  
17 Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) trying to provide efficient and economical access to  
18 the Internet, it is contrary to the policy favoring Internet development as well.

19 As Mr. Ducloo and Mr. Gates explain, as a technological and economic matter,  
20 when a Qwest customer calls a Level 3 customer served by a VNXX arrangement, what  
21 Qwest does is 100%, exactly, the same as what Qwest does when it delivers a traditional,  
22 geographically-delimited “local” call to a Level 3 customer. Moreover, Level 3’s  
23 proposed intercarrier compensation treatment of VNXX calls to ISPs is identical to the  
24 intercarrier compensation treatment that would apply to an ISP or anyone else who  
25 purchased traditional “FX” service from Qwest itself.

1           At bottom, Qwest doesn't like the fact that its subscribers spend a lot of time  
2 calling ISPs served by Level 3; it does not like the fact that those ISPs themselves,  
3 viewed as customers, have chosen to take service from Level 3 as opposed to Qwest; and,  
4 I suspect, at bottom Qwest still feels threatened by the incredible level of consumer  
5 interest in accessing the Internet. Given this, Qwest is naturally motivated to throw grit  
6 in the gears of the most efficient means of serving those ISP customers and letting its  
7 own subscribers connect to them. Qwest obviously can't literally prevent its customers  
8 from connecting to their chosen ISP — the consumer and, I would hope, regulatory  
9 outrage would be unbearable. So it is trying to do the next best thing, which is to make it  
10 economically unviable for Level 3 to offer the efficient arrangement. If Level 3 had to  
11 pay originating access charges on VNXX calls to ISPs, that would make the service  
12 totally uneconomic.<sup>2</sup> But even depriving Level 3 of the appropriate \$0.0007 per minute  
13 applicable to ISP-bound traffic would, as Qwest well knows, put a dent in Level 3's  
14 business case for serving ISPs.

15           The Commission should reject Qwest's position and require that VNXX calls to  
16 ISPs be treated, for intercarrier compensation purposes, like any other locally-dialed ISP-  
17 bound calls.

18 **Q. How do the policies you identified above apply to the question of termination rates**  
19 **for VoIP traffic?**

20 A. VoIP is an exciting and innovative Internet application that turns the voice-centric world  
21 of the PSTN on its head by treating voice communication as just another data-oriented  
22 application on the worldwide Internet. From a long-run industry perspective, it  
23

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24 <sup>2</sup> I am not a lawyer, but even so it is obviously bizarre for Qwest to claim that *intrastate* access  
25 charges apply to ISP-bound calls, after the FCC for years has been saying that ISP-bound traffic is  
26 *interstate* in nature. In April 2001 the FCC set up a special interstate regime for handling compensation  
for all ISP-bound calls. From my perspective, Qwest's attempts to carve the most common means of  
providing service to ISPs out from that regime is blatant regulatory gamesmanship.

1 represents the triumph of data networks over voice networks. While the PSTN can  
2 provide only a limited, low-bandwidth form of data communications (basically, dial-up  
3 access to the Internet at 56 kilobits per second), the Internet can do everything the PSTN  
4 can do, and more. In my view, it is only a matter of time before the entities that comprise  
5 and operate the PSTN convert to IP-based communications, as indeed, Qwest and other  
6 PSTN entities are already beginning to do.

7 One of the features of the Internet is that distance and location are largely  
8 irrelevant. As the FCC has explained, the contents of a single web page can come from a  
9 variety of different servers in a variety of different locations. Most of us familiar with  
10 modern business travel have learned that our email can reach us anywhere, either  
11 downloaded to a computer in a hotel room by means of now-ubiquitous broadband  
12 connections offered by business hotels, or to wireless devices such as a Blackberry.

13 VoIP is an Internet application first and a voice application second. By this I  
14 mean that VoIP partakes in the distance-insensitive, location-insensitive characteristics of  
15 Internet applications. No matter what telephone number might be assigned to a VoIP  
16 customer (if any number is assigned at all), the customer might be participating in a call  
17 from next door or from around the world.

18 It is obviously challenging from a regulatory perspective to figure out what to do  
19 with VoIP traffic. The FCC has a number of ongoing proceedings trying to sort it out.  
20 But one thing is clear: whatever VoIP is, it is not traditional “telephone toll service,”  
21 where the end user makes a call from some fixed location, completes it to some distant  
22 location, and is charged a separate toll charge for the privilege. In both economic and  
23 technical terms, VoIP calling is *sui generis*.

24 In these circumstances, the choice between assessing traditional access charges or  
25 lower and more economical reciprocal compensation rates on this traffic should actually  
26 be very clear. This is a new and innovative service that we should all want to encourage.

1 That means that we should impose the lowest reasonable charges on it, when it needs to  
2 interface with the PSTN. That means that as a policy matter this traffic should be subject  
3 to reciprocal compensation rates, not access charges.

4 This makes sense from a competitive and economic perspective as well. In policy  
5 terms, the idea of access charges is that a long distance carrier collects “tolls” from end  
6 users who make use of the long distance carrier’s services, and the long distance carrier  
7 then, in effect, shares those tolls with the local carriers on either end of the call. Access  
8 charges arose as an historical matter out of the divestiture of the local companies from the  
9 old Bell System. They were a means to preserve the traditional (and extensive) subsidy  
10 that AT&T Long Lines had provided to the operation of the local portions of the Bell  
11 System.

12 Obviously, this economic logic has no application to VoIP services. There are no  
13 traditional “tolls” being collected by VoIP providers with which to fund access charge  
14 payments; instead, VoIP services are essentially universally offered at flat rates for  
15 PSTN-wide calling. And, there is obviously no historical tradition of VoIP providers  
16 subsidizing former Bell System local entities. So, the only question, from a policy  
17 perspective, is whether we want to *require*, as an affirmative policy decision, that this  
18 new and innovative service must provide subsidies to the legacy PSTN, simply because  
19 one close PSTN counterpart service — traditional toll service — is required to provide  
20 such subsidies.

21 The answer is clearly “no.” All three of the policies I articulated at the beginning  
22 of my testimony point to this same conclusion. Permitting VoIP traffic to be terminated  
23 at reciprocal compensation rates will encourage competition. VoIP is exactly the kind of  
24 new and innovative service that we should be trying to encourage, so it should not be  
25 subject to high access charges when lower reciprocal compensation rates provide  
26 adequate compensation to Qwest. And, VoIP is the latest innovative service to arise from

1 the Internet, which should be encouraged for independent policy reasons. As a policy  
2 matter, therefore, VoIP traffic should be subject to reciprocal compensation, not access  
3 charges.

4 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

5 A. Yes.

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**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION  
OF OREGON  
ARB 665**

In the Matter of  
  
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, INC's  
  
Petition for Arbitration Pursuant to Section  
252(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as  
amended by the Telecommunications Act of  
1996, and the Applicable State Laws for Rates,  
Terms, and Conditions of Interconnection with  
Qwest Corporation

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY J GATES  
ON BEHALF OF LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC**

**August 12, 2005**

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**I. INTRODUCTION**

1  
2 **Q. Please state your name, occupation, and business address.**

3 A. My name is Timothy J Gates. My business address is QSI Consulting, 819 Huntington  
4 Drive, Highlands Ranch, Colorado 80126.

5 **Q. What is QSI Consulting, Inc., and what is your position with the firm?**

6 A. QSI Consulting, Inc. ("QSI") is a consulting firm specializing in traditional and non-  
7 traditional utility industries, econometric analysis and computer aided modeling. I  
8 currently serve as Senior Vice President.

9 **Q. Please describe your educational background and work experience.**

10 A. I received a Bachelor of Science degree from Oregon State University and a Master of  
11 Management degree in Finance and Quantitative Methods from Willamette University's  
12 Atkinson Graduate School of Management. Since I received my Masters, I have taken  
13 additional graduate-level courses in statistics and econometrics. I have also attended  
14 numerous courses and seminars specific to the telecommunications industry, including  
15 both the NARUC Annual and NARUC Advanced Regulatory Studies Programs.

16 Prior to joining QSI, I was a Senior Executive Staff Member at MCI. I was  
17 employed by MCI and/or MCI/WorldCom for 15 years in various public policy positions.  
18 While at MCI I managed various functions, including tariffing, economic and financial  
19 analysis, competitive analysis, witness training and MCI's use of external consultants.  
20 Prior to joining MCI, I was employed as a Telephone Rate Analyst in the Engineering  
21 Division at the Texas Public Utility Commission and earlier as an Economic Analyst at  
22 the Oregon Public Utility Commission. I also worked at the Bonneville Power  
23 Administration (United States Department of Energy) as a Financial Analyst doing total  
24 electric use forecasts while I attended graduate school. Prior to doing my graduate work,  
25 I worked for ten years as a reforestation forester in the Pacific Northwest for

1 multinational and government organizations. Exhibit TJG-1, attached hereto to this  
2 testimony, is a summary of my work experience and education.

3 **Q. Have you ever testified before this Commission?**

4 A. Yes. I have submitted testimony or comments in six separate docketed proceedings  
5 before the Commission in the last twenty-two (22) years, many of which pertain to  
6 opening Oregon telecommunications markets to competition. In two of those six  
7 proceedings, my testimony was provided on behalf of the Commission. I have also  
8 testified more than 200 times in 43 other states and filed comments with the FCC on  
9 various public policy issues ranging from costing, pricing, local entry and universal  
10 service to strategic planning, merger and network issues. As noted above, a list of  
11 proceedings in which I have filed testimony or provided comments is attached hereto as  
12 Exhibit TJG-1.

13 **Q. On whose behalf was this testimony prepared?**

14 A. This testimony was prepared on behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC. (“Level 3”).

15 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

16 A. The purpose of my testimony is to address certain issues identified in the Level 3 Petition  
17 for Arbitration (“Petition”).<sup>1</sup> Specifically, I will address: **Issue 1:** Interconnection  
18 Architecture; **Issue 2:** Separate Trunk Groups; **Issue 3:** Internet Service Provider (“ISP”)   
19 Bound Traffic, Relative Use Formula (“RUF”), and Virtual NXX (“VNXX”); and **Issue**  
20 **4:** Voice Over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”). Some of these disputes are primarily  
21 engineering issues, but I will be addressing them from an economic perspective.

22 **Q. How is your testimony organized?**

23 A. My testimony is organized by issue. The various discussions of the Tier 1 issues can be  
24 found on the following pages:  
25

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<sup>1</sup> See Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Arbitration of an Interconnection Agreement with Qwest Corporation, pursuant to Section 252(B) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; filed on June 3, 2005 (“Petition”).

1     **Issue 1** Interconnection Architecture.....Page 10  
2     **Issue 2** Separate Trunk Groups.....Page 23  
3     **Issue 3** VNXX, ISP-Bound Traffic, and RUF.....Page 27  
4     **Issue 4** VoIP .....Page 44

5 **Q. What key economic principles apply to the issues in this arbitration?**

6 A. All of my recommendations in this matter are based on a few simple but important  
7 economic principles:

8           *First*, neither party to an interconnection agreement should be able to impose  
9 unnecessary costs on the other. Obviously the process of interconnection itself entails  
10 certain costs, some of which fairly and properly fall on each party. But neither party  
11 should be able to insist on interconnection arrangements that are costly to the other party  
12 *for no good reason*. As a society, we want interconnection arrangements to be as  
13 efficient as possible; requiring needless expense is inconsistent with that goal.

14           *Second*, interconnection arrangements should reflect the most efficient technical  
15 means for handling any particular situation, even if that that is not the technical  
16 arrangement currently in place for one of the parties. If a party can prevent an efficient  
17 arrangement simply because that party has not taken the time or effort to become efficient  
18 itself, the interconnection agreement will, in this respect, become a government-  
19 sanctioned transfer of wealth from the more efficient party to the less efficient party. A  
20 similar transfer of wealth will occur if the incumbent is allowed to force inefficiencies on  
21 the party with which it interconnects. Such inefficiencies do not make any economic  
22 sense and are not in the public interest.

23           *Third*, it needs to be very clear that the incumbent’s way of doing things is not  
24 necessarily the most efficient way of doing things. From an economic perspective the  
25 purpose of the 1996 Act is to enable and facilitate competition in traditionally  
monopolized telecommunications markets by removing economic and operational

1 impediments.<sup>2</sup> Further, with the rapid pace of technological advances in transport and  
2 switching technologies, no rational provider would adopt the traditional technologies and  
3 methods of operation of the incumbent. Facilitating and enabling competition, therefore,  
4 necessarily requires analyzing interconnection and intercarrier compensation issues from  
5 a forward-looking perspective in which the technology that is most efficient from a long-  
6 run economic cost perspective that may not include the technology currently in use by the  
7 incumbent. It follows that “because the incumbent does it that way” is not only *not* a  
8 good argument in favor of a particular resolution of an issue — in many cases it might be  
9 a *good* reason to reach the opposite conclusion.

10 **Fourth** and finally, a recognition of the critical role that technological advance  
11 has played in contributing to economic welfare in the field of telecommunications  
12 justifies a preference for the result that favors, and enables, new technology. There is no  
13 dispute that communications technology is a decreasing cost industry. From an economic  
14 perspective, anyone who has a large sunk investment in a particular technical approach  
15 will rationally do whatever he can to prevent new technologies from making his  
16 technology obsolete. But this private interest in protecting existing investment from the  
17 forces of competition is directly contrary to the public interest in innovation and the  
18 deployment of new, more efficient technologies. From an economic perspective it is not  
19 only appropriate but necessary for decisions regarding interconnection disputes to take  
20 this factor into account.

## 21 II SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

22 **Q. With those principles in mind, please summarize your recommendations on the key**  
23 **issues separating qwest and level 3 in this arbitration.**

24 **A. Issue 1** relates to interconnection architecture. Level 3 wants the agreement to clearly  
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<sup>2</sup> In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; **FIRST REPORT AND ORDER**; CC Docket No. 96-98; Released August 8, 1996; at ¶3. Hereinafter referred to as the FCC’s “*Local Competition Order*.”

1 state that it is entitled to interconnect with Qwest at a single point of interconnection  
2 (“POI”) in each LATA; to state that all types of traffic will be exchanged by means of  
3 that physical POI; and that each party will bear the costs of its facilities and arrangements  
4 on its side of the POI, including all costs of getting its own traffic to the POI. This is the  
5 correct result from an economic viewpoint.

6 Qwest’s network architecture reflects a mix of technology and economic  
7 decisions that Qwest has made over many decades. That architecture does not remotely  
8 reflect what an efficient firm would construct today. It follows that Qwest should not be  
9 able to force Level 3 to spend money to duplicate or mirror Qwest’s architecture —  
10 which is essentially what a multiple-POI requirement does. Rather, each carrier should  
11 be responsible for its own network, with the hand-off of traffic between the networks  
12 occurring at a single, efficient point. Of course, this does not preclude the parties from  
13 voluntarily agreeing to establish whatever additional POIs they may choose in particular  
14 cases. It does, however, prevent Qwest from imposing transport and other  
15 responsibilities onto Level 3 that arise from Qwest’s legacy network architecture.

16 **Issue 2** relates to the use of trunk groups that carry different “types” of traffic on a  
17 combined basis to and from the POI. Level 3 wants all traffic exchanged between Qwest  
18 and Level 3 switches within a LATA to be carried on a single trunk group between its  
19 network and the POI. Qwest wants Level 3 to separate the traffic and route it over  
20 different trunk groups based on whether the traffic falls into arbitrary categories. There is  
21 no sound economic basis for Qwest’s proposal. As Mr. Ducloo testifies, from a technical  
22 perspective, taking a large volume of traffic and breaking it up into a set of smaller trunk  
23 groups degrades trunking efficiency, so that a higher total number of trunks — and  
24 therefore trunk ports on switches — is needed. In economic terms, this results in a pure  
25 deadweight loss – *i.e.* costs are imposed with no corresponding economic or societal  
benefit.

1 Qwest says that it needs traffic on separate trunk groups in order to properly apply  
2 different billing rates to the different types of traffic, but that is simply not true. All that  
3 is required is to measure the total volume of traffic on a trunk group, and then apply  
4 factors (based on a periodic analysis of the traffic) indicating what proportion of the  
5 traffic is subject to reciprocal compensation, what proportion is subject to access charges,  
6 etc. These jurisdictional factors have been used for decades.

7 **Issue 3** relates generally to whether ISP-bound traffic should be subject to the  
8 FCC-mandated rate of \$0.0007 per minute even when the ISP's equipment is not in the  
9 originating local calling area (as developed for Qwest's network architecture) of the end  
10 user dialing up the ISP. Level 3 maintains that this low rate should apply because the  
11 FCC has preempted the states as to intercarrier compensation for this traffic; Qwest  
12 apparently takes the view that if the ISP's equipment is not in the originating local calling  
13 area, not only should Qwest not pay Level 3 the \$0.0007, but Level 3 should actually pay  
14 Qwest originating access charges.

15 Qwest also wants to impose its own network costs on Level 3. Qwest's position  
16 is simply wrong. When Qwest delivers an ISP-bound call originated by its customer to  
17 Level 3's POI for termination, Qwest's costs are not affected in the slightest by the  
18 location of the ISP's equipment. Moreover, Qwest's position would impose a penalty on  
19 Level 3 for working with ISP customers to efficiently configure their equipment in a  
20 manner to minimize both their and Level 3's costs, or, put another way, would create an  
21 incentive on Level 3 and its ISP customers to configure their equipment inefficiently  
22 simply in order to avoid regulatorily-imposed payments to Qwest. From an economic  
23 perspective, Qwest's position is totally irrational and discriminatory and should be  
24 rejected.

25 **Issue 4** relates to the application of the \$0.0007 rate to IP-enabled voice traffic,  
generally referred to as Voice over Internet Protocol or "VoIP", as well as purely "ISP-

1 bound” traffic. This type of traffic should not be burdened with “access charges.”  
2 Further, there is no technical or economic reason to treat VoIP differently from other ISP-  
3 bound traffic. Qwest wants to either exclude this type of traffic entirely from  
4 interconnection or impose special, higher charges for terminating that traffic. Here again,  
5 Qwest’s position makes no economic sense. Qwest does not incur any costs for  
6 terminating this VoIP traffic that differ from its costs in terminating traffic that Qwest  
7 would acknowledge is subject to the lower rate. From an economic viewpoint, it appears  
8 that Qwest is trying to ensure that growth of this new technology is inhibited by means of  
9 making it more costly than necessary to actually complete such calls. This is contrary to  
10 the public interest and to the efficient development and operation of the market. Unless  
11 there is some compelling legal or policy reason that *requires* the application of higher  
12 charges to this traffic — and I am certainly not aware of any — it makes sense to have  
13 the lower rate apply. I discuss each of these issues in more detail below.

14 Finally, I note that **Issue 5** in this matter is largely “legal” in nature, relating to the  
15 incorporation of certain terms by reference into the parties’ interconnection agreement. I  
16 do not address that issue in this direct testimony.

17 **Issue 1 -- Interconnection Architecture.**

18 **Q. Please summarize the positions of Level 3 and Qwest with regard to interconnection**  
19 **architecture.**

20 **A.** Level 3 wants to exercise its right to establish a single POI for each LATA for the  
21 exchange of all types of traffic with Qwest, with each party responsible for the facilities  
22 on its side of the POI.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the only charges from one party to the other for  
23 terminating traffic delivered to the POI would be the applicable per-minute charges  
24 (reciprocal compensation or access). Qwest seeks to require the establishment of  
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<sup>3</sup> As will be discussed later in this testimony, a POI is the point at which two networks interconnect for the exchange of traffic.

1 multiple POIs in some circumstances and to improperly impose onto Level 3 the cost of  
2 establishing and maintaining trunking arrangements put in place for Qwest's own  
3 convenience.

4 **Q. Please provide a general overview of the economic rationale for interconnection**  
5 **pursuant to the Act.**

6 A. Interconnection of networks is essential for the provision of telecommunications services.  
7 If two networks are not interconnected, their subscribers cannot call each other, which  
8 reduces the value of both networks. However, the economic effect of denial of  
9 interconnection is not the same for each network. If a large network denies  
10 interconnection to a smaller one, the impact on the large network may well be very small  
11 (since few of its customers will want or need to contact customers of the other network),  
12 while the denial of interconnection will be devastating to the smaller network, since its  
13 few subscribers would not be able to call anyone other than others on the same network.  
14 Where the dominant network became dominant as a result of government policy (as is the  
15 case with the ILECs), it would be wrong to ignore the potential that smaller networks  
16 might be harmed as a result of denial of interconnection, or by inefficient  
17 interconnection, when government policy (the Telecom Act of 1996) now recognizes the  
18 importance of promoting competition.

19 **Q. Did Congress recognize the importance of interconnection to the development of**  
20 **competition?**

21 A. Yes. Congress recognized the importance of interconnection by requiring all  
22 telecommunications providers to interconnect, directly or indirectly, in Section 251(a)(1)  
23 of the Act. But Congress also recognized that the ILECs were and would remain the  
24 overwhelmingly largest networks and the dominant carriers in any given area for the  
25 foreseeable future (and, nearly 10 years after the passage of the Act, this remains true).  
This situation gives the ILECs powerful economic leverage over CLECs: the ILEC will

1 be strongly motivated to use its control over access to its large base of subscribers either  
2 to out-and-out destroy its competitors (by not allowing interconnection at all) or hamper  
3 their growth by only permitting interconnection on expensive or inefficient terms. So,  
4 Congress — quite rationally from an economic standpoint — imposed special  
5 interconnection duties on ILECs.

6 **Q. What were those special interconnection duties imposed on ILECs?**

7 A. In Section 251(c)(2) of the Act, ILECs are required to permit a “requesting  
8 telecommunications carrier” to physically interconnect its network with that of the ILEC  
9 for the exchange of traffic. This limits the ability of the ILEC to exploit its market power  
10 — arising from its control of access to the overwhelming majority of subscribers in an  
11 area — to the detriment of competitors and consumers who would benefit from a choice  
12 in providers.

13 The FCC implemented this basic interconnection requirement with its specific  
14 rules to make clear that once interconnection is established for the exchange of  
15 “traditional” traffic — telephone exchange service and exchange access — other types of  
16 traffic can and should be exchanged using the same facilities. Specifically, at ¶ 995 of  
17 the *Local Competition Order*, the FCC said:

18 [I]f a company provides both telecommunications and information services, it  
19 must be classified as a telecommunications carrier for purposes of section 251  
20 ... . [T]elecommunications carriers that have interconnected or gained access  
21 under sections 251(a)(1), 251(c)(2), or 251(c)(3), **may offer information  
22 services through the same arrangement, so long as they are offering  
23 telecommunications services through the same arrangement as well.** Under  
24 a contrary conclusion, a competitor would be precluded from offering  
25 information services in competition with the incumbent LEC under the same  
arrangement, thus increasing the transaction cost for the competitor. We find  
this to be contrary to the pro-competitive spirit of the 1996 Act. By rejecting  
this outcome we provide competitors the opportunity to compete effectively  
with the incumbent by offering a full range of services to end users without  
having to provide some services inefficiently through distinct facilities or  
agreements.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See *Local Competition Order* at ¶ 995 (emphasis added).

1 This is plainly the correct policy from an economic perspective. Once the  
2 investment has been made to establish a facility interconnecting two networks, it makes  
3 no sense to limit the use of that facility to particular types of traffic, if there are other  
4 types of traffic that also need to be exchanged. Instead, the most efficient use should be  
5 made of whatever physical interconnection facilities are established. As the FCC itself  
6 has noted, the obligations identified in section 251 are necessary to support the FCC's  
7 goal of developing competition for the benefit of consumers and the economy.<sup>5</sup>  
8 Interconnection should be established on a cost-based, efficient basis that inhibits the  
9 ILEC's use of market power in anti-competitive ways to erect barriers to the  
10 establishment of an effectively competitive market.

11 **Q. How do these considerations relate to the question of using a single POI per LATA**  
12 **for interconnection?**

13 A. The use of a single POI per LATA is generally an efficient and effective way to exchange  
14 all traffic between an ILEC and a CLEC's network. Requiring the CLEC to establish  
15 multiple POIs boils down to making the CLEC duplicate some or all of the ILEC's  
16 preexisting network architecture. This will not be efficient, given that the CLEC may  
17 serve a different customer base than the incumbent and will likely use different (and more  
18 modern) technology. As a result, there is every reason to think that requiring the CLEC  
19 to mirror the ILEC's network architecture will be inefficient and not in the public  
20 interest. Therefore, all that should be required is a single POI interconnection  
21 architecture.

22 **Q. Please define a "point of interconnection" or "POI."**

23 A. In order for Level 3 and Qwest to exchange traffic between their respective customers,  
24 they must physically interconnect their networks. Per the FCC's rules, "interconnection"  
25

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<sup>5</sup> Total Telecommunications Services, Inc and Atlas Telephone Company, Inc v. AT&T Corp, *Memorandum Opinion Order*, FCC 01-84, ¶ 25 (released March 13, 2001).

1 refers to the physical linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic between  
2 customers subscribed to the respective networks.<sup>6</sup> A POI is simply the place where the  
3 two networks interconnect. It is also normally viewed as the financial and physical  
4 demarcation point that defines where one party's financial and operational obligations  
5 end and the other party's begin.

6 **Q. Who should bear the costs of interconnection?**

7 A. Basically, each provider should bear its portion of the cost. Each carrier's subscribers  
8 benefit from the ability to make calls to and/or receive calls from the other carrier's  
9 subscribers. Of course, each carrier is really only able to control the costs and activities  
10 on its own network, not on the other party's network. Therefore, it is sensible to require  
11 that each carrier be responsible for the costs of its own network, on its side of the POI.  
12 This is precisely what the FCC has required in Rule 51.703(b). This rule says that each  
13 carrier is fully responsible for the costs incurred in getting traffic from its network to the  
14 POI.<sup>7</sup>

15 **Q. What are the economic benefits of using a single POI per LATA?**

16 A. The key benefit of a single POI architecture is that it allows the carrier delivering traffic  
17 to aggregate that traffic onto a large, efficient transmission facility to the other carrier,  
18 while at the same time it allows the carrier receiving the traffic to route that incoming  
19 traffic in whatever manner is most efficient based on its own traffic and network. Now,  
20 obviously, a large established carrier would benefit by being able to require its dependent  
21 competitor to deliver traffic to each and every switch in the established carrier's network,  
22 but from an overall societal point of view that would be terribly inefficient.

23 **Q. How would the dominant provider benefit by requiring a CLEC to deliver traffic to  
24 every switch?**

25 <sup>6</sup> See *Local Competition Order* at ¶ 176.

<sup>7</sup> 51.703(b) states, "A LEC may not assess charges on any other telecommunications carrier for telecommunications traffic that originates on the LEC's network."

1 A. The most obvious benefit would be increasing the cost of the potential competitor and  
2 thereby disadvantaging that CLEC with respect to its entrance to, and operation in, the  
3 market. The FCC recognized the ILEC incentive to disadvantage CLECs. Specifically,  
4 the FCC noted:

5 Given the incumbent LEC will be providing interconnection to its  
6 competitors pursuant to the purpose of the 1996 Act, the LEC has the  
7 incentive to discriminate against its competitors by providing them less  
8 favorable terms and conditions of interconnection than it provides itself.<sup>8</sup>

9 Requiring multiple POIs disadvantages the CLECs by increasing their costs. If  
10 the ILEC had the same customer and traffic characteristics as the CLEC it would also  
11 operate with a single POI. As such, requiring multiple POIs for CLECs when they are  
12 not justified is both anticompetitive and discriminatory, not to mention inefficient from  
13 both an economic and engineering perspective.

14 **Q. You said that Qwest’s proposal would increase Level 3’s costs. Is that common in  
15 arbitrations?**

16 A. Yes, unfortunately such proposals are common. It is not in the best interest of Qwest to  
17 make it easy or cheap for Level 3 to interconnect. In fact, former Chairman Powell  
18 recognized the ILEC incentives when he stated, “At times, as I have observed, it is  
19 tempting to play the regulatory “game” in the way the incumbents often do. Begging for  
20 regulatory protection. Seeking regulatory favoritism that raises the costs of your  
21 competitors.”<sup>9</sup>

22 **Q. Why would it be inefficient to require a competitor to interconnect at many  
23 different points on the ILEC’s network?**

24 A. In economic terms, the location of the ILEC’s switches reflects a series of choices made  
25 over a period of decades about the placement of multiple switches as compared to the use

<sup>8</sup> See Local Competition Order at ¶ 218.

<sup>9</sup> Prepared Remarks of Michael K. Powell, Before the Association of Local Telecommunications Services; “Local Competition...CLECs in the Midst of an Explosion.” Convention, Las Vegas, Nevada; December 2, 1998.

1 of transport from a smaller number of switches to reach subscribers. In the past when  
2 switching was relatively cheap and transmission was relatively expensive, it made sense  
3 to have lots of dispersed switches, with relatively short transport links between switches  
4 and to subscribers. Today, however – although the costs of both switching and transport  
5 have declined over time – switching is relatively expensive and transmission is relatively  
6 cheap, and it makes economic sense to have a small number of switches and relatively  
7 long transmission links to customers. So, even if it was perfectly efficient and rational  
8 for an ILEC to deploy a particular set of switches at various locations in the past, that  
9 does not remotely mean that it would be efficient and rational for a CLEC to duplicate  
10 those choices today, given the technologies available today and the particular geographic  
11 distribution of the CLEC’s customers.

12 **Q. Does the Act recognize these differences between ILECs and CLECs?**

13 A. Yes. The 1996 Act recognizes this by giving the CLEC, not the ILEC, the choice of  
14 where to interconnect as long as it is technically feasible. Section 251(c)(2) of the Act  
15 says that the CLEC can choose to exchange traffic at “any technically feasible point”  
16 within the ILEC’s network. The criterion is technical feasibility, not the economic  
17 impact – albeit minimal - on the ILEC of having to carry its traffic to or from the  
18 technically feasible point selected.

19 **Q. Please explain why it makes sense for the CLEC to have the discretion to select POIs  
20 and not the ILEC.**

21 A. It makes perfect economic sense, in light of the principles discussed above, to give the  
22 choice of where to locate a POI or POIs to the CLEC and not the incumbent.<sup>10</sup> As noted  
23 above, the incumbent built out its network over many years in response to a wide variety  
24 of then existing economic, technological and demographic conditions. It would be

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
<sup>10</sup> Indeed, footnote 464 of the *Local Competition Order* states, “Of course, requesting carriers have the right to select points of interconnection at which to exchange traffic with an incumbent LEC under section 251(c)(2).” Many orders since the *Local Competition Order* have supported the CLEC right to have only one POI per LATA.

1 irrational to assume that a competitor would find it economic to re-create anything like  
2 the same network today, even to serve the same customer base — and of course no  
3 competitor will have the kind of ubiquitous customer base as the ILEC. It follows that,  
4 where it is economically reasonable for the CLEC to establish multiple POIs at multiple  
5 points on the ILEC’s network, it will do so. In fact, Level 3 has a history of working  
6 closely with the ILECs in the establishment of additional POIs where traffic warrants  
7 such additional facilities. But where it does not choose to establish multiple POIs, that is  
8 solid evidence that there is no economic reason to require it to do so. To the contrary,  
9 forcing the CLEC to take account of the ILEC’s network architecture choices — beyond  
10 requiring the POI to be “within” the ILEC’s network — essentially forces the legacy  
11 network design choices and the inefficiencies of the ILEC onto the CLEC.

12 **Q. As you understand the FCC’s rules, do ILECs such as Qwest have the right to select**  
13 **POIs?**

14 **A.** No. As just noted, that right is limited to CLECs and does not extend to ILECs. The  
15 FCC explained that this is so because the ILEC “has the incentive to discriminate against  
16 its competitors by providing them less favorable terms and conditions of interconnection  
17 than it provides itself.”<sup>11</sup> Eventually, of course, the hope is that CLEC networks become  
18 sufficiently robust such that the erstwhile dominant ILEC literally cannot afford to treat  
19 CLECs badly: “competition eventually will eliminate the ability of an incumbent local  
20 exchange carrier to use its control of bottleneck local facilities to impede free market  
21 competition.”<sup>12</sup>

22 **Q. Are you saying that a CLEC, such as Level 3, will always establish a single POI in a**  
23 **LATA?**

<sup>11</sup> See Local Competition Order at ¶ 218.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at ¶ 4.

1 A. No. The specifics will vary from case to case, but depending on the traffic mix and  
2 where the CLEC already has facilities, it may well make sense for the CLEC to establish  
3 more than one POI in a LATA. The point, however, is that the choice has to be with the  
4 CLEC, not the ILEC. This is because the ILEC will always want to force the CLEC to  
5 interconnect at points that are favorable to the ILEC and its legacy network. From my  
6 economic perspective, it is clear that the FCC was correct when it recognized the ILEC  
7 incentives and abilities at paragraph 10 of the *Local Competition Order* wherein it states  
8 in pertinent part:

9           Because an incumbent LEC currently serves virtually all subscribers in its  
10 local serving area, an incumbent LEC has little economic incentive to  
11 assist new entrants in their efforts to secure a greater share of that market.  
12 An incumbent LEC also has the ability to act on its incentive to discourage  
13 entry and robust competition by not interconnecting its network with the  
14 new entrant's or by insisting on supracompetitive prices or other  
15 unreasonable conditions for terminating calls from the entrant's customers  
16 to the incumbent LEC's subscribers.

13 **Q. Has Level 3 established more than one POI per LATA in certain areas?**

14 A. Yes. In the past, Level 3 has negotiated interconnection agreements that provide for  
15 additional POIs if demand or other circumstances merited such an investment. However,  
16 establishing additional POIs should be based on the need for such additional POIs, and on  
17 traffic patterns, not on Qwest's attempts to force inefficient costs onto Level 3.  
18 Moreover, just because Level 3 may have multiple POIs in certain LATAs does not mean  
19 that Level 3 should be forced to add POIs in every LATA at Qwest's discretion. To the  
20 contrary, from an economic perspective, the fact that in some cases Level 3 has  
21 voluntarily established multiple POIs, but in other cases has not, simply confirms that it is  
22 not efficient to require Level 3 to mirror Qwest's network architecture. Rather, this fact  
23 demonstrates, on the basis of actual market behavior, that Level 3 needs flexibility to  
24 establish one or more POIs where it is efficient to do so. Qwest's proposal would not  
25 give Level 3 that flexibility.

The Commission should be extremely wary of establishing any obligations in an

1 interconnection agreement that would require Level 3 to deploy significant amounts of  
2 capital in situations where Level 3 would not independently find doing so in its interest.  
3 Since the implosion of the competitive telecommunications industry in 2000, it has  
4 become increasingly difficult for CLECs to attract capital; investors are understandably  
5 wary of this sector. SBC has asserted in testimony filed in other state arbitrations that  
6 more than 200 CLECs have ceased operations in SBC territory since 2000. I have no  
7 reason to think that the numbers would be any different for Qwest's territory. Forcing  
8 CLECs to build or lease facilities, where margins are slim or nonexistent, simply to  
9 require the CLEC to duplicate the ILEC's legacy network, would only worsen CLEC  
10 prospects for attracting capital. Such a result would be inefficient from both an economic  
11 and operational standpoint and has consequently been regularly rejected by regulators as  
12 not in the public interest. The likely result of such a requirement would not be more  
13 CLEC investment; it would be fewer CLECs entering the market because the  
14 regulatorily-imposed capital requirements do not justify the investment.

15 **Q. But regardless of the FCC rules and economic principles discussed above, isn't it**  
16 **unfair to Qwest to give Level 3 the choice of where and whether to establish POIs?**

17 **A.** Not at all. As discussed elsewhere in my testimony, the ILEC is entitled to be paid for  
18 the work it does in terminating traffic it receives from the CLEC at a single POI or  
19 multiple POIs, just as the CLEC is entitled to compensation for terminating traffic its  
20 receives from the ILEC. Although this point is sometimes obscured by the FCC's  
21 \$0.0007 rate for ISP-bound traffic, the FCC's rules for reciprocal compensation provide  
22 for a higher level of payment if traffic has to be routed through an ILEC tandem switch to  
23 get to the appropriate end office than if the traffic does not have to go through the tandem  
24 switch.<sup>13</sup>

25  
<sup>13</sup> Under the FCC's rules for compensation for ISP-bound calling, an ILEC may choose to avoid paying reciprocal compensation rates for calls its customers make to ISPs by opting into the FCC's special regime for such traffic. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Inter-Carrier

1 It is not “unfair” to Qwest to have to bear certain costs arising from its status as an  
2 incumbent; or, rather, if it is “unfair,” that “unfairness” is simply a means to compensate  
3 for the fact that it was “unfair” to the public and to potential competitors to allow Qwest  
4 to operate in a monopoly environment for many decades prior to the enactment of the  
5 1996 Act. A policy decision to promote competition, such as that embodied in the 1996  
6 Act, necessarily and inevitably means that certain advantages that would otherwise  
7 accrue to the incumbent are being taken away.

8 Obviously an ILEC such as Qwest does not benefit from accommodating Level 3  
9 in its efforts to attract customers, and would like to charge Level 3 as much as possible  
10 for whatever it is called upon to do. That is simply rational behavior by a monopolist  
11 trying to hold on to its monopoly position. The reason interconnection agreements are  
12 subject to statutory standards as to their content, and regulatory oversight via the  
13 arbitration process, is precisely to allow regulators such as this Board to *prevent* the  
14 ILEC from refusing to reasonably accommodate CLECs and to charge CLECs too much  
15 for what the ILEC has to do.

16 In this regard, a useful model to consider is what would happen if there were three  
17 competing carriers in an area, each serving one third of the customer base, with each  
18 carrier’s customers equally valuable to the others. In this competitive situation, if any  
19 one of the carriers remained unconnected, it would suffer terribly in the marketplace, and  
20 so each carrier would be highly motivated to establish efficient interconnection with the  
21 others, at some convenient point to all three. None of them would be in a position to

22 Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, *Order on Remand and Report and Order*, 16 FCC Rcd 9151 (2001) at ¶¶ 89-  
23 93. If the ILEC does so it only has to pay \$0.0007 per minute for calls its customers make to ISPs. But if the ILEC  
24 chooses to protect itself economically by electing to only *pay* \$0.0007 per minute for ISP-bound traffic, it is obliged  
25 to accept all traffic from the competitor network for termination at the same \$0.0007 rate, whether that traffic is  
delivered at a tandem, at an end office, or elsewhere. So it is probably true that Qwest would not get any higher  
payment from Level 3 for traffic Level 3 delivers at the tandem (or elsewhere) as compared to at the end office. But  
that is only because *Qwest* has chosen to protect itself from having to pay full reciprocal compensation rates for ISP-  
bound traffic by opting into the FCC’s regime. From this perspective, giving up additional tandem-based  
compensation for inbound traffic is part of the price Qwest has chosen to pay in exchange for paying less for  
outbound ISP-bound traffic.

1 dictate to the others where interconnection would occur, and none of them would be in a  
2 position to demand that the others pay for its own costs of running its network.  
3 Obviously we do not have anything like this kind of competitive situation today, but this  
4 hypothetical model provides a good reference point for what makes sense in establishing  
5 interconnection arrangements under the 1996 Act.

6 Whenever Qwest makes a demand for multiple POIs, or for Level 3 to have to pay  
7 for the privilege of terminating traffic originated by Qwest's customers, or for Level 3 to  
8 split its traffic among different trunk groups based on Qwest's preferred categorization  
9 when one trunk group would be more efficient, it is reasonable to ask whether one of our  
10 three hypothetical equally-sized competitive carriers could ever hope to get its two  
11 competitors to agree to such a thing. If not, then it's a pretty good bet that Qwest isn't  
12 being reasonable but, instead, is trying to abuse its position as the dominant provider of  
13 services.

14 **Q. Please summarize your testimony regarding establishing a single POI.**

15 A. Competitors using new technology should not be limited by the historic decisions of  
16 Qwest network planners who established switch locations and local calling areas decades  
17 ago based upon the more limited technology available to them. Those decisions, even if  
18 justifiable and supportable then, would certainly be different today given the changes in  
19 technology. As such, forcing competitors to conform to the ILEC's legacy network  
20 topology would be inconsistent with the goals of the *Local Competition Order* and the  
21 Act. Rather, the promotion of efficient markets dictates that a competitor such as Level 3  
22 only be required to interconnect in a specific area where its own assessment of traffic  
23 volumes, customer demand, and available technology justify investment in facilities  
24 needed to reach that area. Level 3 should not be required to extend its facilities to POIs  
25 unilaterally identified by Qwest; instead, Qwest is obligated to provide interconnection  
for Level 3 facilities at POIs which Level 3 properly determines best serve its network

1 architecture and business plans. This concept actually allows Qwest to continue to design  
2 a network around its own needs, while allowing Level 3 to do the same thing.

3 **Q. How should the Commission decide this issue?**

4 A. The Commission should adopt Level 3's position which permits the flexibility of a single  
5 POI per LATA and reject Qwest's proposed language.

6 **Q. What types of traffic should be exchanged over the physical interconnection  
7 facilities established at any given POI?**

8 A. Any and all traffic should be exchanged over the physical facilities at a given POI. It is  
9 economically irrational to require the establishment of different physical facilities for  
10 different "types" of traffic when one facility will handle the traffic efficiently.

11 **Q. Is this conclusion limited to whether the traffic falls into the regulatory category of  
12 "telecommunications" or not?**

13 A. No. Once a POI has been established, Qwest should be required to use that POI (and  
14 should be required to permit Level 3 to use that POI) for the exchange of all types of  
15 traffic, whether they are classified as "telecommunications services," "information  
16 services," "local services," "access services," "251(b)(5) traffic," or anything else.  
17 Assuming that transmitting a particular type of traffic over a given physical facility is  
18 technically feasible, it makes no economic sense to require the establishment of  
19 additional, duplicative facilities based on the regulatory classification of the traffic. As I  
20 noted above, the FCC recognized as much at the very inception of competition under the  
21 1996 Act: once a physical interconnection arrangement has been established for any type  
22 of traffic for which such an arrangement is properly called for under the Act, the  
23 competitor is permitted to use that same physical arrangement to deliver other types of  
24 traffic as well, even including traffic for which interconnection might *not* be legally  
25 required.<sup>14</sup> The express policy behind this requirement is to prevent ILECs from forcing

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<sup>14</sup> See Local Competition Order at ¶ 995.

1 competitors to establish duplicative physical facilities for which there is no independent  
2 technical or economic need.

3 **Issue 2: Separate Trunking**

4 **Q. Please summarize the dispute regarding separate trunking.**

5 A. Mr. DuCloo provides technical testimony on this point. Very briefly, a trunk is a single  
6 transmission path between switching systems, and a trunk “group” is a number of trunks  
7 similarly configured to act together to carry traffic between the same two end points.  
8 While more traffic requires more trunks in a trunk group, as Mr. DuCloo explains, the  
9 number of trunks needed to handle the traffic does not rise at the same rate as the traffic.  
10 It does not take twice as many trunks to handle twice as much traffic; it takes fewer than  
11 twice as many. Traffic engineering is similar for telecommunications and road design.  
12 You can gain efficiencies in handling traffic by adding trunks (or lanes on a highway),  
13 but the relationship is not one to one. These efficiencies are important to controlling  
14 costs for both the ILEC and the CLEC.

15 **Q. Please explain.**

16 A. By efficiencies, I mean that the more traffic that can be included within a single trunk  
17 group, the less money it costs both carriers to handle the traffic. On the other hand, for  
18 any given volume of traffic between two switches, the more trunk groups into which the  
19 traffic is subdivided, the more expensive it becomes at the margin to carry it.

20 Given this, Level 3, understandably, wants to include all of the traffic exchanged  
21 between any given Qwest switch and Level 3 on a single trunk group. From an economic  
22 perspective, the technical “trunking efficiencies” noted above guarantee that a single  
23 large trunk group will be the most economically efficient solution. Qwest, however,  
24 wants to require that the traffic to and from a particular Qwest switch be routed over  
25 separate trunk groups based not on the technical characteristics of the traffic, but rather

1 on the regulatory classification of the traffic. This makes no economic sense, and  
2 Qwest's position should be rejected.

3 Adding insult to injury, not only does Qwest want Level 3 to artificially divide  
4 traffic into different trunk groups based on economically irrelevant (for these purposes)  
5 regulatory classifications, Qwest wants to *charge* Level 3 for establishing these separate  
6 trunk groups. Qwest is entirely responsible for the cost of getting its traffic to Level 3;  
7 and, while Level 3 is entirely responsible for paying Qwest intercarrier compensation for  
8 terminating Level 3-originated traffic, that compensation is set on a per-minute basis and  
9 does not entail Qwest charging Level 3 for setting up trunks at all.

10 **Q. How would Level 3 be disadvantaged by the language proposed by Qwest?**

11 A. As Mr. DuCloo explains at page 22 of his testimony, under Qwest's proposal, Level 3  
12 will have to spend more on switch programming, trunk administration, trunk ports on  
13 switches, digital cross-connect systems, and fiber optic terminals; and at some point will  
14 have to spend more on switches themselves. There is no operational or economic  
15 justification for imposing these costs on CLECs. Their only purpose would be to  
16 disadvantage CLECs vis-a-vis Qwest. In fact, Qwest's proposal would increase its own  
17 costs as well. I urge the Board to reject Qwest's proposal.

18 **Q. Are there operational problems associated with Level 3 using trunks to carry both  
19 local and toll traffic?**

20 A. No. As Mr. DuCloo explains, there are no technical or operational problems associated  
21 with Level 3's proposal to combine different "types" of traffic on a single trunk group  
22 that would be avoided by separate trunks. Requiring separate trunk groups, as suggested  
23 by Qwest, results in a deadweight economic loss to society, as I noted earlier.

24 **Q. Is there any justification for requiring separate trunks for different types of traffic?**

25 A. No. Qwest says that traffic subject to different billing rates should be put onto separate  
trunks in order to keep the billing straight, but that makes no sense from an economic

1 perspective either.

2 **Q. Why not?**

3 A. There is a simple, inexpensive way to keep the billing straight that does not entail the  
4 significant network inefficiencies of separate trunking. All that is needed is for the  
5 parties to periodically sample the traffic going between them and develop factors for how  
6 much is subject to reciprocal compensation, how much to access charges, etc. Then all  
7 that is required is to keep track of the total minutes exchanged in a given month, apply  
8 the factors, and determine the appropriate bill. Mr. DuCloo addresses this in his  
9 testimony as well.

10 **Q. Have these factors been used in the past for billing purposes?**

11 A. Yes. These billing factors have been used for decades with great success.

12 **Q. Have other regulators accepted the fact that billing can be accomplished using  
13 factors rather than inefficient separate trunks?**

14 A. Yes. The use of factors to allocate traffic on a particular facility or trunk into different  
15 billing categories has a long history in the telecommunications business going back at  
16 least as far as the early 1980s, when “other common carriers” used business lines to  
17 connect to the network to provide their competing long distance services. Eventually  
18 they became known as “Feature Group A” lines, and the industry agreed to certain  
19 assumptions regarding total traffic on such lines and on how much of the traffic was  
20 interstate versus intrastate.

21 Since the passage of the 96 Act, commissions have approved the use of  
22 jurisdictional factors that allows the efficient use of interconnection trunks. For instance,  
23 the Michigan Public Service Commission found in a Sprint/Ameritech arbitration  
24 proceeding that:

25 It appears to the Commission that economic entry into the market requires  
that Sprint be permitted to use its existing trunks for *all* traffic whenever

feasible.<sup>15</sup> (emphasis added) In Texas, the Commission there ordered Verizon to allow Sprint to carry local, intrastate intraLATA and intrastate interLATA traffic on the same trunks.<sup>16</sup> Other states, such as Indiana, have required the use of PLUs (percentage local usage) or other allocators (e.g., PIUs – percent interstate usage) to reflect the jurisdiction of traffic on such trunks for billing purposes.<sup>17</sup>

1  
2  
3  
4 **Q. Other than billing, is there any other argument for Qwest to require separate**  
5 **trunking arrangements for different types of traffic?**

6 A. No, in fact, Qwest would be disadvantaging itself by requiring CLECs to separate traffic  
7 of different types onto multiple trunk groups rather than carrying all traffic on a single  
8 trunk group. To put it simply, not only is it most efficient for Level 3 to carry all traffic  
9 on a single trunk group, it is efficient from Qwest’s perspective as well. **Both** parties  
10 would have to pay extra for trunk ports, switch capacity, etc., if traffic is artificially  
11 forced onto separate trunk groups.

12 **Q. Why would Qwest insist on contract language that would be disadvantageous to**  
13 **itself?**

14 A. I cannot answer for Qwest, but it would appear that Qwest is willing to absorb costs in  
15 the short term in order to disadvantage or drive its competitors from the marketplace.<sup>18</sup>  
16 This is, of course, totally contrary to the public interest in the development of efficient  
17 competitive telecommunications networks, but might well be rational from the  
18 perspective of Qwest’s private interest. This is particularly true if, as Mr. DuCloo notes,  
19 Qwest has excess capacity of trunk ports on its switches. If Qwest has already invested

20  
21 <sup>15</sup> In the Matter of the Application of Sprint Communications Company, L.P. for Arbitration to Establish an  
Interconnection Agreement with Ameritech Michigan, MPSC Case No. U-11203, Order Approving Arbitration  
Agreement with Modifications, Jan 15, 1997.

22 <sup>16</sup> Texas Public Utility Commission; *In the Matter of the Petition of Sprint for Arbitration with Verizon*; Docket No.  
24306; Final Order Modifying Arbitration Award and Approving Interconnection Agreement; dated February 17,  
23 2004.

24 <sup>17</sup> Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission; In the Matter of AT&T Petition for Arbitration with Indiana Bell  
Telephone Company; Cause No. 40571-INT-03; November 20, 2000. Further, in its Revised Response to Level 3  
25 Request No. 22 in the Illinois arbitration, SBC Illinois stated, “SBC Illinois uses a PLU methodology to distinguish  
local versus intraLATA toll in cases where the CLEC does not provide calling party number (CPN) information.”

<sup>18</sup> Given the fragile nature of the competitive telecommunications industry, it would take very little to eliminate  
facilities-based competition. As such, any decision that disadvantages competitors as compared to Qwest will  
further diminish the chances for effective competition.

1 in an excessive number of trunk ports (perhaps due to overly aggressive estimates of  
2 growth of traffic on its network), then it will, in effect, have trunk ports “lying around”  
3 unused. This would create a situation in which the short-run cost to Qwest of requiring  
4 inefficient trunking is relatively small, while the cost to Level 3 of using inefficient  
5 trunking would be large. Qwest could therefore engage in the classic monopolist’s  
6 strategy of increasing competitors’ costs at very little cost to itself by seeking and  
7 obtaining a regulatory obligation on competitors to use inefficient trunking. This is  
8 entirely rational behavior from Qwest’s perspective of trying to maximize shareholder  
9 wealth through protection of its monopoly, but of course it makes no sense at all from the  
10 perspective of the public interest.

11 **Q. What are your recommendations regarding this issue?**

12 A. I recommend that the Board adopt Level 3’s position and allow it to carry different types  
13 of traffic on one trunk group. Qwest’s proposed language would result in the inefficient  
14 use of the network, additional costs to all carriers, and give an unfair competitive  
15 advantage to Qwest.

16 **Issue 3 – VNXX, ISP-Bound Traffic and RUF**

17 **Q. Please introduce these issues.**

18 A. The ISP-bound traffic and “virtual NXX” issues are very much intertwined. By way of  
19 background, ISPs providing dial-up service receive local calls from their customers in  
20 order to allow those customers to access the Internet. ISPs do not market and do not  
21 expect to receive long distance calls from customers seeking to connect to the Internet  
22 because long distance calls have traditionally had per-minute charges associated with  
23 them.<sup>19</sup> Thus, making long-distance calls to ISPs is uneconomical for end users. For the  
24 ISP, this means that it is important for end users to be able to reach the ISP by means of a

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
<sup>19</sup> Of course it is technically possible for a person to use a long-distance call to connect to his or her ISP. The point of this testimony is that experience has shown that consumers are not willing to pay long-distance charges to access the Internet.

1 local call.

2 It is, however, terribly inefficient for an ISP to establish a physical presence in  
3 each and every ILEC-established local calling area where the ISP might have customers  
4 or where it might want to attract customers. Therefore, it is quite common — I would go  
5 so far as to call it the standard operating arrangement in the industry — for ISPs to obtain  
6 telephone numbers from CLECs or ILECs that are “local” to areas where they have  
7 customers. Because the CLECs or ILECs are providing local numbers for the ISPs,  
8 where they have no local presence, the service is similar to the FX service offered by  
9 Qwest in most states in its serving territory, at least from an end user customer perspective,  
10 although it is sometimes referred to as “FX-like,” “virtual NXX,” or “VNXX.”

11 **VNXX for ISP-Bound Traffic**

12 **Q. Does the ISP have facilities in each of the local calling areas where they have local**  
13 **numbers?**

14 A. Not usually. As noted above, it would be very expensive for the ISPs to put their own  
15 facilities in the many thousands of local calling areas around the country. Instead, they  
16 purchase local services from carriers like Qwest and Level 3 in those areas where they  
17 have or desire customers.

18 **Q. Does Level 3 provide such a service to ISPs? And, if so, what is it called?**

19 A. Yes. Level 3 sells its direct inward dial (“DID”) service to ISPs where it operates as or  
20 like a CLEC. This service arrangement is often referred to as “virtual NXX,” or  
21 “VNXX” service. It is just another name for the functionality that has been provided for  
22 decades by ILECs under the name “foreign exchange,” or “FX” service. Mr. DuCloo  
23 describes FX service in his testimony.

24 **Q. Does Qwest provide FX service in Oregon?**

25 A. The answer to that question is not entirely clear. In response to Level 3 Request No.  
024IS which asked whether Qwest offers FX service in Oregon, Qwest stated: “The

1 Commission discontinued FX service in Oregon with certain customers grandfathered in  
2 1983.” Qwest refers to the Commission’s Order 83-839, issued in Docket No. UT 5, in  
3 which the Commission “put a freeze” on the provision of traditional FX services, in  
4 response to concerns arising out of the break-up of AT&T. However, in response to  
5 Level 3 Request No. 3I, Qwest has also indicated that two of its affiliates offer Internet  
6 access services in Oregon—but so far has refused to provide any details about how that  
7 service is delivered. So, at this point, all we know is that Qwest may be offering FX  
8 services to certain grandfathered customers in Oregon, and may be delivering VNXX or  
9 FX-like services to its ISP customers, through its affiliates operating in Oregon. (See  
10 Exhibit TJG-2)

11 **Q. Please explain the market for VNXX service.**

12 A. Where ISPs, such as Earthlink or AOL, want to offer dial-up Internet access, they contact  
13 an ILEC or CLEC to purchase local service. In Level 3’s situation, the ISP subscribes to  
14 Level 3’s DID service and is assigned local numbers from the Level 3 switch in the  
15 exchanges where dial-up service is being offered and where Level 3 offers service. The  
16 ISPs advise their customers of the numbers that the ISPs have been assigned, who then  
17 program the numbers into their computers for accessing the Internet. The customers’  
18 computers then dial these local numbers; the calls are routed from the ILEC to Level 3 in  
19 exactly the same manner as other local calls; and Level 3 delivers the calls to the ISP  
20 being called.

21 **Q. Please explain how the VNXX calls are routed in the network.**

22 A. Actually, “VNXX” calls are routed in exactly the same way as non-VNXX local calls.  
23 There is nothing special about these calls.

24 **Q. Please explain.**

25 A. Assume that Level 3 has a single POI in a LATA located at a Qwest tandem in Portland.  
Assume further that Level 3 serves all of its ISPs who have customers in that LATA from

1 a single switch that Level 3 uses to serve the entire LATA. Now assume that a customer  
2 of one of those ISPs, who takes telephone exchange service from Qwest, uses his or her  
3 computer's modem to connect to the ISP. In that case, Qwest's switch will receive the  
4 number as dialed by its customer, recognize it as a Level 3 number, and direct the call to  
5 a trunk group that connects to Level 3's POI. Level 3 then accepts the traffic and routes  
6 it to its switch and then on to its ISP customer. This is the same manner in which all  
7 local calls are routed.

8 **Q. If this call handling is the same as all local calls then what is the dispute between**  
9 **Qwest and Level 3?**

10 **A. If** the Qwest customer making the call happens to be in the same Qwest retail originating  
11 local calling area as the ISP's equipment, then Qwest would say that the call is "local"  
12 and there is no dispute. On the other hand, if the ISP's gear is in a different Qwest retail  
13 local calling area, Qwest says that the call is a "VNXX" call and is not local.

14 **Q. Does the location of the ISP equipment impact the jurisdiction of the call, the**  
15 **handling of the call, or the cost of getting the call to the POI?**

16 **A.** No. Qwest's responsibilities, and costs, are absolutely identical regardless of the location  
17 of the ISP equipment. In each case, a locally dialed call is routed to the POI for  
18 termination. All that Qwest does is determine that the dialed telephone number is a Level  
19 3 number and ship the call off to Level 3 on an appropriate trunk group. And, what Level  
20 3 does is the same in both cases: it recognizes the incoming traffic as bound for one of its  
21 customers and sends the traffic on to that customer. The only difference is whether the  
22 ISP's gear receiving the call is at the end of a short circuit (close to Level 3's switch, and  
23 thus often not in the calling party's retail local calling area) or a longer circuit (away from  
24 Level 3's switch, and thus, possibly, in the calling party's retail local calling area).  
25 Regardless of the distance, it is Level 3's responsibility to complete the call. In other  
words, it is Level 3 and **not** Qwest that is providing the Level 3 ISP customer with the

1 VNXX functionality. It makes no economic sense whatsoever to make any distinction in  
2 Qwest's financial obligations depending on whether Level 3 uses a long or short circuit to  
3 connect its customers to its switch.

4 As the discussion above (I hope) illustrates, from an economic perspective,  
5 Qwest's proposal is completely arbitrary and irrational. There is simply no sound  
6 economic basis upon which to distinguish these two situations.

7 **Q. Is the routing of VNXX calls different in any way from the routing of any other local**  
8 **call?**

9 A. No. As described above, and by Mr. DuCloo, it is exactly the same.

10 **Q. Do the physical end points of the calls have any impact on Qwest's responsibilities**  
11 **or costs?**

12 A. No. In response to Level 3 Request No. 023, Qwest stated in pertinent part, "The costs  
13 Qwest incurs do not vary based upon the physical location of the Level 3 customer."  
14 (See Exhibit TJG-3)

15 **Q. Is Qwest's proposal consistent with the historical handling of locally-dialed calls?**

16 A. No. As Mr. DuCloo explains, Qwest is actually trying to invent a new way to classify  
17 calls that has no operational or historical basis in the telephone network. Qwest's  
18 proposal is to rate and distinguish traffic based on the actual physical location of  
19 customers as opposed to the numbers the customers are assigned. This flies in the face of  
20 the way calls have been rated since the establishment of the PSTN. What's really going  
21 on here is that it is more efficient for a new competitor like Level 3 to offer FX-like  
22 services to ISPs than it is for Qwest to do so, leading to ISPs "voting with their feet" and  
23 moving their business to competitors like Level 3. Qwest is essentially trying to recoup  
24 its losses in the marketplace, and to punish its competitors, for being willing and able to  
25 offer a more efficient serving arrangement to the ISPs.

**Q. Did Qwest agree in discovery that calls are not rated based on the actual physical**

1 **location of customers?**

2 A. Yes. In response to Level 3 Request No. 1-029, Qwest said that, “The telephone numbers  
3 that Qwest uses for call routing purposes are assigned to its end users based on NPA-  
4 NXXs associated with specific LCAs in the state.” (See Exhibit TJG-4) This is  
5 consistent with Level 3’s position in this proceeding. Qwest also noted correctly that  
6 “...switches do not route calls based on specific addresses stored within the switches....”  
7 (Id.) Indeed, neither Qwest’s tariffs nor its switches contain customer specific location  
8 information that would be required to implement Qwest’s proposal in this proceeding.

9 **Q. Are there negative consequences associated with Qwest’s proposal to treat VNXX**  
10 **calls as something other than local calls?**

11 A. Yes. Qwest’s proposal would impose substantial additional costs on ISPs. If Level 3 is  
12 required to pay access charges for calls it receives to its ISP customers who use VNXX  
13 services (or is denied intercarrier compensation for such calls), Level 3’s cost of doing  
14 business will increase and it may have to raise its rates to its ISP customers. In order to  
15 deal with those rate increases, the ISP customers will either have to deploy otherwise  
16 unnecessary and inefficient facilities so that their equipment actually is in the calling  
17 parties’ local calling areas (thereby relieving Level 3 of some of the economic burdens  
18 caused by Qwest’s proposal), or keep the efficient equipment arrangement but be subject  
19 to the higher costs. Either way, the ISPs may have to raise rates to their customers, and,  
20 particularly for some areas, may simply decline to provide dial-up access, in order to  
21 minimize costs. This is plainly contrary to the public interest.

22 Moreover, Qwest’s proposal to not pay reciprocal compensation on calls to  
23 customers who are not “physically located” in the same local exchange, or require toll  
24 treatment for such calls, would give Qwest yet another competitive advantage over  
25 CLECs. Qwest’s proposal would improperly benefit its own affiliated ISPs, increase the  
cost of Internet access and reduce competition to the detriment of consumers and the

1 economy. Qwest's proposal would put in jeopardy any competition for ISP dial-up  
2 services, thereby depriving consumers of choice in what has become an indispensable  
3 information, education and economic tool, especially for those still significant portions of  
4 customers who cannot yet afford the costs of dedicated broadband connections to the  
5 Internet.

6 **Q. Are there any additional negative consequences associated with Qwest's proposal?**

7 A. Yes. In developing its multi-billion dollar nationwide network, Level 3 did not simply  
8 duplicate the network of Qwest and other ILECs. Instead, Level 3 has deployed a  
9 softswitch technology-based network which is much less capital intensive, and much  
10 more location insensitive than traditional ILEC networks. Using this advanced  
11 technology, Level 3's network is designed to operate most efficiently by serving large  
12 regions of the country on an integrated basis. It is indifferent to ILEC legacy central  
13 office boundaries. By taking advantage of such technology shifts, competitors such as  
14 Level 3 can participate in the natural progression of market development, perhaps even  
15 "pulling even" with ILECs who, by virtue of the presence of their existing networks have  
16 incredible inherent market advantages. Qwest's proposal would therefore at least  
17 partially negate efficiencies Level 3 designed into its network — which efficiencies Level  
18 3 continues to invest in, as demonstrated by its recent decision to upgrade its network  
19 with optical equipment capable of carrying up to 400 gigabits per second over a single  
20 fiber strand. These efficiencies are of no use to anyone, however, if Qwest is permitted  
21 to burden Level 3 with such arbitrary and unwarranted interconnection and compensation  
22 provisions.

23 **Q. Does Qwest offer ISPs a service similar to VNXX service?**

24 A. Yes. In addition to standard offerings such as FX, Qwest offers its "Wholesale Dial"  
25 service. According to its online literature, Qwest's service "provides a secure, reliable,  
cost-effective dial-up network infrastructure solution for ISPs. The service provides the

1 ISPs' end users with seamless dial-up functionality that remains transparent.” One of the  
2 benefits touted by Qwest is the availability of “local access telephone numbers.”<sup>20</sup> So, as  
3 you can see, this is yet another example of services provided to ISPs for the purpose of  
4 providing local dial-up access for consumers in areas where the ISPs may or may not  
5 have a physical presence.

6 **Q. You noted earlier that Qwest wants to impose access charges on Level 3 in**  
7 **connection with calls that Qwest customers make to ISPs served via FX numbers. Is**  
8 **there any economic rationale for doing so?**

9 A. No. VNXX service is a “local” service to which access charges do not apply. Instead,  
10 the VNXX calls are ISP-bound calls that terminate (from Qwest’s perspective) at the  
11 POI. Neither Qwest nor Level 3 imposes any sort of toll charge in connection with calls  
12 to FX numbers. As a result, there is no economic basis on which any sort of “access  
13 charge” could be imposed.

14 **Q. What would be the economic effect of adopting Qwest’s proposal?**

15 A. It would simply eliminate an efficient and technologically advanced means of providing  
16 dial-up Internet access to customers throughout the State of Oregon . This would  
17 obviously be counter to the public interest.

18 **Q. Is dial-up access to the Internet important to the state of Oregon?**

19 A. Yes. Dial-up for Internet access is the universal service equivalent of a primary line for  
20 voice service. In other words, not all people can afford broadband access to the Internet,  
21 but most people have a single line with which they can access the Internet over a dial-up  
22 connection. Dial-up access is especially important where broadband connections are not  
23 yet available.

24 Rural residents report less broadband availability than their counterparts in  
25 suburban or urban areas of the United States. In fact, a Pew Internet & American Life

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<sup>20</sup> See “Qwest Wholesale Dial” in its Product Catalog. <http://www.qwest.com/pcat>

1 Project study found that rural residents were two to five times more likely to not have  
2 broadband availability than urban and suburban residents.<sup>21</sup> Pew research associate Peter  
3 Bell also noted:

4 While gaps in income and age appear to be partly responsible, the  
5 difficulty of getting Internet access remains a big barrier for many rural  
6 users. Major Internet service providers accounted for about 40 percent of  
7 use among rural residents, whose most frequent reason for choosing an  
8 ISP was that it was the only one available to them. In contrast, online  
9 users in metropolitan areas usually chose from a range of providers by  
10 seeking the best deal.<sup>22</sup>

11 Although dial-up Internet access is critical in rural areas, as a percentage of the total, it is  
12 decreasing. While DSL and cable broadband connections showed large increases, from  
13 2001 to 2003 dial-up Internet access actually decreased by 12.7 percent. The same study  
14 showed that in rural areas 74.7 percent of the Internet connections were dial-up  
15 connections.<sup>23</sup>

16 **Q. Is dial-up still an important source of Internet access in Oregon?**

17 A. Yes. Although broadband is growing dramatically and dial-up is becoming a smaller  
18 proportion of the total, there is still a significant portion of the population that obtains  
19 Internet access by dial-up.<sup>24</sup>

20 **Q. Despite the downward trend in dial-up access, do you think it will remain an  
21 important type of internet access?**

22 A. Yes. As I mentioned above, dial-up is critical to rural consumers where broadband is not  
23 always available and competitive alternatives are limited. Garry Betty, Earthlink's chief  
24 executive stated:

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25 <sup>21</sup> See Pew Internet & American Life Project; Rural Areas and the Internet; "Rural American's Internet Use Has  
Grown, But They Continue to Lag Behind Others"; February 17, 2004.

<sup>22</sup> See TodaysSeniorsNetwork.com; "Rural use of Internet continue to lag, Costs, access remain barriers, new data  
shows."; June 7, 2005.

<sup>23</sup> See "A Nation Online: Entering the Broadband Age"; U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics  
Administration, National Telecommunications and Information Administration; September, 2004, at 5, 13.

<sup>24</sup> See e.g., "High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of December 31, 2004", Industry Analysis and  
Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau (FCC Rel. July 2005).

1 Despite compelling reasons to switch to broadband, dial-up lines will  
2 always have a place in American homes. Customers in rural areas where  
3 broadband is not available will continue to log on via a dial-up connection;  
4 other people may prefer the simplicity of dial-up.<sup>25</sup>

5 For those citizens of Oregon that either can't afford or don't have available to them  
6 broadband connectivity, dial-up internet provides access to one of – if not the –  
7 cornerstone of economic and community vitality. The ability to apply for jobs, get  
8 weather reports, crop price forecasts on a real time basis, participate in educational  
9 endeavors, gain community information on safety and health, and communicate via e-  
10 mail to friends and businesses, form the very fabric of commerce in the world we live in.  
11 Non-participation or lack of access, simply stated, sentences portions of our society to  
12 second class status. Without vigorous competition to ensure low cost dial-up Internet  
13 access, both the citizens of Oregon and the State itself will suffer irreparable harm as a  
14 significant segment of the population is unable to compete economically, advance  
15 educationally and establish community ties.

16 **Q. It is sometimes suggested by ILECs that industry numbering guidelines prohibit the**  
17 **assignment of numbers for FX or similar services. Is that true?**

18 **A.** No. In fact Section 2.14 of the Numbering Guidelines specifically identifies FX services  
19 as being eligible for number assignment:

20 **2.14 It is assumed from a wireline perspective that CO**  
21 **Codes/blocks allocated to a wireline service provider are to be utilized**  
22 **to provide service to a customer's premise physically located in the**  
23 **same rate center that the CO codes/blocks are assigned.** Exceptions  
24 exist, for example tariffed services such as with the exception of foreign  
25 exchange service.<sup>26</sup> **(emphasis added)**

26 If it were improper or a violation of the guidelines to use virtual NXX codes then all  
27 ILECs nationwide who are currently providing FX and FX-type services, including  
28 Qwest, would be in violation today.

<sup>25</sup> See, The New York Times, "Dial-up Internet Going the Way of Rotary Phones"; June 21, 2005.

<sup>26</sup> Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions; Sponsor of Industry Numbering Committee; Central Code (NXX) Assignment Guidelines; Released May 28, 2004.; hereinafter referred to as "Numbering Guidelines".

1 **Q. What are NXX number blocks?**

2 A. NXX number blocks are groups of numbers assigned to carriers for distribution to  
3 customers. The blocks contain 10,000 numbers, or where number pooling is in place,  
4 blocks of 1,000 numbers. The NXX codes are the fourth through sixth digits of a ten-  
5 digit telephone number. For instance, the NXX code for my telephone number (303-424-  
6 4433) is 424. These codes are used as rate center identifiers for rating and routing of  
7 calls.

8 **Q. Must a carrier be local number portability (“LNP”) capable to participate in  
9 number pooling?**

10 A. Yes. Level 3 is LNP capable and able to participate in number pooling. Further, Level 3  
11 normally utilizes only numbers in the 4,000 block within a 10,000 block. By not  
12 contaminating the numbers in the other thousand blocks, should jeopardy occur and  
13 pooling be imposed, Level 3 could return numbers to the administrator.

14 **Q. How are carriers assigned an NXX code?**

15 A. Carriers who meet the criteria for the assignment of central office codes, like Level 3 and  
16 Qwest, request and are assigned blocks of telephone numbers by the numbering  
17 administrator.<sup>27</sup> The numbers are loaded into Level 3’s switch and referenced in the  
18 Local Exchange Routing Guide (“LERG”) for routing by other carriers. Level 3 then  
19 assigns numbers from within those blocks to its customers as requested.

20 **Q. How is the rating of calls impacted by the numbers assigned to customers?**

21 A. Standard industry practice and procedure provides that each NXX code is associated with  
22 a particular rate center within a local calling area. A single rate center may have more  
23 than one NXX code, but each code is assigned to one and only one rate center. This  
24 uniquely identifies the end office switch serving the NXX code, so that each carrier that  
25 is routing a call knows which end office switch to send the call to.

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<sup>27</sup> See Numbering Guidelines, Section 4.0.

1 **Q. Is it uncommon for NXX codes to be assigned to customers who are not physically**  
2 **located in the local calling area where the NXX is “homed” or assigned?**

3 A. No. It is also not uncommon for the “routing” point for an NXX code to differ from the  
4 “rating” point for the same code. In other words, although an NXX may be rated or  
5 homed to a specific end office switch, the routing information in the LERG may specify  
6 that calls to that NXX code be routed to a different wire center, for instance, a tandem.

7 **Q. Is it improper or against any rules for CLECs to provide numbers to their**  
8 **customers?**

9 A. No, not at all. In fact, as noted above, carriers must request numbers in order to provide  
10 service in a particular exchange. Based on my review of Level 3’s practices, Level 3  
11 utilizes and abides by the Numbering Guidelines.<sup>28</sup> In fact, Level 3 has developed its  
12 own LNP solution and has established stringent guidelines that result in very efficient use  
13 of numbering resources.

14 **Q. Please summarize your testimony on VNXX traffic.**

15 A. Level 3’s FX-like traffic is a competitive response to ILEC FX service and is the primary  
16 service used by ISPs to provide local dialing for their customers. Calls to such FX and  
17 VNXX numbers are local calls in every sense of the phrase and do not impose any  
18 additional costs or responsibilities on Qwest. The CLEC assignment of numbers in  
19 exchanges where they serve is completely consistent with the industry numbering  
20 guidelines. Qwest’s proposal to impose access charges on these calls should be rejected.

21 **Relative Use Factor**

22 **Q. Please describe the dispute between the parties regarding the “relative use factor,”**  
23 **or “RUF.”**

24 A. Prior to recent FCC rulings, it was commonplace for some CLECs to call on the ILEC to  
25 establish a transmission facility (often called an “entrance facility”) running from some

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<sup>28</sup> The Numbering Guidelines require compliance as a condition of receiving numbers.

1 point on the ILEC's network to the CLEC's switch location. In its original ruling  
2 regarding interconnection under the 1996 Act,<sup>29</sup> the FCC addressed the question of rates  
3 applicable to "transmission facilities that are dedicated to the transmission of traffic  
4 *between* two networks" (emphasis added), and ruled that the cost should be apportioned  
5 in accordance with relative use of the facility. In cases where a CLEC obtained an  
6 entrance facility from the ILEC to connect to the CLEC's switch, the effect of this rule  
7 (which remains embodied in 47 CFR § 51.709(b)) was to reduce the ILEC's charges for  
8 the entrance facility based on what proportion of the traffic going over it was ILEC-  
9 originated, as opposed to CLEC-originated. This is, generally speaking, what the "RUF"  
10 is intended to capture (although Qwest's particular language does not properly track the  
11 FCC's rule). The FCC's *Triennial Review Remand Order*, however, held that entrance  
12 facilities were no longer to be provided — at least not at TELRIC-based rates — for these  
13 purposes.<sup>30</sup> This suggests that even Qwest would not think that the RUF would apply  
14 between the parties.

15 **Q. Would a RUF apply for facilities on either side of the POI?**

16 A. No. RUF logically applies in the case of a "meet point" interconnection at a POI. The  
17 very definition of a "meet point" or POI-based form of interconnection is that each party  
18 bears its own costs for the facilities needed to get to the POI. The FCC in the *Local*  
19 *Competition Order* specifically recognized that each party is responsible for its own costs  
20 in getting to a meet point, and expressly found that it is perfectly reasonable to require the  
21 ILEC to build out new facilities at its own expense, at least to some extent, to  
22 accommodate a meet point interconnection.<sup>31</sup> Level 3 seeks to interconnect with Qwest  
23 at a single meet-point POI per LATA. It follows that there will not *be* any situations in  
24

25 <sup>29</sup> See Local Competition Order at ¶ 1062.

<sup>30</sup> See FCC **Order on Remand** in WC Docket No. 04-313, CC Docket No. 01-338, Released February 4, 2004 at ¶ 137.

<sup>31</sup> See Local Competition Order at ¶ 553.

1 which there are “transmission facilities that are dedicated to the transmission of traffic  
2 between” Level 3 and Qwest. Instead, the two networks will *meet* at a particular *point*,  
3 with no inter-network facilities, per se, at all. Each party will be responsible for the costs  
4 of its own facilities up to the POI, which will constitute a “meet point” as the FCC used  
5 that term.

6 **Q. What is Level 3’s concern with the RUF?**

7 A. Level 3 is concerned that Qwest is trying to use the “RUF” concept to avoid the  
8 economic logic of establishing a meet-point POI. Level 3 is concerned, specifically, that  
9 even with a single POI, Qwest will try to assign some of the costs of its own network on  
10 its side of the POI to Level 3, based in some way on the amounts of traffic that Qwest  
11 sends Level 3 and vice versa. That is unreasonable in and of itself.

12 **Q. Assuming there was a reason to make a RUF calculation, does Qwest put forth a  
13 correct algorithm?**

14 A. No. Qwest gets it wrong on the calculation, by seeking to unfairly and unreasonably  
15 exclude the substantial volumes of ISP-bound traffic it sends to Level 3 from calculating  
16 the “relative use” of the facilities it uses to deliver that traffic. As described below, there  
17 is no basis for excluding ISP-bound traffic from any RUF calculation that might be  
18 appropriate in light of the way Level 3 and Qwest actually interconnect.

19 **Q. Why is this a contentious issue?**

20 A. It is contentious because of the traffic flows. A significant amount of the traffic  
21 exchanged between Qwest and Level 3 will be calls originated by Qwest customers for  
22 termination to Level 3 customers. The Level 3 customers tend to be ISPs. The one-way  
23 nature of this type of traffic means that Qwest would pay for the vast majority of the  
24 interconnection facilities assuming such a calculation were to be made.

25 **Q. Is that unfair?**

A. No. To the contrary, it is completely consistent with the economic rule of cost-causation

1 and the accounting concept of matching. It is the Qwest customers who are originating  
2 the calls to the Level 3 customers. As such, Qwest is originating the traffic and causing  
3 the use and consequent costs of the network facilities. As such, the cost causer – Qwest –  
4 should pay for the costs. Further, Qwest customers are paying local rates to make those  
5 calls. As such, Qwest has both the revenues and the costs associated with the calls. To  
6 foist those costs on Level 3 while only Qwest enjoys the revenues would violate the  
7 matching principle. It would be unfair and inequitable for Qwest to impose those costs  
8 on Level 3.

9 Perhaps an example would help clarify the situation. In some cities, people must  
10 pay tolls to travel on roads. The tolls supposedly pay for the cost of the roads. Now  
11 suppose a new amusement park is opened and traffic on the toll roads to that amusement  
12 park is significant. Forcing the amusement park to pay the tolls associated with the  
13 peoples' choice to visit the amusement park would be unfair. After all, the people  
14 decided to visit the amusement park and they decided to drive to the facility. It was their  
15 decision to go and as such, they are the cost-causers with respect to the tolls.

16 Forcing Level 3 to pay for the Qwest facilities when Qwest originates the vast  
17 majority if not all of the calls, would be like charging the amusement park for the cost of  
18 getting the people to the park. Qwest customers purchase Qwest local service and decide  
19 to make the calls and it is Qwest's obligation – under the reciprocal compensation rules –  
20 to pay Level 3 for the cost of terminating those calls. Rule 51.703(b) specifically states  
21 that "a LEC may not assess charges on any other telecommunications carrier for local  
22 telecommunications traffic that originates on the LEC's network."<sup>32</sup>

23 Note in this regard that one of the effects of consumer demand for dial-up Internet  
24 access was to lead consumers to purchase additional telephone lines into their homes in  
25 order to allow the consumers to use dial-up Internet access while also engaging in voice

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<sup>32</sup> 47 C.F.R., §51,703(b).

1 telephone conversations on the other line. These second lines have almost exclusively  
2 been provided by the ILEC. As time goes on, of course, more and more people are  
3 switching from dial-up to broadband Internet access, which will simultaneously (from  
4 Qwest's perspective) lower second line revenues, increase DSL revenues, and lower  
5 intercarrier compensation payments for ISP-bound traffic. But looking only at the dial-  
6 up segment, Qwest has received and will continue to receive substantial additional  
7 revenues, in the form of second line revenues, in connection with its customers' calls to  
8 ISPs. Given this, any claim that Qwest has been or is being economically harmed by  
9 delivering ISP-bound calls without receiving access charges, or any claim that Qwest  
10 cannot afford to pay intercarrier compensation with respect to such calls, must therefore  
11 be viewed with great skepticism.

12 **Q. Is Qwest's position consistent with 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(b)?**

13 A. No. This rule is very straightforward and simple in its reading. Qwest may not assess  
14 charges on any other telecommunications carrier for telecommunications traffic that  
15 originates on its network. Qwest's position is just the opposite. Qwest wants to exclude  
16 the ISP-bound traffic, even though it is originated by its own customers, from the relative  
17 use calculation. There is simply no support for that position and it is clearly contrary to  
18 the existing rules and the economic principles of cost causation.

19 **Q. Is there any other reason to exclude ISP-bound traffic from the relative use  
20 calculation?**

21 A. No. Again, it is clear that RUF calculations are not appropriate in a POI situation. But if  
22 for some reason the Board were to decide to apply the RUF, ISP traffic must be included  
23 in the calculation. Simply because the calls are directed to an ISP does not change the  
24 fact that these are locally dialed telecommunications calls that traverse the circuit  
25 switched network in exactly the same fashion as any other local call. The effect of  
Qwest's mathematical manipulation of the formula is to transfer to Level 3 a large

1 portion of the costs of delivering Qwest-originated traffic. There is simply no economic,  
2 engineering or public policy reason to exclude the traffic from the calculation.

3 **Q. Please summarize your position on the relative use calculation.**

4 A. There is no need to apply a RUF calculation on each side of the POI since each party is  
5 responsible for getting its traffic to the POI. Nevertheless, if a RUF calculation is made it  
6 must include the ISP-bound traffic. The traffic is telecommunications traffic originated  
7 by Qwest customers and, as such, is the responsibility of Qwest.

8 **Issue 4 – VoIP**

9 **Q. Please introduce this issue and the dispute between Level 3 and Qwest.**

10 A. IP-Enabled services, such as IP-enabled voice traffic -- the most common form of which  
11 is referred to as voice over Internet protocol or VoIP -- are becoming more common as  
12 they offer significant efficiencies from both an economic and network operations  
13 perspective. Qwest and Level 3 disagree on the proper regulatory treatment of these  
14 services. To the extent that this Board has regulatory authority over any aspect of these  
15 services, Level 3 urges the Board take a “hands-off” approach to regulation. As  
16 described below, VoIP constitutes a form of “enhanced” or “information” service, like  
17 Internet access, so that under existing FCC rules it would not be appropriate for such  
18 services to be subject to access charges in any event. But putting aside that point, from  
19 an economic perspective it would be a mistake to subject VoIP services to traditional  
20 access charges, whether or not it would be permissible to do so from a legal or regulatory  
21 perspective. In contrast, Qwest encourages the Board to treat these services like  
22 traditional long distance calls, and impose access charges on this traffic, unless the VoIP  
23 provider’s point of presence is in the same local calling area as the called party.

24 **Q. What is voice over internet protocol or “VoIP” traffic?**

25 A. Mr. DuCloo discusses this in more detail. Briefly, VoIP services involve using the same  
network that carries Internet traffic to carry packetized voice communications. Because

1 voice data packets can be dispersed among other types of Internet traffic, such as e-mail  
2 messages, web pages, Instant Messaging conversations, music downloads from iTunes or  
3 similar services, etc., VoIP doesn't use as much bandwidth as in a circuit-switched  
4 network. This makes phone calls essentially as cheap to transmit as e-mail.<sup>33</sup> Indeed,  
5 VoIP is a good example of the convergence of computers, telephones and television into  
6 a single and more efficient integrated information environment.

7 **Q. Please describe the fundamental differences between VoIP calls and typical PSTN**  
8 **calls.**

9 **A.** In the simplest of terms, VoIP is an information service application that uses the Internet  
10 backbone and discrete data packets to deliver real-time voice communications. Rather  
11 than voice information being transmitted across the traditional circuits of the PSTN, VoIP  
12 uses the Internet Protocol, and the Internet backbone, or some other private IP network.  
13 In addition to this difference in transmission, VoIP calling, being IP-enabled, facilitates  
14 the introduction and integration all sorts of potential capabilities not present with PSTN  
15 circuit switched calls.<sup>34</sup> From a regulatory perspective the IP-based capabilities  
16 distinguish VoIP – an information service – from basic circuit-switched  
17 telecommunications services.

18 **Q. Is Qwest offering VoIP services today?**

19 **A.** Yes. On December 8, 2004, Qwest announced that its VoIP service (Qwest OneFlex™)  
20 is available to business customers nationwide. In that same press release Qwest noted  
21 that it offers a range of VoIP solutions including OneFlex™ Integrated Access,  
22 OneFlex™ Hosted VoIP and IP Centrex Prime.<sup>35</sup>

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24 <sup>33</sup> See Comments of VON Coalition in CC Docket No. 01-92, WC Dockets No. 02-361, 03-211, 03-266, 04-36;  
filed August 19, 2004, at page 2.

25 <sup>34</sup> For instance, when you have a missed call on Vonage service, you get an email detailing the call information  
(time, calling number, etc.). The features and capabilities of VoIP services are many and expanding.

<sup>35</sup> See Qwest Press Release entitled, "Qwest Launches Expanded Nationwide VoIP Service for Businesses."  
Released December 8, 2004.

1 **Q. Has Qwest admitted in discovery that its OneFlex™ service provides up to five**  
2 **virtual numbers that allow people to call the subscriber on a local instead of a toll**  
3 **basis?**

4 A. Yes. I have attached Qwest's Response to Level 3 Request No. 17A-S1, in which Qwest  
5 admits that Qwest Communications Corporation ("QCC") does offer OneFlex™ with  
6 virtual numbers. (See Exhibit TJG-6)

7 **Q. How does Qwest price its Qwest OneFlex service?**

8 A. In Response to Level 3 Request No. 20A-S1, Qwest admitted that QCC  
9 offers its VoIP service for approximately \$30 per month, plus 5 cents per minute for  
10 long-distance calls with a \$2.99 month fee. The offering also includes a full range of  
11 features, including caller ID and voice mail. (See Exhibit TJG-7).

12 ILECs and CLECs alike are offering VoIP and other IP-Enabled services. For  
13 instance, and as discussed above, Qwest also offers its "Wholesale Dial" service.  
14 Qwest's service provides many of the same benefits and features as Level 3's service,  
15 including local dialing for dial-up Internet access. In fact, Qwest notes that its service  
16 provides a dial-up network architecture "...covering 85 percent of the U.S. population  
17 with a local call."<sup>36</sup>

18 **Q. Is there any economic justification for treating Level 3's services for ESPs that**  
19 **provide VoIP applications like typical telephone services?**

20 A. No. As noted by the FCC in its IP-Enabled Services NPRM, "Dial-up, or narrowband,  
21 Internet access utilizes the same PSTN infrastructure that telephone subscribers use to  
22 place traditional circuit-switched voice calls."<sup>37</sup> Broadband VoIP services do not impose  
23 any additional costs on the ILECs or their network either. As such, treating these  
24 services as if they were traditional long distance telecommunications services, and  
25

<sup>36</sup> See <<http://www.qwest.com/wholesale/pcat/wholesaledial.html>>.

<sup>37</sup> See FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; WC Docket No. 04-36; Released March 10, 2004, FN 32.

1 imposing their associated access charges, would allow ILECs to over-recover their  
2 network costs. At the same time, imposing these high call origination and termination  
3 rates on this new technology would suppress the use of the new services and, effectively,  
4 tax a new, efficient competitor for the benefit of the legacy, incumbent operator. Such a  
5 result would not only constitute a windfall for ILECs, but it would impede the natural  
6 efficiency of the market by unnecessarily burdening the development of new services.  
7 There is simply no economic justification for treating IP-Enabled services as if they were  
8 traditional services.

9 **Q. Is there precedent in the telephone industry for adopting policies that insulate**  
10 **nascent, innovative technologies from bearing an undue portion of the costs of the**  
11 **legacy network?**

12 A. Yes. In fact, the FCC has repeatedly recognized that encouraging innovation in this  
13 industry requires exempting nascent technologies and industry segments from providing  
14 support to the legacy network. One of the earliest examples of this policy dates from the  
15 1970s and early 1980s. Historically, all customer premises equipment (“CPE”) had been  
16 provided to customers by the regulated telephone company as part of telephone service.  
17 In the 1960s the FCC ruled (in a famous case called *Carterphone*) that the Bell System  
18 could not forbid the attachment of “foreign” devices that did not harm the network.<sup>38</sup> In  
19 response, the Bell System grudgingly permitted non-Bell CPE to be connected to the  
20 network, but imposed charges for “protective connecting arrangements” on that new  
21 CPE. The FCC responded to this anticompetitive tactic by establishing network  
22 interconnection specifications that applied to all CPE – Bell and non-Bell alike – and then  
23 by requiring the Bell System to provide all CPE on an unregulated basis, through a  
24

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25 <sup>38</sup> The Carterphone case started as a court case and the FCC (Docket Nos. 16942, 17073) then found the AT&T  
tariff to be unreasonable in that it prohibited the use of interconnection devices (the Carterphone) which did not  
adversely affect the telephone system. See FCC 68-661, Adopted June 26, 1968. I do not cite to this case for legal  
reasons, but only to show that unreasonable interconnection requirements are not in the public interest.

1 separate subsidiary. This allowed the then-nascent competitive CPE market to develop  
2 without having to pay a “legacy network tax” to the Bell System.

3 Another example of protecting nascent technologies and services from supporting  
4 the legacy network is the “ESP Exemption” from access charges. In 1983 the FCC ruled  
5 that even though interstate traffic to and from enhanced service providers could,  
6 logically, be subject to per-minute access charges, those charges would not apply. The  
7 explicit basis for this ruling was that this new market should not be required to pay rates  
8 that include subsidies for the traditional network. As noted above, I believe that this  
9 exemption directly applies to VoIP; but whether it literally applies or not, the *policy*  
10 behind it applies with full force here. VoIP is a nascent technology. There are many  
11 different forms of these services. Different entities are pursuing different technical and  
12 business strategies with respect to it. While we should not ask legacy network operators  
13 like Qwest to provide explicit subsidies to these new services, neither should we ask the  
14 new services to provide subsidies to legacy network operators like Qwest. It follows,  
15 from an economic perspective, that VoIP services should be permitted to interconnect  
16 with the legacy network at low, cost-based rates (either Section 251(b)(5) reciprocal  
17 compensation rates or the FCC-established \$0.0007 rate), rather than requiring those  
18 services to pay subsidy-laden access charges.<sup>39</sup>

19 Still another example is the FCC’s treatment of interconnection between landline  
20 LECs and wireless carriers. The FCC has long sought to encourage the growth of  
21 wireless services, free from the traditional constraints of the legacy network. In the *Local*  
22 *Competition Order* the FCC advanced this goal by establishing extremely broad  
23 geographic regions within which traffic exchanged between landline and wireless carriers  
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25 <sup>39</sup> Even though interstate access rates have been declining over time, they are still well above what an economist  
would view as a cost-based rate. To be cost-based from an economic perspective requires that a rate be in line with  
forward-looking incremental cost. Intercarrier compensation rates developed in connection with Section 251(b)(5)  
and ISP-bound calling reflect this approach; traditional access rates do not.

1 would be viewed as “local” and thus not subject to access charges.<sup>40</sup> As a result of this  
2 ruling, a call from a wireless customer in western Wisconsin to a landline customer in  
3 North Dakota (or vice versa) is “local,” as is a call from southern Iowa to southeastern  
4 South Dakota (or vice versa). Even though these calls would be treated as “long  
5 distance” calls within the traditional landline network, the wireless carrier only has to pay  
6 the low reciprocal compensation rate when it is the originating carrier, and the wireless  
7 carrier gets paid that rate — as opposed to paying originating access charges — when it is  
8 the terminating carrier. This decision to exempt large amounts of “long distance”  
9 wireless traffic from traditional access charges is, from an economic perspective, an  
10 explicit policy decision by the FCC — and one of which I completely approve — to  
11 exempt this relatively new, growing technology from having to pay subsidies to support  
12 the legacy network.

13 Just as sound regulatory policy exempted ESPs and wireless carriers from having  
14 to support the legacy network by paying access charges, so too sound regulatory policy  
15 supports exempting VoIP services from them as well. Again, this is true from an  
16 economic perspective independent of whether, as a legal or regulatory matter, the so-  
17 called “ESP Exemption” literally applies to VoIP traffic.

18 **Q. Has the FCC stated any positions regarding the economic impact of regulating**  
19 **VoIP?**

20 **A.** Yes. Former FCC Chairman Powell maintained this support for leaving IP-Enabled  
21 services unregulated at the FCC Forum on Voice over Internet Protocol in Washington,  
22 where he was quoted as saying, “As one who believes unflinchingly in maintaining an  
23 Internet free from government regulation, I believe that IP-based services such as VoIP  
24 should evolve in a regulation-free zone.” Then Chairman Powell went on to caution  
25 regulators with respect to IP-Enabled services’ regulation, saying “No regulator, either

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<sup>40</sup> *Local Competition Order* at ¶ 1036. See also 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(b)(2).

1 federal or state, should tread into this area without an absolutely compelling justification  
2 for doing so.”<sup>41</sup> Chairman Powell’s statements were part of a daylong forum to address  
3 business, technical, service feature and policy issues. Consistent with those statements,  
4 Chairman Powell stated,

5 The burden should be placed squarely on government to demonstrate why  
6 regulation is needed, rather than on innovators to explain why it is not.”<sup>42</sup>

7 **Q. Can you discuss further why the “hands-off” approach by the FCC has been so**  
8 **successful?**

9 **A.** Yes. By refraining from regulating technology, the FCC has eliminated the uncertainty  
10 that regulation sometimes imposes on the industry. This has allowed the capital markets  
11 and industry players to develop business plans and to invest capital to meet consumer  
12 demand.

13 It is very difficult for companies to develop products and technology when faced  
14 with a patchwork of regulatory requirements. The balkanization of the regulatory  
15 landscape increases not only the costs of compliance – if what constitutes compliance can  
16 even be determined – but also embeds an unacceptable level of inefficiency resulting  
17 from an inability to achieve economies of scale – economies of scale that the ILECs have  
18 enjoyed throughout their life cycle by virtue of their monopoly hold on the market. In  
19 other words, there should be one unified regulatory approach to VoIP services and  
20 technology, not a 50-state patchwork of regulation.

21 **Q. Are you suggesting that the states should simply follow the lead of the FCC?**

22 **A.** No. But the Federal approach has been very successful, so the states should seriously  
23 consider what benefits would derive from imposing multiple and perhaps wildly varying  
24 regulatory paradigms of their own. The Board should not apply access charges on IP-


25 <sup>41</sup> Opening Remarks of FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell at the FCC Forum on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) December 1, 2003 – Washington, D.C.

<sup>42</sup> See, US News & World Report, “Courting Calls – Telecom and Cable Firms Scramble to Offer Internet Calls”; by Mary Kathleen Flynn; Feb 2, 2004.


1 Enabled traffic until the FCC completes its investigations in the NPRMs (*Developing a*  
2 *Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime*, CC Docket No. 01-92 and *IP-Enabled*  
3 *Services*, WC Docket No. 04-36). The information gathered in the FCC proceedings will  
4 be useful in the evolving policy debate at the state level.

5 **Q. Is IP-enabled or VoIP traffic a significant part of the total traffic in the United**  
6 **States?**

7 A. No, but it is a growing percentage. In the two charts below, a comparison of various  
8 technologies is provided for 2003 and for 2008.<sup>43</sup> The first chart shows VoIP minutes  
9 were about one percent of total switched minutes of use in 2003. In the second chart, we  
10 see projected 2008 VoIP minutes to be about six percent of the total.



<sup>43</sup> These charts and their underlying data were taken from publicly available research sources and compiled for use in FCC Docket Nos. 04-36, 03-266.



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At the same time, we see dramatic increases in the projected amount of wireless minutes of use. So, while VoIP is getting significant attention today, the volumes and revenues associated with that traffic are not yet significant. Further, to the extent substitution is occurring in the market, the majority of that substitution is occurring because of wireless and not VoIP.

14 **Q. Won't ILECs be harmed by not receiving access charges on IP-enabled traffic, even if that traffic is a small percentage of the total?**

15  
16 A. No. First of all, as discussed above, the traffic to date is *de minimis*. Second, Qwest is being fully compensated for the traffic, albeit at a lower rate.

17  
18 **Q. If Qwest and the other RBOCs were correct about the impact on revenues and earnings, would that justify regulation of IP-enabled services?**

19  
20 A. No. Neither the ILECs' dire predictions of reduced local revenue (as market share shifts to VoIP providers), nor their dire predictions of all long distance traffic moving to VoIP to avoid access charges, even if they were correct, would justify common carrier regulation of IP-Enabled services. Moreover, as Verizon's Chief Executive Officer Seidenberg has stated: "Our view is to let cannibalization occur."<sup>44</sup> Seidenberg has said that while VoIP probably would reduce Verizon's local phone market share from 90% to

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<sup>44</sup> Communications Daily, (June 20, 2001).

1 60%, Verizon plans to participate in VoIP both as a backbone provider and as an ISP,  
2 “meaning more revenue per customer.”<sup>45</sup>

3 **Q. Has Qwest supported the federal “hands off” approach to IP-enabled services?**

4 A. Yes. Qwest has supported the FCC’s position against regulation of voice  
5 communications over the Internet. In an article dated December 5, 2003, Qwest’s CEO  
6 said, “...it would be inconsistent for the commission to regulate what’s known as “voice  
7 over Internet protocol” (VoIP) service when similar services, such as telephone via cable  
8 connection and wireless phones, are not regulated.” He went on to note that Qwest was  
9 launching its VoIP service in Minnesota and that VoIP could be more profitable to the  
10 company than traditional phone service, because it does not have the added costs of  
11 regulation.<sup>46</sup>

12 **Q. Have ILECs argued in the past that, in the absence of access charge revenues,  
13 ratepayers would be negatively impacted?**

14 A. Yes. The faulty premise of the previous RBOC argument has been that the impact of  
15 VoIP would negatively impact RBOC margins, resulting in the need for RBOCs to  
16 increase local rates. Today, however, as discussed above, the RBOCs are rapidly  
17 deploying VoIP services and embracing the new technology. Indeed, the RBOCs are  
18 supporting the FCC decision to not regulate these services, in part because of their  
19 offerings. In fact, on Qwest’s website it boasts about its IP network and its ability to  
20 provide “mission critical applications” such as VoIP:

21 For years, Qwest’s state-of-the-art IP network has been transferring voice  
22 and data across the globe for businesses of all sizes. The Qwest network  
23 has the capacity and advanced capabilities to support today’s mission  
24 critical applications such as Voice over IP (VoIP), as well as bandwidth-  
intensive business applications such as Enterprise Resource Planning,  
Customer Relationship Management, and other business-to-business  
functions.<sup>47</sup>

25 <sup>45</sup> *Id.*

<sup>46</sup> “Qwest Chief Backs Up FCC on Voice Over Internet”; Denver Post, Dec 5, 2003.

<sup>47</sup> See <http://www.qwest.com/about/qwest/network/index.html>.

1 AT&T has rolled out an aggressive VoIP initiative. Time Warner Cable has said  
2 that it is teaming with MCI and Sprint to offer VoIP services nationally. As such, this is  
3 not just a niche market, but one that all providers – ILECs, CLECs, cable providers, etc. –  
4 are rushing to participate in. As a U. S. News and World Report article concluded, “The  
5 bottom line: Consumers and businesses stand to benefit from lower prices and a wide  
6 range of sophisticated features.”<sup>48</sup>

7 **Q. Why would Qwest seek to impose access charges on VoIP traffic when it is**  
8 **deploying the service?**

9 A. Qwest is attempting to maintain its sinecure access revenue as a prop as it migrates itself  
10 to the IP platforms – the end result being a continuation of its predominant market  
11 position and the lack of competition.

12 **Q. Assuming VoIP is substituting for other services, are there offsets to the substitution**  
13 **occurring in the industry?**

14 A. Yes. Over the last few years, RBOCs have been the beneficiaries of gaining, for the first  
15 time, access to markets and associated revenues that have experienced tremendous  
16 growth. For example, Qwest announced last year that it had achieved one million DSL  
17 subscribers. This growth in DSL is directly related to the growing popularity of the  
18 Internet and related services, including VoIP. Specifically Qwest stated:

19 As a direct result of strategic DSL investments and initiatives, Qwest  
20 Communications International Inc. (NYSE: Q) announced today that it has  
21 achieved one million DSL subscribers. This represents an important  
22 milestone for the company and highlights the fact that Qwest’s four  
consecutive quarters of double-digit subscriber growth is outpacing the  
current industry average.<sup>49</sup>

23 Qwest’s consumer data and Internet revenues were up nearly 50 percent in 2004. Qwest  
24 also ended 2004 with 4.6 million long-distance lines, more than double the 2.2 million

25 <sup>48</sup> See, US News & World Report, “Courting Calls – Telecom and Cable Firms Scramble to Offer Internet Calls”;  
by Mary Kathleen Flynn; Feb 2, 2004.

<sup>49</sup> See Qwest Press Release entitled, “Qwest Achieves One Million DSL Subscriber Milestone”, released December  
13, 2004.

1 lines a year earlier. These significant gains, combined with reduction in the access line  
2 losses, shows that Qwest is not being harmed by the introduction of IP-Enabled services.

3 **Q. Please explain what you mean by “reduction in access line losses.”**

4 A. Prior to the passage of the 96 Act and the introduction of competition in the local market,  
5 ILECs had essentially 100 percent of the access lines. As CLECs entered to the local  
6 market, ILECs saw a reduction in the total number of access lines. Generally, the number  
7 of access lines lost increased over time. Since the demise of UNE-P, however, and the  
8 continuing consolidation in the CLEC market, the loss in access lines has decreased. In  
9 its fourth quarter 2004 financial reports, Qwest stated,

10 The company continues to make significant inroads in stemming  
11 competitive loss from facilities-based competitors. Resold lines declined  
12 28,000 sequentially as changes in the regulatory environment have  
13 reduced competition from UNE resellers.<sup>50</sup>

14 In that same document Qwest also noted under **Operational Highlights**, “Major drivers  
15 of Qwest’s revenue included operational progress in key growth areas, as well as  
16 improvement in access line losses.” So the “reduction in access line loss” is an indication  
17 that Qwest is taking back lines or losing fewer lines than in the past.

18 **Q. Is there any reason why VoIP and other IP-enabled offerings should not be given  
19 the freedom to develop?**

20 A. No. The Internet, VoIP applications, wireless, fixed wireless and other developing  
21 technologies only increase the value of local phone service. Today we are seeing  
22 significant investments in newer technologies (3G wireless, IP networks, IP CPE, PDAs,  
23 cable plant upgrades, automation and robotics, etc.) instead of continuing investment in  
24 the traditional circuit switched network.<sup>51</sup> These new investments and technologies are

25 <sup>50</sup> See Qwest News Release, “Qwest Improves in Key Growth Areas and Sees Margin Expansion in Fourth Quarter 2004.”

<sup>51</sup> I am not suggesting that investment in the traditional PSTN has stopped. Investments continue to be made, including maintenance on existing plant in service; the new investments, however, are focusing on new technologies.

1 resulting in more efficient provisioning of service, new features and mobility, and  
2 flexibility in managing services and features. In fact, IP-Enabled services, with their  
3 integrated voice and data features, will make business and personal use of  
4 communications much more efficient. This new trend is adding value to the economy  
5 and consumers (residential and business alike) are enjoying new services and flexibility.

6 **Q. Why are VoIP, wireless and other technologies so intriguing to consumers?**

7 A. There are several reasons why consumers are attracted to these new offerings. These  
8 new services offer flexibility that a fixed wireline cannot offer and, as such, provide an  
9 important complement to wireline services. Wireless and VoIP services are portable so  
10 you can in effect take your service with you. In certain environments this is a significant  
11 benefit to consumers. Efficiency, which always entails a cost advantage, is also a  
12 consumer issue. Further, companies will enjoy savings and efficiencies through virtual  
13 call centers, reduced commuting costs as employees work more efficiently from home  
14 and the obvious savings that competition will bring.

15 **Q. Have some states recognized the potential efficiencies and savings that VoIP might  
16 provide?**

17 A. Yes. A California Performance Review noted that “Moving to VoIP could reduce the  
18 state’s phone bill by between \$20 million and \$75 million a year.”<sup>52</sup> An article on the  
19 review also referred to findings that “VoIP technology has competitive features that  
20 would benefit the state. Internet-based phone calling has built-in benefits such as  
21 integrated caller ID, flexibility and network management tools that provide real-time  
22 monitoring of bandwidth.”<sup>53</sup>

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23  
24 <sup>52</sup> “The ultimate goal of the California Performance Review is to restructure, reorganize and reform state  
25 government to make it more responsive to the needs of its citizens and business community. Only by demonstrating  
through concrete action the responsiveness of state government can the public’s trust and confidence be regained.”  
<http://cpr.ca.gov/about/#cpr>. The entire report can be found on the Internet at <http://www.report.cpr.ca.gov/>. The  
quotation in the text above is from the fourth volume of that report, at SO15, Voice Over Internet Protocol Statewide  
Network Infrastructure.

<sup>53</sup> See, “California Urged to Use Open Source, VoIP”, c|net News.Com; August 13, 2004.

1 **Q. Please summarize your testimony regarding the regulation of IP-enabled services.**

2 A. The Board should adopt the same “hands off” policy that has been so successful in  
3 encouraging the development of Internet and other IP-based applications, including VoIP.  
4 Concurrently, the Board should reaffirm its commitment to competitors, especially  
5 competitors that serve the VoIP application community, that non-discriminatory, cost  
6 based, pro-competitive access to the network infrastructure of the ILECs will be  
7 vigorously promoted and enforced. Unless there is some specific need to regulate such  
8 offerings, they should be allowed to thrive or fail based on the market dynamics they face  
9 and create.

10 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

11 A. Yes, it does.

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## **Qualifications of Timothy J. Gates Exhibit TJG-1**

### **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE.**

- A. Prior to my current position with QSI Consulting, I was a Senior Executive Staff Member in MCI WorldCom's ("MCIW") National Public Policy Group. In this position, I was responsible for providing public policy expertise in key cases across the country and for managing external consultants for MCIW's state public policy organization. In certain situations, I also provided testimony in regulatory and legislative proceedings.

Prior to my position with MCIW in Denver, I was an Executive Staff Member II at MCI Telecommunications ("MCI") World Headquarters in Washington D.C.. In that position I managed economists, external consultants, and provided training and policy support for regional regulatory staffs. Prior to that position I was a Senior Manager in MCI's Regulatory Analysis Department, which provided support in state regulatory and legislative matters to the various operating regions of MCI. In that position I was given responsibility for assigning resources from our group for state regulatory proceedings throughout the United States. At the same time, I prepared and presented testimony on various telecommunications issues before state regulatory and legislative bodies. I was also responsible for managing federal tariff reviews and presenting MCI's position on regulatory matters to the Federal Communications Commission. Prior to my assignment in the Regulatory Analysis Department, I was the Senior Manager of Economic Analysis and Regulatory Policy in the Legal, Regulatory and Legislative Affairs Department for the Midwest Division of MCI. In that position I developed and promoted regulatory policy within what was then a five-state operating division of MCI. I promoted MCI policy positions through negotiations, testimony and participation in industry forums.

Prior to my positions in the Midwest, I was employed as Manager of Tariffs and Economic Analysis with MCI's West Division in Denver, Colorado. In that position I was responsible for managing the development and application of MCI's tariffs in the fifteen MCI West states. I was also responsible for managing regulatory dockets and for providing economic and financial expertise in the areas of discovery and issue analysis. Prior to joining the West Division, I was a Financial Analyst III and then a Senior Staff Specialist with MCI's Southwest Division in Austin, Texas. In those positions, I was responsible for the management of regulatory dockets and liaison with outside counsel. I was also responsible for discovery, issue analysis, and for the development of working relationships with consumer and business groups. Just prior to joining MCI, I was employed by the Texas Public Utility Commission as a Telephone Rate Analyst in the Engineering Division responsible for examining



telecommunications cost studies and rate structures.

I was employed as an Economic Analyst with the Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon from July, 1983 to December, 1984. In that position, I examined and analyzed cost studies and rate structures in telecommunications rate cases and investigations. I also testified in rate cases and in private and public hearings regarding telecommunications services. Before joining the Oregon Commissioner's Staff, I was employed by the Bonneville Power Administration (United States Department of Energy) as a Financial Analyst, where I made total regional electric use forecasts and automated the Average System Cost Review Methodology. Prior to joining the Bonneville Power Administration, I held numerous positions of increasing responsibility in areas of forest management for both public and private forestry concerns.

**Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL CREDENTIALS.**

A. I received a Bachelor of Science degree from Oregon State University and a Master of Management degree in Finance and Quantitative Methods from Willamette University's Atkinson Graduate School of Management. I have also attended numerous courses and seminars specific to the telecommunications industry, including the NARUC Annual and Advanced Regulatory Studies Program.

**Q. WHAT ARE YOUR CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES?**

A. Effective April 1, 2000, I joined QSI Consulting as Senior Vice President and Partner. In this position I provide analysis and testimony for QSI's many clients. The deliverables include written and oral testimony, analysis of rates, cost studies and policy positions, position papers, presentations on industry issues and training.

**Q. PLEASE IDENTIFY THE JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU HAVE TESTIFIED.**

A. I have filed testimony or comments on telecommunications issues in the following 44 states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. I have also filed comments with the FCC and made presentations to the Department of Justice.



I have testified or presented formal comments in the following proceedings and forums:

**Alabama:**

October 18, 2000; Docket No. 27867; Adelphia Business Solutions Arbitration with BellSouth Telecommunications; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Adelphia.

January 31, 2001; Docket No. 27867; Adelphia Business Solutions Arbitration with BellSouth Telecommunications; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Adelphia.

**Arkansas:**

September 7, 2004; Docket No. 04-0999-U; In the Matter of Level 3 Petition for Arbitration with Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. D/B/A SBC Arkansas; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3.

**Arizona:**

September 23, 1987; Arizona Corporation Commission Workshop on Special Access Services; Comments on Behalf of MCI.

August 21, 1996; Affidavit in Opposition to USWC Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; No. CV 95-14284, No. CV-96-03355, No. CV-96-03356, (consolidated); On Behalf of MCI.

October 24, 1997; Comments to the Universal Service Fund Working Group; Docket No. R-0000-97-137; On Behalf of MCI.

May 8, 1998; Comments to the Universal Service Fund Working Group; Docket No. R-0000-97-137; On Behalf of MCI.

November 9, 1998; Docket No. T-03175A-97-0251; Application of MCI metro Access Transmission Services, Inc. to Expand It's CCN to Provide IntraLATA Services and to Determine that Its IntraLATA Services are Competitive; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI WorldCom, Inc.

September 20, 1999; Docket No. T-00000B-97-238; USWC OSS Workshop; Comments on Behalf of MCI WorldCom, Inc.

January 8, 2001; Docket Nos. T-03654A-00-0882, T-01051B-00-0882; Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC, for Arbitration with Qwest Corporation; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3.



February 20, 2001; Superior Court of Arizona; Count of Maricopa; ESI Ergonomic Solutions, LLC, Plaintiff, vs. United Artists Theatre Circuit; No. CV 99-20649; Affidavit on Behalf of United Artists Theatre Circuit.

September 2, 2001; Docket No. T-00000A-00-0194 Phase II – A; Investigation into Qwest's Compliance with Wholesale Pricing Requirements for Unbundled Network Elements and Resale Discounts; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of WorldCom, Inc.

January 9, 2004; Docket No. T-00000A-03-0369; In the Matter of ILEC Unbundling Obligations as a Result of the Federal Triennial Review Order; Direct Testimony on Behalf of WorldCom, Inc. (MCI).

November 18, 2004; Docket No. T-01051B-0454; In the Matter of Qwest Corporation's Amended Renewed Price Regulation Plan; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Time Warner Telecom, Inc.

July 15, 2005; Docket No. T-03654-05-0350, T-01051B-05-0350; In the Matter of Level 3 Communications, LLC Petition for Arbitration with Qwest Corporation, Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3.

**Arkansas:**

September 7, 2004; Docket No. 04-099-U; In the Matter of Level 3 Petition for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252(b) with Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. D/B/A SBC Arkansas; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC.

**California:**

August 30, 1996; Application No. 96-08-068; MCI Petition for Arbitration with Pacific Bell; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 10, 1996; Application No. 96-09-012; MCI Petition for Arbitration with GTE California, Inc.; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

June 5, 2000; Docket No. A0004037; Petition of Level 3 Communications for Arbitration of an Interconnection Agreement with Pacific Bell Telephone Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC.



June 1, 2004; Docket No. A.04-06-004; Petition of Level 3 Communications for Arbitration with SBC; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3 Communications LLC.

**Colorado:**

December 1, 1986; Investigation and Suspension Docket No. 1720; Rate Case of Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 26, 1988; Investigation and Suspension Docket No. 1766; Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company's Local Calling Access Plan; Direct Testimony of Behalf of MCI.

September 6, 1996; MCImetro Petition for Arbitration with U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Docket No. 96A-366T (consolidated); Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 17, 1996; MCImetro Petition for Arbitration with U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Docket No. 96A-366T (consolidated); Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 26, 1996; Application of U S WEST Communications, Inc. To Modify Its Rate and Service Regulation Plan; Docket No. Docket No. 90A-665T (consolidated); Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 7, 1996; Application of U S WEST Communications, Inc. To Modify Its Rate and Service Regulation Plan; Docket No. Docket No. 90A-665T (consolidated); Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

July 18, 1997; Complaint of MCI to Reduce USWC Access Charges to Economic Cost; Docket Nos. 97K-237T, 97F-175T (consolidated) and 97F-212T (consolidated); Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

August 15, 1997; Complaint of MCI to Reduce USWC Access Charges to Economic Cost; Docket Nos. 97K-237T, 97F-175T (consolidated) and 97F-212T (consolidated); Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

March 10, 1998; Application of WorldCom, Inc. for Approval to Transfer Control of MCI to WorldCom, Inc.; Docket No. 97A-494T; Supplemental Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.



March 26, 1998; Application of WorldCom, Inc. for Approval to Transfer Control of MCI to WorldCom, Inc.; Docket No. 97A-494T; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

May 8, 1998; Application of WorldCom, Inc. for Approval to Transfer Control of MCI to WorldCom, Inc.; Docket No. 97A-494T; Affidavit in Response to GTE.

November 4, 1998; Proposed Amendments to the Rules Prescribing IntraLATA Equal Access; Docket No. 98R-426T; Comments to the Commission on Behalf of MCI WorldCom and AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc.

May 13, 1999; Proposed Amendments to the Rules on Local Calling Area Standards; Docket No. 99R-128T; Oral Comments before the Commissioners on Behalf of MCIW.

January 4, 2001; Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Arbitration with Qwest Corporation; Docket No. 00B-601T; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3.

January 16, 2001; Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Arbitration with Qwest Corporation; Docket No. 00B-601T; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Level 3.

January 29, 2001; Qwest Corporation, Inc., Plaintiff, v. IP Telephony, Inc., Defendant. District Court, City and County of Denver, State of Colorado; Case No. 99CV8252; Direct Testimony on Behalf of IP Telephony.

June 27, 2001; US WEST Statement of Generally Available Terms and Conditions; Docket No. 991-577T; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Covad Communications Company, Rhythms Links, Inc., and New Edge Networks, Inc.

January 26, 2004; Regarding the Unbundling Obligations of ILECs Pursuant to the Triennial Review Order; Docket No. 03I-478T; Direct Testimony on Behalf of WorldCom, Inc. (MCI).

February 18, 2005; Regarding Application of Qwest for Reclassification and Deregulation of Certain Products and Services; Docket No. 04A-411T; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Time Warner Telecom.

July 11, 2005; Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Arbitration with Qwest Corporation; Docket No. 05B-210T; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3.



**Connecticut:**

November 2, 2004; Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252(b) with Southern New England Telephone Company d/b/a/ SBC Connecticut; Level 3/SNET Arbitration; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC.

**Delaware:**

February 12, 1993; Diamond State Telephone Company's Application for a Rate Increase; Docket No. 92-47; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

**Florida:**

July 1, 1994; Investigation into IntraLATA Presubscription; Docket No. 930330-TP; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 5, 2000; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with BellSouth; Docket No. 000907-TP; Direct Testimony On Behalf of Level 3.

October 13, 2000; Petition of BellSouth for Arbitration with US LEC of Florida Inc.; Docket No. 000084-TP; Direct Testimony On Behalf of US LEC.

October 27, 2000; Petition of BellSouth for Arbitration with US LEC of Florida Inc.; Docket No. 000084-TP; Rebuttal Testimony On Behalf of US LEC.

November 1, 2000; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with BellSouth; Docket No. 000907-TP; Rebuttal Testimony On Behalf of Level 3.

June 11, 2004; Petition of KMC Telecom for Arbitration with Sprint Communications; Docket No. 031047-TP; Direct Testimony on Behalf of KMC Telecom III, L.L.C, KMC Telecom V, Inc., and KMC Data, L.L.C.

July 9, 2004; Petition of KMC Telecom for Arbitration with Sprint Communications; Docket No. 031047-TP; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of KMC Telecom III, L.L.C, KMC Telecom V, Inc., and KMC Data, L.L.C.

**Georgia:**

December 6, 2000; Docket No. 12645-U; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with BellSouth; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3.



December 20, 2000; Docket No. 12645-U; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with BellSouth; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Level 3.

**Idaho:**

November 20, 1987; Case No. U\_1150\_1; Petition of MCI for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

March 17, 1988; Case No. U\_1500\_177; Investigation of the Universal Local Access Service Tariff; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

April 26, 1988; Case No. U\_1500\_177; Investigation of the Universal Local Access Service Tariff; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 25, 2002; Case No. GNR-T-02-16; Petition of Potlatch, CenturyTel, the Idaho Telephone Association for Declaratory Order Prohibiting the Use of "Virtual" NXX Calling; Comments/Presentation on Behalf of Level 3, AT&T, WorldCom, and Time Warner Telecom.

**Illinois:**

January 16, 1989; Docket No. 83-0142; Appropriate Methodology for Intrastate Access Charges; Rebuttal Testimony Regarding Toll Access Denial on Behalf of MCI.

February 16, 1989; Docket No. 83-0142; Appropriate Methodology for Intrastate Access Charges; Testimony Regarding ICTC's Access Charge Proposal on Behalf of MCI.

May 3, 1989; Docket No. 89-0033; Illinois Bell Telephone Company's Rate Restructuring; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

July 14, 1989; Docket No. 89-0033; Illinois Bell Telephone Company's Rate Restructuring; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 22, 1989; Docket No. 88-0091; IntraMSA Dialing Arrangements; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

February 9, 1990; Docket No. 88-0091; IntraMSA Dialing Arrangements; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.



November 19, 1990; Docket No. 83-0142; Industry presentation to the Commission re Docket No. 83-0142 and issues for next generic access docket; Comments re the Imputation Trial and Unitary Pricing/Building Blocks on Behalf of MCI.

July 29, 1991; Case No. 90-0425; Presentation to the Industry Regarding MCI's Position on Imputation.

November 18, 1993; Docket No. 93-0044; Complaint of MCI and LDDS re Illinois Bell Additional Aggregated Discount and Growth Incentive Discount Services; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI and LDDS.

January 10, 1994; Docket No. 93-0044; Complaint of MCI and LDDS re Illinois Bell Additional Aggregated Discount and Growth Incentive Discount Services; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI and LDDS.

May 30, 2000; Docket No. 00-0332; Level 3 Petition for Arbitration to Establish and Interconnection Agreement with Illinois Bell Telephone Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

July 11, 2000; Docket No. 00-0332; Level 3 Petition for Arbitration to Establish and Interconnection Agreement with Illinois Bell Telephone Company; Supplemental Verified Statement on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

June 22, 2004; Docket No. 04-0428; Level 3 Petition for Arbitration to Establish an Interconnection Agreement with Illinois Bell Telephone Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

September 3, 2004; Docket No. 04-0428; Level 3 Petition for Arbitration to Establish an Interconnection Agreement with Illinois Bell Telephone Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

**Indiana:**

October 28, 1988; Cause No. 38561; Deregulation of Customer Specific Offerings of Indiana Telephone Companies; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

December 16, 1988; Cause No. 38561; Deregulation of Customer Specific Offerings of Indiana Telephone Companies; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI Regarding GTE.

April 14, 1989; Cause No. 38561; Deregulation of Customer Specific Offerings of Indiana Telephone Companies; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI Regarding Staff Reports.



June 21, 1989; Cause No. 37905; Intrastate Access Tariffs -- Parity with Federal Rates; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

June 29, 1989; Cause No. 38560; Reseller Complaint Regarding 1+ IntraLATA Calling; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 25, 1990; Cause No. 39032; MCI Request for IntraLATA Authority; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

April 4, 1991; Rebuttal Testimony in Cause No. 39032 re MCI's Request for IntraLATA Authority on Behalf of MCI.

September 2, 2004; Cause No. 42663-INT-01; In the Matter of Level 3 Communications, LLC Petition for Arbitration with SBC Indiana; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC.

October 5, 2004; Cause No. 42663-INT-01; In the Matter of Level 3 Communications, LLC Petition for Arbitration with SBC Indiana; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC.

**Iowa:**

September 1, 1988; Docket No. RPU 88\_6; IntraLATA Competition in Iowa; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 20, 1988; Docket No. RPU\_88\_1; Regarding the Access Charges of Northwestern Bell Telephone Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 25, 1991; Docket No. RPU-91-4; Investigation of the Earnings of U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 3, 1991; Docket No. NOI-90-1; Presentation on Imputation of Access Charges and the Other Costs of Providing Toll Services; On Behalf of MCI.

November 5, 1991; Docket No. RPU-91-4; Investigation of the Earnings of U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

December 23, 1991; Docket No. RPU-91-4; Investigation of the Earnings of US WEST Communications; Inc.; Supplemental Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

January 10, 1992; Docket No. RPU-91-4; Investigation of the Earnings of U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.



January 20, 1992; Docket No. RPU-91-4; Investigation of the Earnings of U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Surrebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

June 8, 1999; Docket NOI-99-1; Universal Service Workshop; Participated on numerous panels during two day workshop; Comments on Behalf of MCIW.

October 27, 1999; Docket NOI-99-1; Universal Service Workshop; Responded to questions posed by the Staff of the Board during one day workshop; Comments on Behalf of MCIW and AT&T.

November 14, 2003; Docket Nos. INU-03-4, WRU-03-61; In Re: Qwest Corporation; Sworn Statement of Position on Behalf of MCI.

December 15, 2003; Docket Nos. INU-03-4, WRU-03-61; In Re: Qwest Corporation; Sworn Counter Statement of Position on Behalf of MCI.

July 20, 2005; Docket No. ARB-05-4; In the Matter of Level 3 Communications, LLC Petition for Arbitration with Qwest; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3.

#### **Kansas:**

June 10, 1992; Docket No. 181,097-U; General Investigation into IntraLATA Competition within the State of Kansas; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 16, 1992; Docket No. 181,097-U; General Investigation into IntraLATA Competition within the State of Kansas; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

August 31, 2004; Docket No. 04-L3CT-1046-ARB; In the Matter of Arbitration Between Level 3 Communications LLC and SBC Communications; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC.

#### **Kentucky:**

May 20, 1993; Administrative Case No. 323, Phase I; An Inquiry into IntraLATA Toll Competition, an Appropriate Compensation Scheme for Completion of IntraLATA Calls by Interexchange Carriers, and WATS Jurisdictionality; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

December 21, 2000; Case No. 2000-404; Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Arbitration with BellSouth; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3.



January 12, 2001; Case No. 2000-477; Petition of Adelphia Business Solutions for Arbitration with BellSouth; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Adelphia.

**Louisiana:**

December 28, 2000; Docket No. U-25301; Petition of Adelphia Business Solutions for Arbitration with BellSouth; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Adelphia.

January 5, 2001; Docket No. U-25301; Petition of Adelphia Business Solutions for Arbitration with BellSouth; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Adelphia.

**Maryland:**

November 12, 1993; Case No. 8585; Competitive Safeguards Required re C&P's Centrex Extend Service; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

January 14, 1994; Case No. 8585; Competitive Safeguards Required re C&P's Centrex Extend Service; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

May 19, 1994; Case No. 8585; Re Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc.'s Transmittal No. 878; Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

June 2, 1994; Case No. 8585; Competitive Safeguards Required re C&P's Centrex Extend Service; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 5, 2001; Case No. 8879; Rates for Unbundled Network Elements Pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Rebuttal Testimony on behalf of the Staff of the Public Service Commission of Maryland.

October 15, 2001; Case No. 8879; Rates for Unbundled Network Elements Pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Surrebuttal Testimony on behalf of the Staff of the Public Service Commission of Maryland.

**Massachusetts:**

April 22, 1993; D.P.U. 93-45; New England Telephone Implementation of Interchangeable NPAs; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

May 10, 1993; D.P.U. 93-45; New England Telephone Implementation of Interchangeable NPAs; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.



**Michigan:**

September 29, 1988; Case Nos. U\_9004, U\_9006, U\_9007 (Consolidated); Industry Framework for IntraLATA Toll Competition; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 30, 1988; Case Nos. U\_9004, U\_9006, U\_9007 (Consolidated); Industry Framework for IntraLATA Toll Competition; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

June 30, 1989; Case No. U-8987; Michigan Bell Telephone Company Incentive Regulation Plan; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

July 31, 1992; Case No. U-10138; MCI v Michigan Bell and GTE re IntraLATA Equal Access; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 17, 1992; Case No. U-10138; MCI v Michigan Bell and GTE re IntraLATA Equal Access; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

July 22, 1993; Case No. U-10138 (Reopener); MCI v Michigan Bell and GTE re IntraLATA Equal Access; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

February 16, 2000; Case No. U-12321; AT&T Communications of Michigan, Inc. Complainant v. GTE North Inc. and Contel of the South, Inc., d/b/a GTE Systems of Michigan; Direct Testimony on Behalf of AT&T. (Adopted Testimony of Michael Starkey)

May 11, 2000; Case No. U-12321; AT&T Communications of Michigan, Inc. Complainant v. GTE North Inc. and Contel of the South, Inc., d/b/a GTE Systems of Michigan; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of AT&T.

June 8, 2000; Case No. U-12460; Petition of Level 3 Communications for Arbitration to Establish an Interconnection Agreement with Ameritech Michigan; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

September 27, 2000; Case No. U-12528; In the Matter of the Implementation of the Local Calling Area Provisions of the MTA; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Focal Communications, Inc.

June 1, 2004; Case No. U-14152; Petition of Level 3 Communications LLC for Arbitration with SBC Michigan; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC.



January 30, 1987; Docket No. P\_421/CI\_86\_88; Summary Investigation into Alternative Methods for Recovery of Non-traffic Sensitive Costs; Comments to the Commission on Behalf of MCI.

September 7, 1993; Docket No. P-999/CI-85-582, P-999/CI-87-697 and P-999/CI-87-695, In the Matter of an Investigation into IntraLATA Equal Access and Presubscription; Comments of MCI on the Report of the Equal Access and Presubscription Study Committee on Behalf of MCI.

September 20, 1996; Petition for Arbitration with U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Docket No. P-442, 421/M-96-855; P-5321, 421/M-96-909; and P-3167, 421/M-96-729 (consolidated); Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 30, 1996; Petition for Arbitration with U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Docket No. P-442, 421/M-96-855; P-5321, 421/M-96-909; and P-3167, 421/M-96-729 (consolidated); Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 14-16, 1999; USWC OSS Workshop; Comments on Behalf of MCI WorldCom, Inc. re OSS Issues.

September 28, 1999; Docket No. P-999/R-97-609; Universal Service Group; Comments on Behalf of MCI WorldCom, Inc. and AT&T Communications.

April 18, 2002; Commission Investigation of Qwest's Pricing of Certain Unbundled Network Elements; Docket Nos. P-442, 421, 3012/M-01-1916; P-421/CI-01-1375; OAH Docket No. 12-2500-14490; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of McLeod USA Telecommunications Services, Inc., Eschelon Telecom of Minnesota, Inc., US Link, Inc., Northstar Access, LLC, Otter Tail Telecomm LLC, VAL-Ed Joint Venture, LLP, dba 702 Communications.

January 23, 2004; In the Matter of the Commission Investigation into ILEC Unbundling Obligations as a Result of the Federal Triennial Review Order; Docket No.: P-999/CI-03-961; Direct Testimony on Behalf of WorldCom, Inc. (MCI).

### **Mississippi:**

February 2, 2001; Docket No. 2000-AD-846; Petition of Adelphia Business Solutions for Arbitration with BellSouth Telecommunications; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Adelphia.



February 16, 2001; Docket No. 2000-AD-846; Petition of Adelphia Business Solutions for Arbitration with BellSouth Telecommunications; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Adelphia.

**Montana:**

May 1, 1987; Docket No. 86.12.67; Rate Case of AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc.; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 12, 1988; Docket No. 88.1.2; Rate Case of Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

May 12, 1998; Docket No. D97.10.191; Application of WorldCom, Inc. for Approval to Transfer Control of MCI Communications Corporation to WorldCom, Inc.; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

June 1, 1998; Docket No. D97.10.191; Application of WorldCom, Inc. for Approval to Transfer Control of MCI Communications Corporation to WorldCom, Inc.; Amended Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

**Nebraska:**

November 6, 1986; Application No. C\_627; Nebraska Telephone Association Access Charge Proceeding; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

March 31, 1988; Application No. C\_749; Application of United Telephone Long Distance Company of the Midwest for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

**New Hampshire:**

April 30, 1993; Docket DE 93-003; Investigation into New England Telephone's Proposal to Implement Seven Digit Dialing for Intrastate Toll Calls; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

January 12, 2001; Docket No. DT 00-223; Investigation Into Whether Certain Calls are Local; Direct Testimony on Behalf of BayRing Communications.

April 5, 2002; Docket No. DT 00-223; Investigation Into Whether Certain Calls are Local; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of BayRing Communications.



**New Jersey:**

September 15, 1993; Docket No. TX93060259; Notice of Pre-Proposal re IntraLATA Competition; Comments in Response to the Board of Regulatory Commissioners on Behalf of MCI.

October 1, 1993; Docket No. TX93060259; Notice of Pre-Proposal re IntraLATA Competition; Reply Comments in Response to the Board of Regulatory Commissioners on Behalf of MCI.

April 7, 1994; Docket Nos. TX90050349, TE92111047, and TE93060211; Petitions of MCI, Sprint and AT&T for Authorization of IntraLATA Competition and Elimination of Compensation; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

April 25, 1994; Docket Nos. TX90050349, TE92111047, and TE93060211; Petitions of MCI, Sprint and AT&T for Authorization of IntraLATA Competition and Elimination of Compensation; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

**New Mexico:**

September 28, 1987; Docket No. 87\_61\_TC; Application of MCI for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

August 30, 1996; Docket No. 95-572-TC; Petition of AT&T for IntraLATA Equal Access; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 16, 2002; Utility Case No. 3495, Phase B; Consideration of Costing and Pricing Rules for OSS, Collocation, Shared Transport, Nonrecurring Charges, Spot Frames, Combination of Network Elements and Switching; Direct Testimony on Behalf of the Staff of the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission.

February 9, 2004; Case Nos. 03-00403-UT and 03-00404-UT; Triennial Review Proceedings (Batch Hot Cut and Local Circuit Switching); Testimony on Behalf of WorldCom, Inc. (MCI).

May 11, 2004; Case No. 00108-UT; Regarding Unfiled Agreements between Qwest Corporation and Competitive Local Exchange Carriers; Testimony on Behalf of Time Warner Telecom

**New York:**

April 30, 1992; Case 28425; Comments of MCI Telecommunications Corporation on IntraLATA Presubscription.



June 8, 1992; Case 28425; Reply Comments of MCI Telecommunications Corporation on IntraLATA Presubscription.

**North Carolina:**

August 4, 2000; Docket No. P779 SUB4; Petition of Level (3) Communications, LLC for Arbitration with Bell South; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

September 18, 2000; Docket No. P779 SUB4; Petition of Level (3) Communications, LLC for Arbitration with Bell South; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

October 18, 2000; Docket No. P-886, SUB 1; Petition of Adelpia Business Solutions of North Carolina, LP for Arbitration with BellSouth; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Adelpia.

December 8, 2000; Docket No. P-886, SUB 1; Petition of Adelpia Business Solutions of North Carolina, LP for Arbitration with BellSouth; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Adelpia.

**North Dakota:**

June 24, 1991; Case No. PU-2320-90-183 (Implementation of SB 2320 -- Subsidy Investigation); Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 24, 1991; Case No. PU-2320-90-183 (Implementation of SB 2320 -- Subsidy Investigation); Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

December 4, 2002; Case No. PU-2065-02-465; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with SRT Communications Cooperative; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

May 2, 2003; Case No. PU-2342-01-296; Qwest Corporation Price Investigation; Direct Testimony on Behalf of the CLEC Coalition (US Link, Inc., VAL-ED Joint Venture LLP d/b/a 702 Communications, McLeodUSA Telecommunications, Inc. and IdeaOne Telecom Group, LLC).

**Ohio:**

February 26, 2004; Case No. 04-35-TP-COI; In the Matter of the Implementation of the FCC's Triennial Review Regarding Local Circuit Switching in the Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company's Mass Market; Direct Testimony on Behalf of AT&T.



**Oklahoma:**

April 2, 1992; Cause No. 28713; Application of MCI for Additional CCN Authority to Provide IntraLATA Services; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

June 22, 1992; Cause No. 28713; Application of MCI for Additional CCN Authority to Provide IntraLATA Services; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

**Oregon:**

October 27, 1983; Docket No. UT 9; Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company Business Measured Service; Direct Testimony on Behalf of the Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon.

April 23, 1984; Docket No. UT 17; Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company Business Measured Service; Direct Testimony on Behalf of the Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon.

May 7, 1984; Docket No. UT 17; Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company Business Measured Service; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of the Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon.

October 31, 1986; Docket No. AR 154; Administrative Rules Relating to the Universal Service Protection Plan; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 6, 1996; Docket ARB3/ARB6; Petition of MCI for Arbitration with U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 11, 1996; Docket No. ARB 9; Interconnection Contract Negotiations Between MCImetro and GTE; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 5, 1996; Docket No. ARB 9; Interconnection Contract Negotiations Between MCImetro and GTE; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 6, 2002; Docket No. UM 1058; Investigation into the Use of Virtual NPA/NXX Calling Patterns; Comments/Presentation on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

**Pennsylvania:**

December 9, 1994; Docket No. I-00940034; Investigation Into IntraLATA Interconnection Arrangements (Presubscription); Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.



September 5, 2002; Docket No. C-20028114; Level 3 Communications, LLC v. Marianna & Scenery Hill Telephone Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

**Rhode Island:**

April 30, 1993; Docket No. 2089; Dialing Pattern Proposal Made by the New England Telephone Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

**South Carolina:**

October 2000; Docket No. 2000-0446-C; US LEC of South Carolina Inc. Arbitration with BellSouth Telecommunications; Direct Testimony on Behalf of US LEC.

November 22, 2000; Docket No. 2000-516-C; Adelphia Business Solutions of South Carolina, Inc. Arbitration with BellSouth Telecommunications; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Adelphia.

December 14, 2000; Docket No. 2000-516-C; Adelphia Business Solutions of South Carolina, Inc. Arbitration with BellSouth Telecommunications; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Adelphia.

**South Dakota:**

November 11, 1987; Docket No. F\_3652\_12; Application of Northwestern Bell Telephone Company to Introduce Its Contract Toll Plan; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

May 27, 2003; Docket No. TC03-057; Application of Qwest to Reclassify Local Exchange Services as Fully Competitive; Direct Testimony on Behalf of WorldCom, Inc., Black Hills FiberCom and Midcontinent Communications.

**Tennessee:**

January 31, 2001; Petition of Adelphia Business Solutions for Arbitration with BellSouth Telecommunications; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Adelphia.

February 7, 2001; Petition of Adelphia Business Solutions for Arbitration with BellSouth Telecommunications; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Adelphia.



June 5, 2000; PUC Docket No. 22441; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with Southwestern Bell Telephone Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

June 12, 2000; PUC Docket No. 22441; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with Southwestern Bell Telephone Company; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

October 10, 2002; PUC Docket No. 26431; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with CenturyTel of Lake Dallas, Inc. and CenturyTel of San Marcos, Inc.; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

October 16, 2002; PUC Docket No. 26431; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with CenturyTel of Lake Dallas, Inc. and CenturyTel of San Marcos, Inc.; Reply Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

July 19, 2004; PUC Docket No. 28821; Arbitration of Non-costing Issues for Successor Interconnection Agreement to the Texas 271 Agreement; Direct Testimony on Behalf of KMC Telecom III, L.L.C, KMC Telecom V, Inc. (d/b/a KMC Network Services, Inc.), and KMC Data, L.L.C.

August 23, 2004; PUC Docket No. 28821; Arbitration of Non-costing Issues for Successor Interconnection Agreement to the Texas 271 Agreement; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of KMC Telecom III, L.L.C, KMC Telecom V, Inc. (d/b/a KMC Network Services, Inc.), and KMC Data, L.L.C.

**Utah:**

November 16, 1987; Case No. 87\_049\_05; Petition of the Mountain State Telephone and Telegraph Company for Exemption from Regulation of Various Transport Services; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

July 7, 1988; Case No. 83\_999\_11; Investigation of Access Charges for Intrastate InterLATA and IntraLATA Telephone Services; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 8, 1996; Docket No. 96-095-01; MCImetro Petition for Arbitration with USWC Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section 252; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 22, 1996; Docket No. 96-095-01; MCImetro Petition for Arbitration with USWC Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section 252; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.



September 3, 1997; Docket No. 97-049-08; USWC Rate Case; Surrebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 29, 1997; Docket No. 97-049-08; USWC Rate Case; Revised Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

February 2, 2001; Docket No. 00-999-05; In the Matter of the Investigation of Inter-Carrier Compensation for Exchanged ESP Traffic; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLP.

January 13, 2004; Docket No. 03-999-04; In the Matter of a Proceeding to Address Actions Necessary to Respond to the FCC's Triennial Review Order; Direct Testimony on Behalf of WorldCom, Inc. (MCI).

**Washington:**

September 27, 1988; Docket No. U-88-2052-P; Petition of Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company for Classification of Services as Competitive; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 11, 1996; Docket No. UT-96-0338; Petition of MCImetro for Arbitration with GTE Northwest, Inc., Pursuant to 47 U.S.C.252; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 20, 1996; Docket No. UT-96-0338; Petition of MCImetro for Arbitration with GTE Northwest, Inc., Pursuant to 47 U.S.C.252; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

January 13, 1998; Docket No. UT-97-0325; Rulemaking Workshop re Access Charge Reform and the Cost of Universal Service; Comments and Presentation on Behalf of MCI.

December 21, 2001; Docket No. UT-003013, Part D; Continued Costing and Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements, Transport, and Termination; Direct Testimony on Behalf of WorldCom, Inc.

October 18, 2002; Docket No. UT-023043; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with CenturyTel of Washington, Inc.; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

November 1, 2002; Docket No. UT-023043; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with CenturyTel of Washington, Inc.; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.



January 31, 2003; Docket No. UT-021569; Developing an Interpretive or Policy Statement relating to the Use of Virtual NPA/NXX Calling Patterns; Comments on Behalf of WorldCom, Inc. and KMC Telecom.

May 1, 2003; Docket No. UT-021569; Developing an Interpretive or Policy Statement relating to the Use of Virtual NPA/NXX Calling Patterns; Workshop Participation on Behalf of MCI, KMC Telecom, and Level (3) Communications, LLC.

August 13, 2003; Docket No. UT-030614; In the Matter of the Petition of Qwest Corporation for Competitive Classification of Basic Exchange Telecommunications Services; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI, Inc.

August 29, 2003; UT-030614; In the Matter of the Petition of Qwest Corporation for Competitive Classification of Basic Exchange Telecommunications Services; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI, Inc.

September 13, 2004; Docket No. UT-033011; In the Matter of Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Petitioners, v. Advanced Telecom Group, Inc., et al, Respondents; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Time Warner Telecom of Washington, LLC.

**West Virginia:**

October 11, 1994; Case No. 94-0725-T-PC; Bell Atlantic - West Virginia Incentive Regulation Plan; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

June 18, 1998; Case No. 97-1338-T-PC; Petition of WorldCom, Inc. for Approval to Transfer Control of MCI Communications Corporation to WorldCom, Inc.; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

**Wisconsin:**

October 31, 1988; Docket No. 05\_TR\_102; Investigation of Intrastate Access Costs, Settlements, and IntraLATA Access Charges; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 14, 1988; Docket No. 05\_TR\_102; Investigation of Intrastate Access Costs, Settlements, and IntraLATA Access Charges; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

December 12, 1988; Docket No. 05\_TI\_116; In the Matter of Provision of Operator Services; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.



March 6, 1989; Docket No. 6720\_TI\_102; Review of Financial Data Filed by Wisconsin Bell, Inc.; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

May 1, 1989; Docket No. 05\_NC\_100; Amendment of MCI's CCN for Authority to Provide IntraLATA Dedicated Access Services; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

May 11, 1989; Docket No. 6720\_TR\_103; Investigation Into the Financial Data and Regulation of Wisconsin Bell, Inc.; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

July 5, 1989; Docket No. 05-TI-112; Disconnection of Local and Toll Services for Nonpayment -- Part A; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

July 5, 1989; Docket No. 05-TI-112; Examination of Industry Wide Billing and Collection Practices -- Part B; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

July 12, 1989; Docket No. 05-TI-112; Rebuttal Testimony in Parts A and B on Behalf of MCI.

October 9, 1989; Docket No. 6720-TI-102; Review of the WBI Rate Moratorium; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 17, 1989; Docket No. 6720-TI-102; Review of the WBI Rate Moratorium; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

December 1, 1989; Docket No. 05-TR-102; Investigation of Intrastate Access Costs, Settlements, and IntraLATA Access Charges; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

April 16, 1990; Docket No. 6720-TR-104; Wisconsin Bell Rate Case; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 1, 1990; Docket No. 2180-TR-102; GTE Rate Case and Request for Alternative Regulatory Plan; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 15, 1990; Docket No. 2180-TR-102; GTE Rate Case and Request for Alternative Regulatory Plan; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 15, 1990; Docket No. 05-TR-103; Investigation of Intrastate Access Costs and Intrastate Access Charges; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

April 3, 1992; Docket No. 05-NC-102; Petition of MCI for IntraLATA 10XXX 1+ Authority; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.



September 30, 2002; Docket No. 05-MA-130; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with CenturyTel; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

October 9, 2002; Docket No. 05-MA-130; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with CenturyTel; Reply Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

September 1, 2004; Docket No. 05-MA-135; Petition of Level 3 for Arbitration with Wisconsin Bell, Inc. d/b/a/ SBC Wisconsin; Direct Testimony on Behalf of Level (3) Communications, LLC.

**Wyoming:**

June 17, 1987; Docket No. 9746 Sub 1; Application of MCI for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

May 19, 1997; Docket No. 72000-TC-97-99; In the Matter of Compliance with Federal Regulations of Payphones; Oral Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

**Comments Submitted to the Federal Communications Commission and/or the Department of Justice**

March 6, 1991; Ameritech Transmittal No. 518; Petition to Suspend and Investigate on Behalf of MCI re Proposed Rates for OPTINET 64 Kbps Service.

April 17, 1991; Ameritech Transmittal No. 526; Petition to Suspend and Investigate on Behalf of MCI re Proposed Flexible ANI Service.

August 30, 1991; Ameritech Transmittal No. 555; Petition to Suspend and Investigate on Behalf of MCI re Ameritech Directory Search Service.

September 30, 1991; Ameritech Transmittal No. 562; Petition to Suspend and Investigate on Behalf of MCI re Proposed Rates and Possible MFJ Violations Associated with Ameritech's OPTINET Reconfiguration Service (AORS).

October 15, 1991; CC Docket No. 91-215; Opposition to Direct Cases of Ameritech and United (Ameritech Transmittal No. 518; United Transmittal No. 273) on Behalf of MCI re the introduction of 64 Kbps Special Access Service.

November 27, 1991; Ameritech Transmittal No. 578; Petition to Suspend and Investigate on Behalf of MCI re Ameritech Directory Search Service.

September 4, 1992; Ameritech Transmittal No. 650; Petition to Suspend and Investigate on Behalf of MCI re Ameritech 64 Clear Channel Capability Service.



February 16, 1995; Presentation to FCC Staff on the Status of Intrastate Competition on Behalf of MCI.

November 9, 1999; Comments to FCC Staff of Common Carrier Bureau on the Status of OSS Testing in Arizona on Behalf of MCI WorldCom, Inc.

November 9, 1999; Comments to the Department of Justice (Task Force on Telecommunications) on the Status of OSS Testing in Arizona and the USWC Collaborative on Behalf of MCI WorldCom, Inc.

**Presentations Before Legislative Bodies:**

April 8, 1987; Minnesota; Senate File 677; Proposed Deregulation Legislation; Comments before the House Committee on Telecommunications.

October 30, 1989; Michigan; Presentation Before the Michigan House and Senate Staff Working Group on Telecommunications; "A First Look at Nebraska, Incentive Rates and Price Caps," Comments on Behalf of MCI.

May 16, 1990; Wisconsin; Comments Before the Wisconsin Assembly Utilities Committee Regarding the Wisconsin Bell Plan for Flexible Regulation, on Behalf of MCI.

March 20, 1991; Michigan; Presentation to the Michigan Senate Technology and Energy Committee re SB 124 on behalf of MCI.

May 15, 1991; Michigan; Presentation to the Michigan Senate Technology and Energy Commission and the House Public Utilities Committee re MCI's Building Blocks Proposal and SB 124/HB 4343.

March 8, 2000; Illinois; Presentation to the Environment & Energy Senate Committee re Emerging Technologies and Their Impact on Public Policy, on Behalf of MCI WorldCom, Inc.

February 19, 2004; Presentation to the Iowa Senate Committee Regarding House Study Bill 622/Senate Study Bill 3035; Comments on Behalf of MCI.

**Presentations Before Industry Groups -- Seminars:**

May 17, 1989; Wisconsin Public Utility Institute -- Telecommunications Utilities and Regulation; May 15-18, 1989; Panel Presentation -- Interexchange Service Pricing Practices Under Price Cap Regulation; Comments on Behalf of MCI.



July 24, 1989; National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners -- Summer Committee Meeting, San Francisco, California. Panel Presentation -- Specific IntraLATA Market Concerns of Interexchange Carriers; Comments on Behalf of MCI.

May 16, 1990; Wisconsin Public Utility Institute -- Telecommunications Utilities and Regulation; May 14-18, 1990; Presentation on Alternative Forms of Regulation.

October 29, 1990; Illinois Telecommunications Sunset Review Forum; Two Panel Presentations: Discussion of the Illinois Commerce Commission's Decision in Docket No. 88-0091 for the Technology Working Group; and, Discussion of the Treatment of Competitive Services for the Rate of Return Regulation Working Group; Comments on Behalf of MCI.

May 16, 1991; Wisconsin Public Utility Institute -- Telecommunications Utilities and Regulation Course; May 13-16, 1991; Participated in IntraLATA Toll Competition Debate on Behalf of MCI.

November 19, 1991; TeleStrategies Conference -- "Local Exchange Competition: The \$70 Billion Opportunity." Presentation as part of a panel on "IntraLATA 1+ Presubscription" on Behalf of MCI.

July 9, 1992; North Dakota Association of Telephone Cooperatives Summer Conference, July 8-10, 1992. Panel presentations on "Equal Access in North Dakota: Implementation of PSC Mandate" and "Open Network Access in North Dakota" on Behalf of MCI.

December 2-3, 1992; TeleStrategies Conference -- "IntraLATA Toll Competition - A Multi-Billion Dollar Market Opportunity." Presentations on the interexchange carriers' position on intraLATA dialing parity and presubscription and on technical considerations on behalf of MCI.

March 14-17, 1993; NARUC Introductory Regulatory Training Program; Panel Presentation on Competition in Telecommunications on Behalf of MCI.

May 13-14, 1993; TeleStrategies Conference -- "IntraLATA Toll Competition -- Gaining the Competitive Edge"; Presentation on Carriers and IntraLATA Toll Competition on Behalf of MCI.

May 23-26, 1994; The 12th Annual National Telecommunications Forecasting Conference; Represented IXCs in Special Town Meeting Segment Regarding the Convergence of CATV and Telecommunications and other Local Competition Issues.



March 14-15, 1995; "The LEC-IXC Conference"; Sponsored by Telecommunications Reports and Telco Competition Report; Panel on Redefining the IntraLATA Service Market -- Toll Competition, Extended Area Calling and Local Resale.

August 28-30, 1995; "Phone+ Supershow '95"; Playing Fair: An Update on IntraLATA Equal Access; Panel Presentation.

August 29, 1995; "TDS Annual Regulatory Meeting"; Panel Presentation on Local Competition Issues.

December 13-14, 1995; "NECA/Century Access Conference"; Panel Presentation on Local Exchange Competition.

October 23, 1997; "Interpreting the FCC Rules of 1997"; The Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California; Panel Presentation on Universal Service and Access Reform.

February 5-6, 2002; "Litigating Telecommunications Cost Cases and Other Sources of Enlightenment"; Educational Seminar for State Commission and Attorney General Employees on Litigating TELRIC Cases; Denver, Colorado.

February 19-20, 2003; Seminar for the New York State Department of Public Service entitled "Emerging Technologies and Convergence in the Telecommunications Network". Presented with Ken Wilson of Boulder Telecommunications Consultants, LLC.

July 25, 2003; National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners Summer Committee Meetings; Participated in Panel regarding "Wireless Substitution of Wireline – Policy Implications."

Oregon  
ARB 665  
L3CI 01-024I

INTERVENOR: Level 3 Communications, Inc.

REQUEST NO: 024I

Does Qwest offer any kind of foreign exchange ("FX") service in this state? If so, please provide a service description (including, but not limited to, tariff pages) for each such service.

RESPONSE:

No. The Commission discontinued FX service in Oregon with certain existing customers grandfathered in 1983. (See Order No. 83-839).

Respondent: Larry Brotherson

Oregon  
ARB 665  
L3CI 01-023I

INTERVENOR: Level 3 Communications, Inc.

REQUEST NO: 023I

Does Qwest contend that the costs it incurs in originating a call to a Level 3 customer differ in any respect whatsoever based upon the physical location of the Level 3 customer? If Qwest responds to the above question with anything other than an unequivocal "no," please provide a detailed explanation of how the location of Level 3's customer on Level 3's side of the POI could affect Qwest's costs. Include in that explanation all cost studies and any other documentation in your possession that you believe provide support for your position.

RESPONSE:

No. The costs Qwest incurs do not vary based upon the physical location of the Level 3 customer. Qwest's overall costs incurred to complete a call, however, vary depending on the originating voice caller's location and the location of the Level 3 POI.

Respondent: Larry Brotherson

Oregon  
ARB 665  
L3CI 01-029A-S1

INTERVENOR: Level 3 Communications, Inc.

REQUEST NO: 029A-S1

Qwest has transported VoIP traffic over its network in the State of Oregon. If your answer is anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe in detail your qualification or denial, and provide any information or evidence which supports your qualification or denial.

RESPONSE:

Please see Qwest's response to Data Request/Request for Admission No. 1, which Qwest incorporates fully herein.

**SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE DATED 07/08/05:**

Without waiving the foregoing objection, Qwest provides the following response:

Admitted.

Given the fact that VoIP is provided by a variety of providers (including Qwest's affiliate), Qwest Corporation has certainly transported traffic that meets the proper definition of VoIP (though, given the fact that the traffic may have been handed off to Qwest by a VoIP provider's carrier in TDM, Qwest would be unlikely to know that the traffic was a VoIP call since all TDM traffic appears the same to Qwest's network).

Oregon  
ARB 665  
L3CI 01-017A-S1

INTERVENOR: Level 3 Communications, Inc.

REQUEST NO: 017A-S1

Please admit that Qwest currently offers Qwest® OneFlex™ Voice over Internet Protocol services within Oregon which provides customers:

[T]he option of choosing up to five additional phone numbers (virtual numbers) that will ring to your phone. Calls placed to a virtual phone number will ring the same phone as calls placed to your primary phone number. A virtual phone number can be beneficial if you have colleagues, friends or family living outside your local calling area. You could request a virtual number within their area and the people who live in that local calling area can call you for a price of a local phone call.

If your answer is anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe in detail your qualification or denial, and provide any information or evidence which supports your qualification or denial.

RESPONSE:

Please see Qwest's response to Data Request/Request for Admission No. 1, which Qwest incorporates fully herein.

**SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE DATED 07/08/05:**

Without waiving the foregoing objections, Qwest admits this request as to QCC but denies it as to Qwest Corporation.

Oregon  
ARB 665  
L3CI 01-020A-S1

INTERVENOR: Level 3 Communications, Inc.

REQUEST NO: 020A-S1

Qwest® OneFlex™ Voice over Internet Protocol offering is less expensive than its Choice Home Plus package, which includes unlimited local calling and a full range of features, which costs approximately \$35 per month, with about \$10 in taxes and fees, with one long-distance option at 5 cents per minute plus a \$4.99 monthly fee. If your answer is anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe in detail your qualification or denial, and provide any information or evidence which supports your qualification or denial.

RESPONSE:

Please see Qwest's response to Data Request/Request for Admission No. 1, which Qwest incorporates fully herein.

**SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE DATED 07/08 /05:**

Qwest can neither admit nor deny this request. It is not clear what "Qwest VoIP offering" is being referred to in this request, thus making it impossible to make the requested comparison.

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION  
OF OREGON**

**ARB 665**

In the Matter of

LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, INC's

Petition for Arbitration Pursuant to Section  
252(b) of the Communications Act of 1934,  
as amended by the Telecommunications Act  
of 1996, and the Applicable State Laws for  
Rates, Terms, and Conditions of  
Interconnection with Qwest Corporation

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ROGIER R. DUCLOO ON BEHALF OF LEVEL 3  
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC**

**August 12, 2005**

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**I. Introduction**

**Q. Please state your name, position, employer, and business address.**

A. My name is Rogier R. Ducloo. I am a Director with Level 3 Communications, LLC. My business address is 1025 Eldorado Blvd, Colorado, 8021. I am filing this testimony on behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC of Broomfield, CO.

**Q. Please review your education and relevant work experience.**

A. I received a Bachelor of Science in Business and Management from the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands in 1996. I've worked at Level 3 since 1998. Most of my experience with Level 3 has been with the company's network group. I've worked in network provisioning, network engineering & design, and network planning & project management of network deployment. Since 2002, I have worked in network planning and regulatory support. Prior to joining Level 3 I worked in business development and international institutional sales.

**II. Statement Of Scope And Summary**

**Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

A. I am testifying on behalf of Level 3 Communications, LLC ("Level 3"), regarding interconnection agreement terms and conditions between Level 3 and Qwest that we have been unable to resolve during negotiations. I will address various technical issues to provide a network and engineering perspective for the issues that are in dispute in this case.

**Q. Please summarize your testimony, including your conclusions and recommendations.**

A. Level 3 is a facilities-based Competitive Local Exchange Carrier ("CLEC"). To facilitate fair competition, and for Level 3 to meet customer demands, Level 3 must be permitted to interconnect with Qwest on reasonable terms, rates and conditions. Moreover, because of Level 3's experience operating the largest next-generation, end-to-end Internet

1 Protocol (“IP”)-based network in the United States, Level 3 is uniquely positioned to  
2 propose terms that are not only reasonable and technically sound, but also consistent with  
3 the overall public interest in the continued technical advancement of the nation’s  
4 communications infrastructure.

5 Qwest, in contrast, takes an extremely limited and one-sided view of  
6 interconnection. The Qwest-sponsored provisions to which Level 3 objects would cause  
7 inefficiencies in the network by, among other things, requiring technically unnecessary  
8 trunks and facilities, as well as changes to efficient interconnection architecture. As a  
9 result, Qwest’s proposals are detrimental to overall network efficiency, quality, and to  
10 Level 3’s ability to offer services in furtherance of the public interest in facilitating and  
11 developing a competitive telecommunications market. As summarized here and as  
12 explained in greater detail below, Qwest’s one-sided proposals cause problems at several  
13 levels.

14 First, Qwest proposes to place a number of restrictions on switching and trunking  
15 operations. It does this through the definitions of various terms in the Agreement. None  
16 of these restrictions has any technical basis. In each case, Qwest would impose  
17 engineering inefficiencies on Level 3 (and in some cases on Qwest itself as well) for no  
18 reason other than, as far as I can tell, to impede Level 3’s growth or to extract extra  
19 revenues from us. These definitional issues affect the outcome of Issues 1 and 2 and I  
20 deal with the definitional concerns in the course of discussing the relevant issues.

21 Second, the companies disagree on the how to divide the traffic we send each  
22 other into different trunk groups. We agree that when total traffic between Level 3 and a  
23 particular Qwest end office switch reaches a certain reasonable volume, we will establish  
24 a direct trunk group between that end office and Level 3. The technical and engineering  
25 efficiency of both parties’ networks will be maximized by including all traffic between  
26 Level 3 and the affected Qwest switch on a single large trunk group. Qwest, however,

1 wants us to establish multiple trunk groups between each pair of switches, with the traffic  
2 divided based on regulatory classifications that have no engineering significance. This is,  
3 pure and simply, inefficient. I understand that governing law requires the terms and  
4 conditions of interconnection to be “reasonable.” From an engineering perspective, what  
5 Qwest is proposing is patently unreasonable. Level 3 fully recognizes that different  
6 regulatory “types” of traffic might be subject to different rates; but we have a proposal  
7 for dealing with that situation simply and efficiently, without degrading network  
8 efficiency and imposing needless costs, discussed below.

9 Third, in Issue 4 Qwest is arguing that certain types of Enhanced Service Provider  
10 (“ESP”) traffic, including specifically VoIP traffic, should be included within the  
11 regulatory category of switched access traffic. My understanding is that the status of  
12 traffic as ESP traffic depends on certain technical characteristics of the entities that  
13 provide it, so that entities that qualify as ESPs are entitled to have their traffic rated on an  
14 end-user basis, as opposed to on a carrier basis. I understand that there are legal and  
15 regulatory considerations affecting this issue which Level 3’s lawyers will address in our  
16 filings. From a technical perspective, however, it is clear that VoIP traffic is a form of  
17 information service, that is, the VoIP providers that Level 3 serves meet what I  
18 understand to be the relevant criteria for having their traffic treated as end-user, as  
19 opposed to carrier, traffic. In this regard, and irrespective of how this traffic is rated  
20 (reciprocal compensation versus access), Qwest also seeks to have ESP traffic, including  
21 VoIP traffic, routed over distinct trunk groups and perhaps over distinct facilities. For the  
22 reasons noted above, this is grossly inefficient and patently unreasonable.

23 In Issue No. 3 the ISP/RUF (VNXX) issue, Qwest is trying to shift the financial  
24 responsibility for maintaining its own network, on its side of the Point of Interconnection  
25 (“POI”), to Level 3. As a contractual matter, the parties agree that the cost of facilities  
26 used to connect their networks will be split based on relative use, so that cost

1 responsibility follows in proportion to which party originates which portion of traffic on  
2 the affected facilities. But what Qwest seeks to do is to exclude from the calculation the  
3 overwhelming majority of traffic that it sends to Level 3. As a simple matter of  
4 mathematics, this sleight-of-hand would relieve Qwest of cost responsibility for facilities  
5 that Qwest uses (in the sense of originates traffic over) much, much more than Level 3  
6 does. In certain cases ( VNXX traffic), Qwest would go even farther, and would send  
7 Level 3 bills for originating intrastate access charges. Again, Level 3's lawyers will  
8 address the legal flaws in Qwest's position, but from an engineering perspective, treating  
9 VNXX calls like intrastate toll traffic is absurd.

10 The **LIS NRC** section continues the issue of who is responsible for the cost of  
11 interconnection, and explains why Qwest should not be able to pass the cost of  
12 installation and maintenance of its own network to Level 3.

13 Finally, the section of the **Determination of Traffic Types** provides a description  
14 of how Level 3 proposes to calculate the traffic mix on trunks. The section also explains  
15 a dispute over the new way that Qwest is proposing to determine whether a call is "local"  
16 or not. New contract language is proposed in this section to specify Level 3's proposal  
17 on how to calculate and manage traffic factors for billing purposes.

18 **Q. To provide some background, please give a brief overview of the difference between**  
19 **the Qwest circuit switch-based network and Level 3's softswitch-based network.**

20 **A.** Qwest's network is comprised of circuit switches connected to each other by fiber and  
21 copper transmission paths, and to end user customers largely by means of copper loops.  
22 Qwest's Class 4 (tandem) and Class 5 (end office) switches are the "brains" of its  
23 network. Like the traditional PSTN of which it is a part, the Qwest network operates  
24 using a centralized architecture which evolved starting more than 50 years ago with the  
25 introduction of automatic (originally, mechanical) circuit switching. The entire design  
26 objective of the PSTN was to do just one thing — deliver voice calls — very, very well.

1 This design objective led to the old Bell System’s implementation of computerized  
2 switches in a hierarchical architecture, the development of time-division multiplexing for  
3 use initially on copper and later on optical fiber, as well as the design of customer  
4 premises equipment and the specification of the interfaces between that equipment and  
5 the PSTN. The goal, and the result, of this focus was a network in which end-to-end  
6 network resources are devoted to the completion of large volumes of plain old voice  
7 telephone calls.

8 Level 3’s network is quite different, arising not out of the hierarchical, circuit-  
9 switched PSTN but instead out of the distributed, open architecture of the Internet. The  
10 Internet evolved as a scientific, educational and military network outside the PSTN,  
11 beginning in the 1960s. The Internet uses packet switching, not circuit switching. Rather  
12 than devoting end-to-end network resources to communicate information (voice or  
13 otherwise), a packet switched network breaks the information down into pieces (packets)  
14 and then separately routes the packets to their destination, often by very diverse routes,  
15 based dynamically on which switches (called “routers” on the Internet) and links are free  
16 or busy on a near-instantaneous basis. The packets are then reassembled into the proper  
17 order at the destination, so that the information is properly delivered.

18 Using Internet Protocol technology, Level 3 operates a distributed softswitch  
19 architecture. All internal connections between nodes on Level 3’s network are by means  
20 of high-capacity optical fiber. Level 3’s softswitch- and IP-based network is based on an  
21 open architecture that optimizes the use of computing technology to maximize the  
22 efficiency of the network infrastructure transport layer. Softswitch technology is able to  
23 bridge the gap between legacy circuit-switched technology and more advanced IP-based  
24 networks. Because it knew that its customers would need to interface with the PSTN,  
25 Level 3 retro-engineered its network — from one perspective, “dumbed it down” — to be  
26 able to exchange IP-based traffic with the PSTN.

1           A simple metaphor illustrates the difference. Qwest’s network is like a funny  
2 kind of highway system. Imagine dedicated roads leading traffic from one point to  
3 another on fixed highways with multiple lanes, like the real highway system. On a  
4 circuit-switched network like Qwest’s, however, when there is a car running down one  
5 lane of the highway — say on a trip from Portland to Phoenix — no other car is allowed  
6 be in its lane, all the way from Portland to Phoenix. Only when the first car has  
7 completed its journey can any other car use “its” lane.

8           In contrast, Level 3’s softswitch and router based network is like the human brain.  
9 It is a smart, highly interconnected network that functions in parallel, so that traffic can  
10 take many different paths to get to the same place, and packets containing bits from  
11 different conversations can travel the same path at the same time for part, or all, of the  
12 route.

13           From Level 3’s perspective, the technical superiority of its flexible, IP-based  
14 network is obvious — even for the traditional mainstay of the PSTN, voice calls. From  
15 both an engineering and business perspective, this is extremely threatening to PSTN  
16 operators like Qwest, who have enormous amounts of money and expertise invested in  
17 what is manifestly an old-fashioned and increasingly obsolete way of doing things. It is  
18 only natural that those with such a heavy investment in old technology and old  
19 knowledge would do everything possible to delay the day when they are overtaken by the  
20 new. For that reason, it is understandable why Qwest would want to shoe-horn Level 3’s  
21 operations, as much as possible, into network architectures, regulatory classifications, and  
22 business models that Qwest understands, and that are in harmony with Qwest’s own  
23 network and operations. But the entire point of introducing competition into the  
24 telecommunications business — at least from my technical perspective — is to make it  
25 possible for consumers to enjoy the benefits made possible by newer and more  
26 technically sophisticated networks. In assessing what constitutes “reasonable” terms for

1 interconnection in this proceeding, therefore, I urge the Commission to recognize and  
2 take account of this fact. I submit that on the issues I address, Qwest is acting primarily  
3 to avoid the impact of new technology-based competition on its legacy network, not in  
4 the best interest of the citizens of Oregon.

5 **III. ISSUE 2: Combining Different Traffic Types on Interconnection Trunks**

6 **Statement of the Issue: Qwest wants Level 3 to provision separate trunk groups for**  
7 **different types of traffic, thus forcing Level 3 to set up duplicate, inefficient trunk groups to**  
8 **every Qwest end office and tandem office switch.**

8 **Q. What is Level 3's position on this issue?**

9 A. Level 3 and Qwest should not be required to set up different trunk groups for different  
10 regulatory "types" of traffic. Instead, all types of traffic going from Level 3 to Qwest  
11 (local and toll, interLATA and intraLATA, interstate and intrastate, "telecommunications  
12 service" or "information service," circuit switched end-to-end or IP-enabled) should be  
13 combined on the same trunk group along a given route. I understand that regulatory rules  
14 might require that different types of traffic be subject to different rating regimes, but that  
15 is no reason to degrade network efficiency by handling technically equivalent traffic in  
16 different ways as a matter of network engineering and architecture. I note in this regard  
17 that Level 3 has agreements with the 3 other RBOCs, covering 39 states and the District  
18 of Columbia that allow for the most network-efficient exchange of all types of traffic.  
19 Qwest is a real outlier on this issue.

20 **Q. What is Qwest's position?**

21 A. Qwest wants Level 3 to order and provision multiple, separate trunk groups to every  
22 tandem and end office in the state. They want one set of trunk groups for local and  
23 IntraLATA traffic, and another set of trunk groups for InterLATA traffic. If they will  
24 accept IP-enabled traffic at all — which they appear to contest — they want that on  
25 separate trunks too. From an engineering perspective, setting up all these separate trunk  
26

1 groups for traffic going to and coming from the same place is grossly inefficient. I  
2 submit that it cannot be considered a “reasonable” condition of interconnection.

3 **Q. What is a trunk?**

4 A. A trunk is a logical connection between two switches, provisioned by means of physical  
5 facilities between those two switches. The physical facility is not the trunk. It may be  
6 any appropriate medium — copper, optical fiber, microwave radio, coaxial cable, etc.  
7 The trunk is the logical path *carried on* the physical facility. The term “trunk” arises  
8 from within the PSTN, so, not surprisingly a trunk refers to a single voice-grade  
9 connection, capable of carrying one voice call between two switches.

10 **Q. What is a trunk group?**

11 A. A trunk group is a collection trunks, normally (but not necessarily) provisioned over the  
12 same physical facility connecting two switches, configured to operate as a cohesive unit  
13 when delivering multiple voice connections between the two switches. You can think of  
14 the physical facility carrying a trunk group as completely unmarked road — just a wide  
15 concrete path between two cities. Each individual lane that we paint on the highway is a  
16 trunk. All the lanes going together in the same direction are a trunk group. The wider the  
17 highway, the more lanes it has, and the more traffic it can carry.

18 **Q. How do you measure the capacity of trunk groups?**

19 A. A single trunk — that can carry a single voice conversation — is known as a “DS0.”  
20 Putting 24 DS0s together creates a DS1, which is the basic unit of carrier-to-carrier  
21 trunking in the PSTN. Putting 28 DS1s together creates a DS3, which is equivalent to  
22 672 DS0s. (For historical reasons, there is no “DS2.”) DS0s, DS1s and DS3s can all be  
23 carried on any normal transmission medium (copper, fiber, or radio).

24 More modern, high-capacity networks exchange traffic using optical fiber  
25 connections. The data-carrying capacity of optical fiber utterly dwarfs the capacity of  
26 copper wires. The smallest normal unit of capacity on an optical network is an OC-3,

1 which is the equivalent of three DS3s. Other common capacity measures for optical  
2 networks are the OC-12 (12 DS3s), the OC-48 (48 DS3s), and the OC-192 (192 DS3s).

3 **Q. How do telecommunications engineers decide how much capacity to put into place**  
4 **between two switches?**

5 A. At a very high level, the more traffic that will flow between the switches, the bigger the  
6 trunk group you will put into service. But it is actually more complicated than that.

7 Think about the highway example discussed above. Imagine that you are trying  
8 to design a highway between a large city and a populous suburb. You would not look at  
9 the number of cars driving between the city and the suburb at 3:00 on Sunday morning.  
10 And, although perhaps not as obvious, you would not just look at the total number of cars  
11 that travel that route over the course of a day or week or month. Instead, to properly  
12 design the highway, you would look at how many cars are trying to travel that route at the  
13 very same time, at rush hour on the busiest day of the week. That way, you would know  
14 how much traffic your new road will need to be able to handle when it is at its busiest.  
15 *That* will tell you how big to make your highway.

16 This same principle applies to deciding how big to make trunk groups between  
17 switches. Different routes that serve different types of customers have different “rush  
18 hours” (called “busy hours” in the telecommunications business). A route between  
19 switches that mainly serve business customers might have a busy hour between 9:00 and  
20 10:00 a.m. when people arrive at their offices for work. On the other hand, a route  
21 between switches that mainly serve residential customers might have a busy hour  
22 between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. as children get home from school and they and their parents  
23 start calling each other to discuss homework, social events, or the evening’s plans.

24 There is a final, but critically important, consideration in determining how large  
25 trunk groups should be. This issue is known as “trunking efficiencies.”

26 **Q. What do you mean by “trunking efficiencies?”**

1 A. For reasons which I will briefly explain below, it turns out that, while the number of  
2 trunks that you need in a trunk group to carry a given amount of busy hour traffic  
3 definitely increases as the amount of traffic increases, the number of trunks goes up at a  
4 *slower rate* than the traffic goes up. If the current amount of traffic is carried on a single  
5 DS1 (24 DS0s), it will *not* require three DS1s to carry three times as much traffic.  
6 Instead, it will require, perhaps, only two DS1s. Moreover, this effect continues as the  
7 traffic growth get larger, so that ten times as much busy hour traffic will not require  
8 anything near a 10-fold increase in the number of trunks.

9 In practical terms, this means that carriers can greatly conserve on the number of  
10 trunks they need to establish between two switches, by combining as much of the  
11 interswitch traffic as possible onto a single, large trunk group.

12 **Q. What trunking is at dispute in this issue?**

13 A. There are several issues. The first has to do with handling incoming (to Qwest)  
14 interLATA traffic. The bulk of traffic between Level 3 and Qwest is “local”  
15 interconnection traffic. However, Level 3 also has some InterLATA traffic that it carries  
16 for IXC that must be delivered to Qwest customers. Today, Level 3 routes this traffic to  
17 3<sup>rd</sup> parties (IXCs) for completion to Qwest. These 3<sup>rd</sup> party IXCs price this service at  
18 relatively high rates, causing this to be an expensive solution for Level 3. Level 3 would  
19 like to complete this traffic directly to Qwest. Unfortunately, Qwest wants to require  
20 Level 3 to use separate trunk groups for this traffic, rather than simply to deliver this  
21 traffic on existing interconnection trunks.

22 **Q. Is Level 3 trying to avoid paying access charges on this IXC traffic?**

23 A. Absolutely not. Level 3 agrees that this traffic is subject to access charges, and has  
24 language in its proposed agreement that provides for the payment of those access charges.  
25 However, for the reasons explained briefly above, it would be technically much more  
26 efficient to include this traffic on the same trunk group that Level 3 uses to deliver

1 “local” traffic to Qwest. That would allow Level 3 (and Qwest) to take advantage of the  
2 trunking efficiencies discussed above.

3 **Q. What other trunking issues exist between Level 3 and Qwest?**

4 A. Qwest seems reluctant to accept incoming IP-enabled traffic (that is, traffic that  
5 originated by means of a broadband data connection as opposed to a normal telephone) at  
6 all. To the extent that it will accept the traffic, however, it wants that traffic, too, to be on  
7 trunks other than the existing “local” interconnection trunks. In addition, Qwest may  
8 even want separate trunking for some calls from its customers to ISPs served by Level 3.

9 **Q. Is there any technical reason to require separate trunk groups for local, IntraLATA,  
10 InterLATA, ISP-bound, and/or IP-enabled calls?**

11 A. No. Although various kinds of calls might begin in non-PSTN format, or be transported  
12 some or all of the way along their journey in a non-PSTN format (such as IP-enabled),  
13 Level 3 delivers all of its traffic bound for Qwest subscribers in standard PSTN circuit  
14 switched format and standard SS7 signaling, and receives all traffic from Qwest in that  
15 same, standard format. (As I mentioned above, one of the capabilities of our softswitches  
16 is precisely to do the necessary conversions from IP to PSTN format and vice-versa). So,  
17 all traffic coming from Qwest is obviously in normal PSTN format, and by the time we  
18 deliver any this traffic to Qwest, it is all in that same format as well — no matter what  
19 transformations and changes it may undergo at other parts of its journey.

20 Now, not surprisingly, Qwest and Level 3 have some disputes about the proper  
21 charging regime to apply to traffic that might fall into different regulatory categories.  
22 But no matter how those disputes might turn out, there is absolutely no technical reason  
23 to carry these different regulatory “types” of traffic on different trunk groups. Yet, that is  
24 what Qwest is proposing to require.

25 **Q. Would it be efficient to build two highways right next to each other, both going to  
26 the same place?**

1 A. No. One large highway is, obviously, more efficient than two smaller highways with the  
2 same number of lanes. As noted above, car traffic on a highway behaves in the much the  
3 same way as traffic on a telephone network. The same types of traffic engineering  
4 calculations are used to size both. The same types of congestion, blocking and capacity  
5 are common to both. Again, though, that is what Qwest's language would seem to  
6 require.

7 **Q. What are some of the reasons why a single large trunk group is better than multiple**  
8 **smaller trunk groups?**

9 A. As alluded to above, requiring multiple trunk groups along the same path between two  
10 switches is unnecessary, inefficient, costly, and can harm network performance. For  
11 example, one key problem is that using multiple trunk groups will lower the blocking  
12 Grade of Service (GOS), unless additional trunks are installed.

13 **Q. Why would the requirement for separate trunk groups cause Level 3 to build**  
14 **separate networks?**

15 A. To meet the Qwest requirement, Level 3 would need to order, build and provision  
16 multiple trunk groups from the Level 3 switch serving the state to each Qwest tandem,  
17 and over time to each end office. Essentially, Level 3 would need to build a separate  
18 network for each type of traffic that Qwest requires to be split out. Each separate  
19 network would be composed of transport facilities and switching facilities between the  
20 Level 3 switch to all Qwest tandems and eventually to virtually all Qwest end offices.  
21 Over time, this would require needless duplication of both transport and switch facilities,  
22 for both Level 3 and Qwest.

23 **Q. Why is this inefficient?**

24 A. From a network point of view, it is always preferable to combine as much traffic as  
25 possible on single trunk groups. Large single trunk groups are much more efficient than  
26 multiple smaller trunk groups. For example, one trunk group with four DS1s will handle

1 much more traffic than two trunk groups, each with two DS1s. To handle the same  
2 amount of traffic, the two trunk groups would need to contain 3 DS1s each to have the  
3 same capacity. This would require a total of six DS1s to do the same job as four DS1s on  
4 one trunk group. “Breakage” of a single trunk group into multiple trunk groups always  
5 requires additional trunks to carry the same traffic load with the same blocking grade of  
6 service.

7 **Q. Earlier you mentioned “blocking grade of service.” What does that term refer to?**

8 A. Blocking Grade of Service (“GOS”) is the measure of call blocking on a trunk group.  
9 Blocking is generally measured at the busy hour and is given as a percent of the calls that  
10 are blocked due to insufficient trunk capacity. A standard, acceptable blocking GOS  
11 would be 2% end-to-end. This means that for every 100 calls that customers try to make  
12 that would be carried on that route, group, two calls will be blocked due to insufficient  
13 capacity. When 2% call blocking is desired end-to-end, an allocation is made to various  
14 facilities and equipment to achieve the 2%. Typically, a trunk group between two  
15 switches is allocated 1% blocking level so that 2% can be maintained end-to-end. This is  
16 due to the fact that many calls involve more than one switch and thus more than one  
17 trunk group. There are also small probabilities of blocking on digital loop carrier  
18 equipment and associated loop transport. (Within the traditional PSTN, you would know  
19 that you had encountered blocking on a trunk group when you heard a “fast busy” signal,  
20 or a recording telling you that “all circuits are busy.”)

21 **Q. What is the impact on blocking GOS when a large amount of traffic must be broken  
22 down into multiple trunk groups?**

23 A. If a large trunk group (say, 48 DS0s, or 2 DS1s) is split into multiple trunk groups with  
24 the same total size (two groups of 1 DS1 each), the overall carrying capacity of the  
25 multiple smaller trunk groups is smaller than the carrying capacity of the original one  
26 trunk group. The laws of trunk engineering dictate that the total number of trunk

1 members in multiple trunk groups must be significantly larger in order to carry the same  
2 amount of traffic. The effect is like congestion on the highway. One four-lane highway  
3 will carry considerably more traffic than two, 2-lane highways. For example, a single  
4 trunk group with 48 members (two DS1s) can carry about 15% more traffic than two  
5 trunk groups with 24 members each.

6 **Q. Is there another type of inefficiency with respect to splitting a large trunk group into**  
7 **multiple smaller trunk groups?**

8 A. Yes. Earlier I mentioned “breakage.” This term is used to describe the problem when  
9 facilities with discrete sizes must be divided into smaller facilities. As I noted earlier, the  
10 DS1 (24 DS0s, or 24 simultaneous calls) is the smallest normal unit in which trunks  
11 between switches are ordered and provisioned. This is because the DS1 is the most  
12 common size of “port” on switching and transport equipment. This makes the practical  
13 effect of the inefficiencies of breaking a large trunk group down into two or more smaller  
14 trunk groups even worse.

15 For example, suppose that if a trunk group needs a total capacity of 30 DS0  
16 trunks. Because trunks are ordered and provisioned in DS1 units, two DS1s must be used  
17 (that is, 48 DS0s). Even though the need is only for 6 DS0s above the first DS1, two  
18 complete DS1s will be established, because the switching and transport gear accepts  
19 trunk groups in DS1-sized “chunks.”

20 Now, if this trunk group must be divided to handle two different call types on two  
21 different trunk groups, it is quite possible that the ratio between the two call types is not  
22 50/50. If the trunk requirement is larger than a multiple of 24 (even if it is only one trunk  
23 member larger – say 25 DS0s) a new DS1 must be provisioned and the associated  
24 equipment added to terminate the new DS1. Coupled with the need for additional  
25 capacity to maintain the same blocking GOS, this leads to significant increases in the  
26 overall number of DS1s needed for a given traffic volume when the trunk groups must be

1 split. Taking this factor and the blocking factor into account, one trunk group with 48  
2 members cannot be replaced with two trunk groups of 24 members. To get the same  
3 blocking grade of service using two trunk groups, both trunk groups would need to have  
4 two DS1s. So the effect of splitting the large trunk group into two is actually to *double*  
5 the total number of DS1s needed — to carry the *exact same amount of traffic!*

6 **Q. What cost elements are added to the network when multiple separate trunk groups  
7 must be maintained?**

8 A. In physical terms, to establish a DS1 trunk group between two switches requires,  
9 essentially, the following. First, each switch must be programmed to separately identify  
10 the traffic bound for the particular trunk group and to direct that traffic to the appropriate  
11 “port” on the switch. Second, there must actually *be* a trunk port (a separate physical  
12 device) available on the switch to accommodate the new DS1 trunk group. The capacity  
13 of switches to accommodate new trunk ports is limited; at some point it is necessary to  
14 add new switch modules (that contain more ports) in order to add new trunk groups, and,  
15 for any given switch, at some point the total number of ports is reached and the only way  
16 to establish a new trunk port is to add a new switch.

17 The same holds true for the transmission medium (in Level 3’s case, typically  
18 optical fiber) used to carry a DS1 trunk group between Level 3 and Qwest. The DS1  
19 trunk physically runs from the Level 3 switch to a device known as a digital cross-  
20 connect system (DCS) – which has its own DS1 ports and port-capacity limits – and then  
21 on to the fiber optic terminal (FOT) that actually sends and receives the laser signals used  
22 to convey information over optical fiber. The FOT also has its own DS1 ports and port-  
23 capacity limits. Adding DS1s, therefore, sooner or later requires the purchase of  
24 additional trunk ports on switches, DCSs, and FOTs, eventually requiring that these  
25 devices be “grown” or that new switches, DCSs, and/or FOTs be purchased. Obviously,  
26 over time this will greatly increase the capital requirements of operating the network.

1           Finally, although obviously much of the operation of a modern  
2 telecommunications network is automatic, behind the scenes a large number of people are  
3 required to monitor, maintain and operate the system. Provisioning and maintaining  
4 additional trunk groups and the resultant facilities requires additional staff time as well.

5           From Level 3's perspective, when it is necessary to incur these costs due to  
6 growth in traffic volume, we of course do so. But at the same time, if it is *not* necessary  
7 to incur these costs in order to carry a given volume of traffic, we obviously do not want  
8 to do so. This is why the issue of using efficient trunking arrangements is so important to  
9 Level 3, and why we believe that it is entirely unreasonable to allow Qwest to require that  
10 traffic be broken down into multiple, smaller trunk groups if there is no technical reason  
11 for doing it.

12 **Q.    Would Qwest face the same inefficiencies from multiple trunk groups that you have**  
13 **described above for Level 3?**

14 A.    Yes. Just like Level 3, Qwest would need to dedicate DS1 ports on its FOTs, DCSs, and  
15 switches to the additional DS1 trunk groups made necessary by inefficient, multiple trunk  
16 groups.

17 **Q.    Why would Qwest want to impose such inefficiencies on itself?**

18 A.    I obviously can't say for sure. That said, it is well known among telecommunications  
19 engineers that traffic is migrating off the traditional landline PSTN. Some normal voice  
20 traffic is just "disappearing" as end users communicate via email and instant messaging,  
21 rather than making telephone calls at all. Some PSTN voice traffic is migrating to  
22 wireless, as people use their cell phones to make calls that would otherwise have been  
23 made over the landline network. Some PSTN voice traffic (although not as much as  
24 Qwest might want the Commission to believe, at least in the short run, as Mr. Gates  
25 describes) is migrating to VoIP services such as those offered by Vonage or Skype.  
26 Unless Qwest had perfect foresight, it is quite possible that it overestimated its own needs

1 for capacity and could well have over-invested in switch, DCS, and/or FOT capacity. (Of  
2 course, since Level 3 is a relatively new and still-growing carrier, Level 3 is not sitting  
3 around with excess capacity on its switches, FOTs, etc. Level 3 has to spend capital  
4 dollars to meet growing demand.) In that situation, Qwest might see it as advantageous  
5 to *require* a competitor like Level 3 to use an inefficiently large number of trunks. If  
6 Qwest already has the excess capacity on hand — which it would, if total demand for its  
7 services was shrinking — then it could impose large capital and other costs on Level 3,  
8 with little or no new cost to itself, simply by convincing this Commission that there was  
9 some reason to require multiple, inefficient trunk groups.

10 **Q. Are there still other potential problems with Qwest’s proposal?**

11 A. Yes. Taking essentially the reverse of the situation described above, if Qwest does *not*  
12 have excess capacity, Qwest might actually not be able to add the necessary trunk ports in  
13 a timely fashion. This would put an effective limit on the rate at which Level 3 could  
14 grow and make competitive inroads in the market. At least from the perspective of the  
15 industry as a whole, this is not hypothetical. As I understand it, in a case within the last  
16 year or so, the FCC found that Verizon had violated the Communications Act by reason  
17 of having insufficient capacity to permit interconnection with a competitor (Core  
18 Communications) to grow. If a true industry giant like Verizon did not invest in enough  
19 capacity to handle growth in interconnection requirements, it is of course possible that  
20 Qwest would be in the same position.

21 **Q. Will there be any increase in misrouted calls if “local,” “toll,” and other “types” of  
22 are carried on a single, large trunk group?**

23 A. No, not at all. Briefly, to determine how to route a call, the switches looks at the first six  
24 digits of the telephone number (the “NPA-NXX”). Part of the human staff effort  
25 described above in administering trunk groups is properly programming the switch to  
26 know that, if the NPA-NXX of the called number on an outgoing call is “602-222,” the

1 call gets routed to “Trunk Group XX,” but if the NPA-NXX is “602-555,” the call gets  
2 routed instead to “Trunk Group YY.”

3 Of course, in actual practice it’s a bit more complicated than that. For example, if  
4 the called number has been ported from its original carrier to a competing carrier, the  
5 switch doesn’t look at the NPA-NXX of the number that was actually *dialed*, it looks at  
6 the “NPA-NXX”-equivalent portion of the “Location Routing Number,” or LRN. And, if  
7 the NPA-NXX in question is subject to “thousands-block pooling,” it will be necessary to  
8 look not only at the first six digits of the number (the NPA-NXX), but also at the seventh  
9 digit — essentially, the NPA-NXX-X — as well.

10 But the point is that none of this activity involved in routing a call outbound from  
11 Qwest to Level 3, or vice versa, is affected in any way by any regulatory overlay that  
12 classifies a call as “local” or “toll” or “intraLATA” or “IP-enabled” or “ISP-bound” or  
13 “interstate” or “intrastate.” What matters is the dialed number or, for ported numbers the  
14 LRN. The rest of the regulatory stuff has literally no impact at all on call routing.<sup>1</sup> The  
15 network will have no trouble correctly routing any type of calls, no matter how many are  
16 combined on the same trunk group. While there will always be some small numbers of  
17 misrouted calls in the network, this number will not increase when these traffic types are  
18 combined on the same trunk group.

19 **Q. Does combining different regulatory “types” of traffic (such as local and access**  
20 **traffic) on the same trunk group result in an increase in the possibility of fraud or**  
21 **intentional misrouting of calls?**

22  
23 <sup>1</sup> In fact, even if there *is* a regulatory requirement to treat some class of traffic differently for *routing* purposes,  
24 such a requirement is basically impossible to implement unless the requirement can be translated into handling  
25 calls with different NPA-NXXs differently. For example, that’s how interLATA calls are routed to a  
26 customer’s presubscribed long distance carrier. Originating ILEC switches contain a list of NPA-NXXs that are  
“local” to the switch contained in their programming, along with a particular trunk port assigned for outgoing  
calls to each “local” NPA-NXX. If a customer dials an NPA-NXX that is not on that list, either the call will be  
sent to the customer’s presubscribed IXC or, in areas where “1+” dialing is required for toll calls, directed to a  
recording saying that the call “cannot be completed as dialed” or some similar message.

1 A. No. Any company can intentionally misroute calls to perpetrate fraud, whether or not  
2 traffic is combined on a single trunk group. Dishonest carriers can change the SS7 call  
3 identification information to make access traffic appear to be local traffic if they so  
4 choose. This can be done whether the traffic is put on separate trunk groups or on a  
5 single trunk group. Level 3 always pays the appropriate access charges for access traffic  
6 and has no intention of changing call information or inappropriately routing calls to avoid  
7 access charges. But requiring separate trunk groups to prevent so-called “call  
8 laundering” is no more useful or effective than it would be to require banks to provide  
9 one copy of everyone’s bank statement on plain white paper, and then an extra copy on  
10 special yellow-and red-striped paper, to prevent “money laundering.” You can establish  
11 such a requirement — obviously at an increased cost — but doing so has nothing to do  
12 with preventing the problem at issue.

13 **Q. Please describe the process by which proper bills for intercarrier compensation are**  
14 **developed.**

15 A. Normally billing for intercarrier compensation is accomplished in several stages. First,  
16 the SS7 signaling network transmits data about an incoming call, such as the  
17 identification of the carrier delivering the call, the calling number, the dialed number, the  
18 LRN if the dialed number has been ported, etc. The switch receiving the traffic generates  
19 a record, known as an “AMA” record in traditional PSTN circuit switches, that records  
20 this information, along with other information such as the time (to the second) that the  
21 call starts and stops, perhaps the specific trunk on which the call was received, and other  
22 switch-specific information. These “AMA” records are then processed through what is  
23 known as a “mediation” system into industry-standard “EMI” (or “electronic message  
24 interchange”) records. The EMI record basically takes the AMA or equivalent data and  
25 puts it into an industry-standard format (sometimes known as a “CDR,” or “call detail  
26

1 record”). These records are then run through a billing system that applies programmed  
2 logic to the data in the records to determine whether, how much, and who to bill.

3 This process normally occurs on a call-record-by-call-record basis. So, it doesn’t  
4 actually matter, for LEC-to-LEC traffic exchange, whether the traffic on a given trunk is  
5 subject to different charging regimes or the same; each call is (or can be) rated  
6 individually.

7 **Q. Is that the way all carriers actually bill for this type of traffic exchange?**

8 A. No. First, some carriers have less capable mediation or billing systems than others, so  
9 not all carriers are capable of performing the call-by-call review. Another carrier might  
10 have a bill-and-keep arrangement with respect to much or all of the traffic exchanged  
11 with interconnected LECs, and so not need to go through the call-by-call process.  
12 Second, carriers can establish a Percent Local Use (PLU) and Percent Interstate Use  
13 (PIU) for calls on a trunk group, updating the information periodically to assure that it is  
14 correct. Basically, instead of reviewing the call-by-call data on a monthly basis for  
15 billing, all or a sample of a month’s traffic is reviewed periodically to determine what  
16 percent of traffic falls into which billing category. In this regard, Level 3 has offered to  
17 track the Percent of IP Use (PIPU) to measure the percent of IP-Enabled traffic that is  
18 exchanged between the parties.<sup>2</sup> This information can be audited if there is any doubt as  
19 to its validity. These two methods are being used today by various CLECs and ILECs to  
20 manage the combining of different traffic types on trunk groups.

21 **Q. How does Level 3 propose to calculate the PLU factor?**

22 A. I describe the process in detail below in Section XI of this testimony, “Determination of  
23 Traffic Types.” This process is being used by Level 3 in all of the Bell South states, SBC  
24  
25

26 <sup>2</sup> See Intercarrier Compensation Sections 3.2.2.4 -3.2.2.5, Issue IC-2. See Intercarrier Compensation Sections 3.2.2.4  
-3.2.2.5, Issue IC-2.

1 states, and Verizon states, and similar processes are used by other CLECs with the  
2 ILECs.

3 **Q. Have other companies dealt with the billing issues associated with combining**  
4 **different types of traffic on interconnection trunks?**

5 A. Yes. Other CLECs have been using factors in many states for more than five years.  
6 Several IXCs with CLEC affiliates combine different traffic types on FGD trunks with  
7 Qwest, using PLU to handle carrier billing. These IXCs started off with an FGD network  
8 for the purpose of exchanging intrastate and interstate access traffic. As their business  
9 strategy changed and these carriers decided to enter the local market, they made use of  
10 the FGD network that was already in place to handle the exchange of all their traffic.  
11 Similarly, Level 3 started out with a “local” network established for the purpose of  
12 exchanging “local” traffic. As described above, there is no technical or “billing”-related  
13 reason that Level 3 should not be able to use those same trunks for terminating FGD and  
14 other types of traffic. In this regard, the distinction between local and toll services is fast  
15 disappearing. Level 3’s customers are demanding packaged services that include the  
16 termination of intrastate and interstate access traffic. Level 3 would like to be able to  
17 make most efficient use of the network that is already in place today. Qwest and Level 3  
18 will be able to do so if Qwest is required to allow the exchange of all traffic over the  
19 existing “local” trunks.<sup>3</sup>

20 **Q. Does Qwest use a PLU for distinguishing local and IntraLATA toll traffic on**  
21 **interconnection trunks?**

22 A. Yes. That is, Qwest already permits the combination of local and intraLATA toll traffic  
23 — normally subject to different charging regimes — on a single trunk group, and uses  
24

25 <sup>3</sup> Qwest calls these “LIS” trunks, for “Local Interconnection Service,” but that is actually a misnomer. Qwest and  
26 Level 3 are co-carriers; although each is responsible for the transport and termination of traffic delivered by the  
other, Qwest is not providing Level 3 a “service” in the normal sense, any more than Level 3 is providing Qwest a  
“service.” Rather, in order for each carrier to provide full “service” to its respective customers, the two carriers  
enter into interconnection arrangements.

1 PLU factors for determining how many minutes are subject to access charges and how  
2 many are subject to reciprocal compensation. In other words, even Qwest allows mixed  
3 traffic on the same trunk group today. To distinguish the traffic that is subject to  
4 reciprocal compensation from the traffic that is subject to intrastate access, it provides on  
5 a quarterly basis, a PLU factor to the terminating carrier. Likewise, it expects any carrier  
6 originating traffic that terminates to Qwest to provide a PLU factor to Qwest. It is neither  
7 technically challenging nor in any way unreasonable to extend that process to include a  
8 PIU or other factors to determine the distribution of traffic among whatever different  
9 regulatory traffic “types” might end up existing under our final contract.

10 **Q. Has Level 3 agreed to send only “local” traffic to Qwest’s “local only” tandem**  
11 **switches?**

12 A. Yes. Most Qwest switches are currently carrying both local and toll traffic. These  
13 switches can easily handle trunk groups that carry both local and toll traffic. Where  
14 Qwest has a tandem switch that currently only handles local traffic, however, as an  
15 accommodation, Level 3 has agreed to send only local traffic to such switches. However,  
16 I would emphasize that Level 3 agreed to this not because it thinks this is good network  
17 engineering. To the contrary, for all the reasons discussed above, it is not sensible to  
18 separate traffic into different types and trunk groups if not required. Because the amount  
19 of affected traffic is small in this case, however, Level 3 chose not to continue to dispute  
20 with Qwest on this topic in the limited circumstance of “local only” tandems.

21 **Q. Has Level 3 agreed not to send toll traffic that doesn’t terminate to Qwest end users**  
22 **or UNE/resale customers to Qwest end office switches?**

23 A. Yes. Qwest has told Level 3 that it expects difficulty with Independent Telephone  
24 Companies (“ITCs”) and other CLECs that expect to receive recording data from the  
25 Qwest tandem switch when an IXC terminates traffic to such other carrier’s through  
26 Qwest’s network. Because Qwest has chosen to configure its so-called “LIS” trunks

1 without the same recording capabilities as FGD trunks have, Qwest will not be able to  
2 provide such data to these carriers. This would create a situation in which these 3<sup>rd</sup> party  
3 LECs would receive traffic as to which they would legitimately be entitled to charge  
4 access rates, but as to which they would have inadequate information to actually render  
5 an access bill. To avoid this situation, for the relatively limited amount of IXC traffic  
6 that Level 3 will deliver to Qwest for further delivery to ITCs or other CLECs, Level 3  
7 has agreed to send such traffic only to Qwest's toll tandems where adequate recordings  
8 for the 3<sup>rd</sup> parties can be made. Again, Level 3 is making this accommodation to Qwest  
9 because its impact is relatively small. The fact that we are doing so does not mean that it  
10 would be sensible to generally carve out different types of traffic for separate trunking,  
11 for all the reasons discussed above.

12 **Q. Qwest states that Level 3 must design its interconnection to comport with Qwest's**  
13 **existing network and not interconnect in a manner that risks exhausting Qwest**  
14 **tandems. Are these statements justified?**

15 A. Qwest is completely wrong to suggest that Level 3 is or should be required to design any  
16 part of its network to mirror, match, duplicate, or conform to Qwest's network design.  
17 Put aside the fact, as discussed above, that Level 3 is a new carrier without any need (yet)  
18 for a ubiquitous network such as Qwest's; and put aside the fact that Level 3's customer  
19 base differs from that of Qwest, which would lead to a different network design. The fact  
20 is that network technology has changed so much since Qwest started deploying its  
21 network in Oregon that if *Qwest* were building a new network today, to serve its own  
22 existing customer base, *Qwest itself* would not re-generate the same network that it  
23 actually has today. It makes no engineering or technical sense to suggest that there is  
24 anything sacrosanct, or even particularly efficient or optimal, about Qwest's existing  
25 network. There is not.

1 Now, that said, Qwest does have a legitimate technical concern that neither Level  
2 3 nor any other interconnected carrier should deliver such large amounts of traffic to  
3 Qwest's tandem that the capacity of the tandem itself would be overloaded. It is standard  
4 practice in the circuit-switched telephone industry to establish direct trunks between  
5 switches when the level of traffic between them exceeds a certain level. Given this,  
6 Level 3 is perfectly willing to work with Qwest to avoid the problem of tandem overload  
7 by jointly engineering separate trunk groups that go directly between Level 3 and those  
8 Qwest end offices with enough traffic to justify the direct trunking. These are known in  
9 the industry as "Direct End Office Trunks," or DEOTs.

10 **Q. Doesn't establishing DEOTs lead to the creation of multiple trunk groups, which**  
11 **you have testified above are inefficient?**

12 A. To a certain extent, yes. However, all network engineering involves making tradeoffs.  
13 There is, to coin a phrase, no such thing as a free lunch. While looking at trunking alone,  
14 it is more efficient for both Qwest and Level 3 to connect their networks with a single,  
15 massive trunk group from Level 3 to Qwest's tandem, that requires that all traffic  
16 between the parties be switched by Qwest twice, once at the end office, and once at the  
17 tandem. In addition, it requires Qwest to make use of three trunk ports for all traffic  
18 between the networks: one at the "Level 3" side of Qwest's tandem, to accept incoming  
19 traffic and send outbound traffic to Level 3; another at the "Qwest Network" side of  
20 Qwest's tandem, to connect the tandem to trunks bound for particular end offices; and  
21 then a third trunk port at the end office itself, to connect that end office to the tandem.  
22 With DEOTs, even though the total number of trunks will be higher than would be the  
23 case in a single massive trunk group, Qwest is able to avoid the use of tandem switching  
24 and to cut down on the total number of trunk ports it has to use. Level 3 is certainly  
25 willing to work with Qwest to permit Qwest to obtain those network efficiencies.  
26

1 **Q. Given these technical concerns with establishing multiple trunk groups along the**  
2 **lines Qwest is suggesting, how do the key technology policies you identified earlier in**  
3 **your testimony relate to the question of establishing multiple trunk groups to the**  
4 **same Qwest switch or switches?**

5 A. From a high-level policy perspective, on this issue, Qwest is trying to drag Level 3 back  
6 into the past. Level 3 proposes to deliver traffic to each Qwest switch on a single,  
7 efficient, combined trunk group. Qwest, however, is not concerned about technical  
8 efficiency. Instead, because it thinks that different kinds of traffic fall into different  
9 regulatory buckets, it wants those types of traffic sent on separate trunk groups. This is  
10 anticompetitive, because, as described above, it will impose needless costs on Level 3. It  
11 is also contrary to the development and encouragement of new services, in that it forces  
12 Level 3 to classify traffic in accordance with the old, existing service classifications with  
13 which Qwest seems most comfortable. And, particularly in the case of VoIP traffic  
14 (addressed below), the inefficiencies imposed by Qwest's suggested requirement of  
15 separate trunking for different "types" of traffic will act to directly suppress the  
16 development of this exciting Internet-based innovative service.

17 **Q. In order to be perfectly clear, how does the issue of establishing separate trunk**  
18 **groups for different types of traffic relate to the question of establishing new,**  
19 **physical points of interconnection — that is, new transmission facilities — between**  
20 **Level 3 and Qwest?**

21 A. As noted above, physical transmission facilities and trunk groups are two different things.  
22 One way to look at it is to consider a physical highway running between two cities.  
23 Looking just at the one city-to-city route, the transmission "facility" is the physical slab  
24 of concrete and asphalt that the cars and trunks will drive on. Setting up a trunk group is  
25 analogous to drawing lane lines on the concrete, indicating that some lanes are for traffic  
26

1 going northbound, some for traffic going southbound, some for trucks only, some for  
2 passenger cars only, etc.

3 As between two communications networks, a single, high-capacity fiber optic  
4 facility between the two networks can easily contain dozens of different trunk groups.  
5 One trunk group might be traffic directed to the ILEC tandem. Another trunk group  
6 might be traffic directed to a specific ILEC end office switch. Still another trunk group  
7 might carry traffic bound for the ILEC's operator service network. But whatever might  
8 lead the carriers to establish different trunk groups (such as traffic bound for different  
9 switches), that is a totally separate question from any need to establish different physical  
10 facilities linking the carriers' networks. The idea behind setting up a physical "meet  
11 point" between two networks is that each carrier is responsible for all the switching,  
12 transmission and related facilities on its side of the meet point. The two carriers then  
13 cooperate with each other to establish whatever trunk groups need to be established,  
14 ***carried over that meet point interconnection facility.***

15 Given this, it is important to recognize that the establishment of separate direct  
16 end office ***trunks*** does not at all mean that it makes sense to establish any separate  
17 ***facilities*** linking Level 3 with Qwest end offices. To the contrary, the ***facilities*** to carry  
18 the trunks from the Qwest tandem location (where Level 3 will normally physically  
19 interconnect in a LATA) to the affected end office already exist; they are the same  
20 facilities (normally optical fiber) that carry the traffic from the tandem to the end office  
21 before the DEOT is established. The new DEOT trunk group will ride the same fiber  
22 optic interconnection facility between Qwest and Level 3 that all other traffic rides, at the  
23 parties' single POI in the LATA.

24 All that said, it makes no sense at all to suggest, as Qwest does, that putting local,  
25 toll, or other types of traffic on a single combined trunk group will risk exhausting Qwest  
26 tandems in any way. What avoids exhausting Qwest's tandem is establishing DEOTs to

1 carry *all* the traffic from Level 3 to a Qwest end office on an efficient basis. Level 3 is  
2 willing to do this. Simply provisioning several inefficient trunk groups of separate  
3 “types” of traffic to Qwest’s tandem will not only not help with tandem exhaust, it will  
4 cause the tandem to exhaust its trunk port capacity more rapidly than keeping the  
5 different types of traffic together in the same trunk group. Again, the solution to tandem  
6 exhaust is DEOTs — which separate traffic out based on *destination switch* — not  
7 separate trunk groups for different “types” of traffic.

8 **Q. How do the key technology policies you identified earlier in your testimony relate to**  
9 **the prospect of Level 3 being required to establish additional physical POIs — that**  
10 **is, additional physical transmission facilities between Level 3 and Qwest?**

11 A. Each of the three pro-technology policies identified above supports allowing Level 3 to  
12 interconnect by means of a single POI until and unless Level 3 itself believes additional  
13 POIs are needed. For this issue, the primary policy is the promotion and encouragement  
14 of competition. Although Level 3, as noted above, has invested billions of dollars in its  
15 advanced, fiber-optic, IP-based network, that does not mean that it can or should be  
16 called upon to mirror or duplicate the local network architecture of the ILECs with which  
17 it interconnects and competes. To the contrary, it would be extraordinary to conclude  
18 that a competitor like Level 3 would have any rational interest in duplicating the  
19 incumbent’s network architecture.

20 The essence of Level 3’s local business plan is to identify customers with high  
21 levels of Internet-based communications, either incoming, outgoing, or both, and provide  
22 highly efficient links for such customers both “upstream” to the Internet itself and  
23 “downstream” to the PSTN. Level 3 has no independent business reason — and certainly  
24 no engineering reason — to try to re-create Qwest’s local network architecture. Instead,  
25 what Level 3 primarily needs from Qwest in order to serve its customers is efficient,  
26 seamless interconnection between Level 3’s network and Qwest’s network. It seems

1 plain that efficient interconnection of this type will be degraded if Level 3 is subject to  
2 regulatory obligations to establish multiple physical interconnections with Qwest, above  
3 and beyond those that are necessary to Level 3's business and that Level 3 will put into  
4 place itself.

5 As I note elsewhere in my testimony, Level 3 is not averse to establishing  
6 multiple physical points of interconnection in a LATA when traffic levels and other  
7 factors so warrant; but *requiring* Level 3 to interconnect at multiple points on Qwest's  
8 network really boils down to punishing Level 3 — in the form of needless mandated  
9 capital expenditures — for not having the same network, the same customer base, and the  
10 same business plan as Qwest. This is contrary not only to the policy of encouraging  
11 competition, but also to the policy of encouraging the deployment of new, innovative  
12 services and network architectures.

13 Clearly, as a policy matter, Qwest is simply wrong in insisting that Level 3 should  
14 have to establish more than one physical POI within a LATA.

15 **Q. What is Level 3 asking this Commission to decide on this issue?**

16 A. Level 3 is asking this Commission to rule that Qwest must allow Level 3 to use single  
17 interconnection trunk groups between the carrier's switches instead of multiple trunk  
18 groups, using PLU, PIU and PIPU for carrier compensation and billing purposes. This  
19 will preserve network efficiency, maintain reasonable call blocking standards, and  
20 minimize the trunking and switching equipment both parties need for interconnection.  
21 The language that Level 3 is proposing for this issue is fair and balanced and will allow  
22 the efficient use of trunks by both companies.



1           In contrast to the PSTN, the Internet is comprised of (among other things)  
2 hundreds of thousands of routers and switches owned by tens of thousands of different  
3 companies. Routers and switches with new networks attached are added to the Internet  
4 every day. Anyone who abides by the standards and protocols used on the Internet can  
5 set up a new network and connect themselves or their customers to the Internet without  
6 any detailed application process or regulatory scrutiny.

7 **Q. What is Voice over Internet Protocol, or VoIP?**

8 A. One of the basic protocols of the Internet is called “IP,” which means (sensibly enough)  
9 “Internet Protocol.” Another basic protocol is called “TCP,” or “Transaction Control  
10 Protocol.” There are many, many protocols that work with these basic protocols to define  
11 how the Internet performs various functions. These include SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer  
12 Protocol, used for email); FTP (File Transfer Protocol, used to allow the retrieval of files  
13 from remote locations); HTTP (Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol, used for transmitting web  
14 pages and establishing web links); and many others. All of these different protocols rely  
15 on the basic TCP/IP protocols to permit different applications (email, file transfer, world-  
16 wide web, etc.) to function on the Internet.

17           Voice over Internet Protocol, or VoIP, refers to various specific protocols that use  
18 the basic TCP/IP system to treat voice communications like any other Internet  
19 application. With VoIP, telephony signals, including voice signals, are digitized and  
20 transmitted as packets to their destination, just as with an email, streaming video, or any  
21 other kind of IP transaction. While the PSTN, as noted above, was designed with a laser-  
22 sharp focus on one thing — delivering voice calls — the Internet focuses equally sharply  
23 on something very different — delivering data packets, no matter what those data packets  
24 might represent. This means that while the PSTN treats data as some unusual thing that  
25 requires special treatment, the Internet treats all data the same — even if the data in  
26

1 question happens to represent a voice call. As a result, the Internet essentially destroys  
2 the old distinctions between “voice” and “data” that are a standard part of PSTN thinking.

3 Indeed, because the information associated with any particular application is  
4 broken down into packets of bits and does not re-assume its original form (i.e. sound, text  
5 or pictures) until it is reassembled at the terminating end, it is virtually impossible to  
6 assign the transmission of packets to any particular service classification at any point  
7 other than origin or destination. An IP network provider, for example, can be carrying  
8 real-time two-way voice packets without actually offering voice service to any end-user  
9 customer.

10 When a VoIP call starts with a computer or with some device on a broadband data  
11 network (such as a DSL line or a cable modem service), and then is delivered to the  
12 PSTN, the protocol, or format, of the transmission has clearly and fundamentally  
13 changed. Specifically, a net protocol conversion is required to convert the packetized IP  
14 data into the Time Division Multiplexed (TDM) signal that is used on the PSTN. Today,  
15 VoIP applications come in many forms. Some resemble traditional phone service, from  
16 the point of view of the end user, more than others. But the application as a whole clearly  
17 entails changing the form (and perhaps even the content) of the signals at issue. As I  
18 understand the relevant regulatory classifications, this means that VoIP is properly  
19 viewed as an “information service” rather than a “telecommunications service.”

20 **Q. Is VoIP, as facilitated by Level 3, a telecommunications service?**

21 **A.** No. Level 3 performs many functions for its various customers. For example, Level 3 is  
22 a CLEC that performs telecommunications functions for its customers — transmission of  
23 traffic between points specified by the customer; assigning telephone numbers and  
24 switching calls to and from them, etc. But the service that Level 3 provides to VoIP  
25 entities is a translation or protocol conversion service that allows communications  
26 between end users of the PSTN and the Internet. This service enables customers to have

1 oral communications over the Internet that may seem to be the similar to ordinary  
2 telephone calls, but in fact are very different. Access to Level 3-provided VoIP is  
3 through high-speed data lines, not phone lines with phone numbers; and the terminal  
4 equipment is not a telephone, but a computer or computer phone. In this regard, the  
5 PSTN itself is not compatible or interoperable with the Internet. Frequently,  
6 communications from end users *to* the Internet are carried by means of PSTN services —  
7 this happens every time a customer dials up a connection to his or her ISP. But the only  
8 way that the PSTN can be actually *connected* to the Internet in any meaningful sense is  
9 by means of a protocol conversion of the signal from Time Division Multiplexing (TDM)  
10 on the PSTN to Internet Protocol (IP) for the Internet. Level 3 does a net (or complete)  
11 protocol conversion from TDM to IP to enable VoIP users to communicate with the end  
12 users of PSTN services.

13 **Q. What is net protocol conversion?**

14 A. Net protocol conversion occurs when the media stream that uses one protocol, native to  
15 one particular type of network, is converted into a different media stream using a  
16 different protocol on a different type of network. In the case of VoIP, a voice call  
17 originating on the PSTN using TDM must be converted to IP by packetizing the data,  
18 generating the Internet protocol and sending out the result on the packet network.

19 **Q. Is net protocol conversion necessary on VoIP calls between Level 3 and Qwest?**

20 A. Absolutely. All VoIP calls that begin with a Level 3 customer and terminate to a Qwest  
21 customer require a net protocol conversion. Likewise, calls that begin with a Qwest  
22 customer and terminate to a Level 3 customer also require a net protocol conversion. The  
23 reason for this is simple. Level 3 has no PSTN-like, TDM-using, circuit switches on its  
24 network. Any and all media streams generated by Level 3 will originate in an IP format  
25 and must be converted to TDM for terminating on the PSTN. The reverse is also true. A  
26 call originating from a Qwest end user (on the Qwest network) must be converted to IP in

1 order for Level 3 to move the signal through its network. In this regard, Level 3 has had  
2 to backwards-engineer its network to be able to facilitate the conversion from TDM  
3 based services offered on the PSTN to IP based services offered Level 3's (and others')  
4 next generation networks. Finally, Level 3 receives and terminates services to its ESP  
5 customers in an IP format – the media originated in TDM on the PSTN is *not* converted  
6 back to TDM by Level 3 before hand-off to its ESP customers. Thus, a net protocol  
7 conversion occurs – media streams go from IP to TDM or vice versa depending on  
8 whether Level 3 originates or terminates the call.

9 **Q. Does normal cellular telephony require a protocol conversion?**

10 A. No. The cell phone uses modulation and compression techniques in the over the air  
11 channel (from the cell phone's antenna to the cell site's antenna), but there is no protocol  
12 conversion at the cell site. The signal is demodulated and decoded as any radio signal  
13 would be. The cell phone and cell site are merely using an efficient means of radio  
14 communication. The cell site operates in the TDM domain and is part of the Public  
15 Switched Telephone Network. This is quite distinct from the protocol conversion that  
16 occurs between the IP domain and the TDM domain.

17 **Q. What type of customer premises equipment is needed for VoIP?**

18 A. VoIP requires specialized Customer Premises Equipment (CPE). Standard Touch Tone  
19 or dial pulse phones will not work on a VoIP network, unless they themselves are  
20 connected to a computer or similar device that *can* handle VoIP format. Special phones,  
21 called "SIP" phones ("SIP" stands for "Session Initiation Protocol," and is another  
22 Internet-related protocol like FTP, SMTP, and HTTP) can be used for VoIP. These  
23 phones have small computers built into them that packetize the voice data and generate  
24 SIP messages. Computers with headsets and microphones can also be used for VoIP.

1 **Q. Can a VoIP customer move his or her SIP phone or computer phone to different**  
2 **locations, while still maintaining the same phone number?**

3 A. Yes. A SIP phone or computer phone can be plugged into any broadband connection to  
4 receive VoIP service. The end user could send and receive calls from any location with  
5 this type of broadband connection. This gives VoIP users a degree of mobility that is not  
6 available to users of PSTN service. This type of mobility is coming to be known in the  
7 industry as a “nomadic” service, in order to distinguish it from more traditional “mobile”  
8 service of the kind provided by normal wireless phones.

9 **Q. Is there currently any way to determine where a VoIP user is located when he or she**  
10 **makes a call?**

11 A. No. At present, the geographic location of a VoIP user is indeterminate. That user can  
12 take a computer from one location to another and make VoIP calls in either location.  
13 Since the “telephone number” is resident in the computer terminal or SIP phone, the  
14 calling number is the same whether the device is located in Washington or Oregon. Of  
15 course, as one might imagine, an indeterminate location makes it challenging for VoIP  
16 services to function properly in connection with location-based E911 services. The VoIP  
17 industry is working on this issue, and the FCC recently required VoIP services that use  
18 normal telephone numbers and that meet certain other criteria to find a way to supply  
19 “normal” 911 capabilities to their users.

20 **Q. Cellular telephones can be used in any location. Do cellular providers and ILECs**  
21 **have the same problem with geographic location as VoIP service?**

22 A. No. The location of a cell phone user is always known within a pretty small geographic  
23 area. The cell phone registers with all cell sites that are nearby and service is provided by  
24 a particular cell site that has a definite location. So if a cell phone user travels from a  
25 home location in Washington to a location in Oregon, the cell phone system will  
26 automatically “know” that the user is in Oregon and not Washington when the user

1 makes a call. This is fundamentally different from the VoIP situation, where the  
2 geography of a call is not known by the ESP that provides the service or carrier that  
3 completes the call. Indeed, the broadband service provider to which a VoIP user  
4 connects his or her SIP phone in most cases probably has no idea that the packets going  
5 back and forth to that particular node on the network represent voice communications as  
6 opposed to email, web site traffic, or any other Internet activity.

7 **Q. Please describe the Level 3 fiber and IP networks.**

8 A. Level 3 has a large all fiber-optic backbone network that connects 68 markets in the U.S.  
9 and 17 markets in Europe, with over 16,000 route miles of fiber in the US intercity  
10 network and 3600 route miles in Europe. Exhibit RRD #1 shows the current  
11 configuration of the Level 3 fiber network that is installed and operational in the US.  
12 Riding on this Fiber Backbone, Level 3 maintains a large IP network that it manages as a  
13 separate network, composed of high-speed links and core routers. Exhibit RRD #2 shows  
14 the current configuration of Level 3's IP network. The Level 3 IP backbone is run as a  
15 private network and is connected to the public Internet via hundreds of peering  
16 arrangements at Level 3 Gateways, located in 29 metropolitan areas.<sup>5</sup> Level 3 central  
17 office facilities are state-of-the-art facilities in the heart of 70 major metropolitan areas.  
18 As noted earlier, these facilities range in size from 50,000 to 550,000 square feet of  
19 equipped floor space. This is where both local and intercity fiber networks terminate,  
20 where high-speed transmission equipment is situated, and where routers and Softswitch  
21 equipment is located.

22 **Q. Is Level 3 a facilities based carrier in Oregon?**

23  
24  
25 <sup>5</sup> Peering arrangements, as used here, refer to locations at which Level 3 exchanges traffic with other providers of  
26 Internet connectivity. Suppose an end user connected to an ISP that uses Level 3 for its Internet connectivity seeks  
to download information from a web site that is hosted by an ISP that uses some other entity (say, UUNet) for its  
Internet connectivity. For the information to get from the UUNet network to the Level 3 network, there must be  
connections between them. That is what the peering arrangements are.

1 A. Yes. Level 3 has fiber facilities in Oregon as well as Points of Interconnection (POIs)  
2 with Qwest. Exhibit RRD #3 shows the fiber route, fiber regeneration facilities and POIs  
3 in Oregon.

4 **Q. How has the Level 3 network been optimized for IP?**

5 A. The Level 3 network was designed as a high-speed packet network for carrying IP traffic.  
6 It is composed of IP routers instead of PSTN type switches, and all of its facility links are  
7 IP-based.

8 **Q. What is the basic difference between the PSTN and Level 3's IP based network?**

9 A. As noted above, the PSTN was designed to carry voice traffic. The PSTN is made up of  
10 circuit switches and facilities linking them that carry circuit-based phone traffic. The  
11 Level 3 IP network is a data network, not a voice network. It is made up of IP routers  
12 and IP data links between the routers.

13 **Q. What types of customers does Level 3 serve and what types of services do they use?**

14 A. Level 3 serves ESPs and ISPs, a subset of ESPs. ISPs require local connectivity to the  
15 PSTN and transport and termination services from Level 3, including modem banks and  
16 collocation space. ESPs and ISPs use the Level 3 network to pass all types of data,  
17 including email, web download services, computer-to-computer data transfer, VoIP and  
18 other streaming media. Level 3 also serves cable companies, DSL providers some large  
19 enterprise companies and other carriers with transport and termination of VoIP and TDM  
20 traffic.

21 **Q. Do Level 3 customers need Level 3 to provide them with the ability to receive traffic  
22 from the PSTN and to originate traffic bound for the PSTN?**

23 A. Yes. Traditional ISPs need to receive dial-up modem access from the PSTN. Though  
24 high-speed service from cable and DSL is becoming increasingly popular, there are still a  
25 great number of customers who utilize dial-up modems to access the Internet from the  
26 PSTN, in part because the costs of high-speed access to the edge of the network are still

1 too expensive for many customers. Many Qwest customers today call Level 3's ISP  
2 customers for dial up Internet service. Level 3's VoIP customers today need Level 3 to  
3 complete calls to Qwest end users and to receive calls from Qwest end users bound for  
4 Level 3's customers' end users.

5 **Q. Can you give a general description of what happens with a VoIP call?**

6 A. Exhibit RRD #9 shows a high level depiction of a VoIP connection. In this example an  
7 end user sitting at a VoIP terminal requests a connection to a Qwest customer. The VoIP  
8 terminal uses a broadband connection to access a VoIP Feature Server ('FS'). The VoIP  
9 terminal and the FS negotiate features and functionality, giving the user a wide variety of  
10 options. The VoIP terminal initiates signaling protocol that is passed through the FS,  
11 through the Level 3 IP network, and on to the Level 3 Softswitch and SS7 Gateway. The  
12 Level 3 SS7 Gateway turns the SIP messages into SS7 messages and thru the SS7  
13 Signaling Transfer Points ("STP") passes them on to the Qwest network, where  
14 appropriate trunking is negotiated. When this call set up has been completed, the VoIP  
15 phone begins passing packetized voice data to the Level 3 IP network. The Level 3 IP  
16 network sends the packets on to the Level 3 Media Gateway ("MG"), which completes a  
17 net protocol conversion on the packetized voice to turn it into Time Division Multiplex  
18 (TDM) signals that are recognized by the Qwest trunks and switches. The Qwest switch  
19 sends the call on to the Qwest end user. In this example voice type data is passed  
20 between the end users.

21 **Q. Does the Qwest network need to terminate VoIP calls in a manner that is different**  
22 **from the termination of normal PSTN based local telephone calls?**

23 A. No. Qwest terminates VoIP calls to its end users in the same manner they would use to  
24 terminate regular PSTN based local calls to their end users. There are no extra processes,  
25 no additional transport, and no additional switching. This is possible because Level 3  
26 itself has already done the work of converting the IP-format data stream into a TDM-

1 format circuit-switched voice call that Qwest's network is capable of recognizing and  
2 handling.

3 **Q. How do the key issues of technology policy that you discussed earlier in your**  
4 **testimony relate to the issue of VoIP calls?**

5 A. At a high level, VoIP is an innovative Internet application that turns the voice-centric  
6 world of the PSTN on its head by treating voice communication as just another data-  
7 oriented application on the worldwide Internet. From a long-run industry perspective, it  
8 represents the triumph of data networks over voice networks. While the PSTN can  
9 provide only a limited, low-bandwidth form of data communications (basically, dial-up  
10 access to the Internet at 56 kilobits per second), the Internet can do everything the PSTN  
11 can do, and more. In my view, it is only a matter of time before the entities that comprise  
12 and operate the PSTN convert to IP-based communications, as indeed, Qwest and other  
13 PSTN entities are already beginning to do.

14 One of the features of the Internet is that distance and location are largely  
15 irrelevant. As the FCC has noted, the contents of a single web page can come from a  
16 variety of different servers in a variety of different locations. Most of us familiar with  
17 modern business travel have learned that our email can reach us anywhere, either  
18 downloaded to a computer in a hotel room by means of now-ubiquitous broadband  
19 connections offered by business hotels, or to wireless devices such as a Blackberry.

20 VoIP is an Internet application first and a voice application second. By this I  
21 mean that VoIP partakes in the distance-insensitive, location-insensitive characteristics of  
22 Internet applications. No matter what telephone number might be assigned to a VoIP  
23 customer (if any number is assigned at all), the customer might be participating in a call  
24 from next door or from around the world.

25 It is obviously challenging from a regulatory perspective to figure out what to do  
26 with VoIP traffic. The FCC has a number of ongoing proceedings trying to sort it out.

1 But one thing is clear: whatever VoIP is, it is not traditional “telephone toll service,”  
2 where the end user makes a call from some fixed location, completes it to some distant  
3 location, and is charged a separate toll charge for the privilege. In both economic and  
4 technical terms, VoIP calling is *sui generis*.

5 In these circumstances, the choice between assessing traditional access charges or  
6 lower and more economical reciprocal compensation rates on this traffic should actually  
7 be very clear. This is a new and innovative service that we should all want to encourage.  
8 That means that we should impose the lowest reasonable charges on it, when it needs to  
9 interface with the PSTN. That means that as a policy matter this traffic should be subject  
10 to reciprocal compensation rates, not access charges.

11 Basically, all three of the policies I articulated at the beginning of my testimony  
12 point to this same conclusion. Permitting VoIP traffic to be terminated at reciprocal  
13 compensation rates will encourage competition. VoIP is exactly the kind of new and  
14 innovative service that we should be trying to encourage, so it should not be subject to  
15 high access charges when lower reciprocal compensation rates provide adequate  
16 compensation to Qwest. And, VoIP is the latest innovative service to arise from the  
17 Internet, which should be encouraged for independent policy reasons. As a policy matter,  
18 therefore, VoIP traffic should be subject to reciprocal compensation, not access charges.

19 **XI. Determination of Traffic Types**

20 **Q. What issues must be resolved for the proper determination of traffic types?**

21 A. First, in order to efficiently combine traffic on single interconnection trunk groups, a  
22 Percent Local Use must be calculated to determine traffic types for billing. Second,  
23 Qwest is proposing a new, technically infeasible method of determining whether traffic is  
24 local or toll.

25 **Q. How does Level 3 propose to calculate the PLU, PIU and PIPU factors?**

1 A. Level 3 maintains local calling area tables as does Qwest. Over a given period of time,  
2 Level 3 can collect all call data on calls exchanged between the parties. Once this data is  
3 collected Level 3 will, per industry standard, calculate and report the Percent Interstate  
4 Usage (PIU). The remaining traffic is a combination of local and Intrastate traffic. Level  
5 3 will then once again compare the remaining call data with call tables and from this  
6 calculation determine the PLU as the percent of local traffic compared to the percent of  
7 intrastate traffic. So, by first determining the percentage of interstate traffic from the  
8 total traffic and then determining the local traffic from the remaining traffic, you end up  
9 with the traffic that is intrastate toll and the traffic that is local. For IP-Enabled traffic,  
10 Level 3 will create a Percent IP Use (PIPU) for both originating and terminating traffic.  
11 This will allow Qwest and Level 3 to properly compensate each other for IP traffic.  
12 Alternatively, Level 3 has proposed to attach an Originating Line Identifier (OLI) code to  
13 the call record to identify calls that originate as IP-Enabled traffic.

14 **Q. What is Level 3's proposal for the use of the OLI field in the identification of IP-**  
15 **enabled traffic?**

16 A. The OLI field is part of the SS7 protocol. It is currently used to identify calls from  
17 payphones, from prisons and for other purposes. Level 3 would like to use the OLI field  
18 to identify IP-Enabled traffic. It is reasonable to assume that IP-Enabled traffic may be  
19 handled differently for purposes of compensation over time; thus, the companies need a  
20 way to identify IP-Enabled calls. Level 3 can identify IP-Enabled calls and can set a  
21 unique identifier in the OLI field for each IP-Enabled call. This would help Qwest to  
22 identify the traffic if they so choose. Level 3 is offering to mark the OLI field for each  
23 IP-Enabled call so that Qwest can track IP-Enabled traffic.

24 **Q. Is there a dispute over the use of the OLI field for the identification of IP traffic?**

25 A. There is currently no guideline or standard that calls for the use of the OLI field in SS7  
26 messages for the identification of IP traffic, though this is one of the mechanisms that is

1 being reviewed nationally. Qwest is reluctant to commit to the use of the OLI field, and a  
2 particular identifier, before national guidelines are set. Level 3 believes the OLI field is  
3 an excellent way to identify IP traffic.

4 **Q. Is there precedent in the industry for using optional SS7 fields or unused identifiers**  
5 **before national guidelines are set?**

6 A. Yes, there is precedent in the industry for carriers to agree on the use of optional or  
7 unused SS7 fields and codes and billing format fields and codes for legitimate business  
8 uses. SBC, for example, does this in many areas of billing, where they have customized  
9 billing formats for their own purposes and now ask carriers who exchange bills with them  
10 to use the customized formats with the optional fields. For example, my understanding is  
11 that SBC wants CLECs to use what are known as “Category 92/99” records. The use of  
12 Category 92/99 records is entirely unique to SBC’s Southwest region.

13 **Q. If Level 3 provides Qwest with PIPU factors for the compensation of IP traffic, is**  
14 **there any need for the identification of IP traffic with the OLI field?**

15 A. Not really. The use of PIPU will allow the companies to correctly compensate each other  
16 for IP traffic without the use of the OLI field. The OLI field identifier for IP traffic is  
17 only needed if the companies want to track every IP call. The PIPU factor makes such  
18 identification unnecessary.

19 **Q. Can Level 3 accurately calculate the PLU, PIU and PIPU?**

20 A. Yes. The calculation of PLU, PIU and PIPU is accurate and can be used for billing  
21 purposes on traffic that is originated by Level 3. Qwest can perform the same  
22 calculations on the calls that it originates. Level 3 can create PIPU for both originating  
23 and terminating traffic, as is discussed below in our proposed contract language.

24 **Q. Does BellSouth have a procedure for administering PLU with Level 3 and other**  
25 **CLECs?**

1 A. Yes. BellSouth has agreed to allow Level 3 to combine different traffic types on  
2 interconnection trunks, and they have established a procedure for administering the PIU  
3 and PLU. I am including the Bell South procedure for PLU below for comparison:

4 PLU – Percent Local Usage

5 This factor is the percentage of intrastate terminating usage that is  
6 categorized as Local Jurisdiction. For purposes of this guide the total  
7 intrastate usage includes intrastate local usage and intrastate non-local  
8 usage. The local jurisdiction is applicable to Competitive Local Exchange  
9 Carriers (CLECs) that are terminating local traffic from their network to  
10 the BellSouth network. CLECs that totally utilize resale or unbundled  
11 network elements to provision local services are not required to report  
12 PLU factors. Interexchange Carriers that do not terminate local traffic as a  
13 CLEC are not required to report PLU factors. The local jurisdiction is  
14 normally defined per Local Interconnection contractual agreements and is  
15 calculated as follows where MOUs are billed minutes of use: *Total Local*  
16 *MOUs [divided by] Total Intrastate MOUs*. The total intrastate minutes  
17 can be determined by multiplying the total minutes by (1- PIU). Therefore  
18 the PLU may also be calculated as follows:

19 
$$\text{Total Local MOUs [divided by] (Total MOUs) x (1-TPIU)}$$

20 This factor is calculated on a statewide basis by Access Carrier Name  
21 Abbreviation (ACNA).

22 **Q. Does Level 3 have contract language that it is proposing for the calculation of PLU,  
23 PIU and PIPU and for the transmission and assurance of accuracy of these  
24 measures?**

25 A. Yes, Level 3 is proposing contract language for definition and calculation of PLU, PIU  
26 and PIPU as well as language for the transfer and verification of these traffic factors on a  
monthly basis. That language is contained in Level 3's proposals for Section 7 of the  
Interconnection Agreement.

**Q. Do these contract provisions adequately codify the accurate collection of data,  
calculation of factors, exchange of factors and verification by the Parties that is  
necessary for proper billing of calls?**

A. Yes. I am not an attorney, but I can read and use the English language. Based on a  
review of the attached contract provisions, it seems clear that they spell out the

1 responsibilities of Level 3 in generating accurate factors and Qwest's right to verify and  
2 audit the results. By using these procedures, the companies can bill each other for access  
3 charges and reciprocal compensation for all types of traffic flowing over the  
4 interconnection trunks.

5 **Q. How do the traffic calculations work when interconnection trunks carry local,**  
6 **IntraLATA, InterLATA and IP traffic?**

7 A. The calculation of factors is spelled out in the language contained in Traffic data is  
8 collected for one month. When the traffic is evaluated to calculate the factors, first the  
9 IP-Enabled traffic is taken out and its percentage calculated. The Level 3 network can  
10 determine whether an originating or terminating call is IP-Enabled or not by looking at  
11 how the calls is originated or terminated (end points can be certified as IP or TDM).  
12 When the call is IP originated the SIP signaling will reflect that, and one of the SS7 call  
13 set up message parameters (OLI) is set to a particular value (65) to flag the call as  
14 enhanced to Qwest. From this process PIPU is tabulated. Next, interstate traffic is  
15 separated from intrastate traffic by calculating the PIU factor. This is done by examining  
16 call records against a database that can tell whether the calling number and the called  
17 number are in the same state. Phone numbers are traditionally associated with a  
18 geographic area (rate center). Rating of TDM based services is done based on the  
19 geographic assignment of the phone numbers. If the terminating phone number is  
20 associated with a rate center that is outside of the state that the originating phone number  
21 is associated with, then the call is rated as interstate and the call counts towards the  
22 calculation of PIU. Finally, the PLU factor is calculated on the remaining traffic by using  
23 a state specific database that looks at whether the calling number and the called number  
24 are associated with rate centers in the same applicable local calling area. This is a  
25 simplified description of the process that is used to put traffic in the correct buckets for  
26 proper compensation. The creation of PLU and PIU factors is a process that is done

1 throughout the industry. Level 3 is leading the industry in the ability to create the PIPU  
2 factor.

3 **Q. Is there a basic dispute between Qwest and Level 3 on how to determine whether**  
4 **traffic is “local”?**

5 A. Yes. As I understand it there is a fundamental disagreement between the parties with  
6 respect to what traffic is properly characterized as “local” and what is not. I recognize  
7 that there are legal and policy aspects to this disagreement. However, I will relate the  
8 technical aspects of this dispute.

9 That said, the dispute is basically this: Level 3 contends that since the only thing  
10 the PSTN “knows” about a call is the originating and terminating telephone number, the  
11 status of traffic as “local” should be determined based on the geographic area associated  
12 with the telephone numbers of the calling and called parties. Qwest, by contrast, seeks to  
13 change that traditional arrangement and to attempt to assess the status of a call as “local”  
14 or not based on the actual physical location of the calling and called parties.

15 **Q. What is Qwest’s position on how to characterize traffic as “local” or not?**

16 A. As noted, Qwest maintains that the definition of a local call should be changed to reflect  
17 the geographic location of both the calling and called party premises as opposed to the  
18 originating and terminating phone numbers that have traditionally been used.

19 **Q. Does Level 3 agree with this new method?**

20 A. No. There are a number of technical problems with the method that Qwest is promoting.

21 **Q. Has the customer premises location been the determining factor in the definition of**  
22 **a local call in the past?**

23 A. No. As I described above in connection with routing calls, the PSTN uses the calling  
24 party’s number and the called party’s number to determine if a call is a local call.

25 **Q. Do local switches know the location of the parties when a call is made?**  
26

1 A. No. Circuit switches have no way of knowing the geographic location of the calling or  
2 called party end user. The switch is programmed with a list of which numbers are  
3 “native” to its area and treats calls to and from such numbers accordingly (i.e., it routes  
4 them on trunks to other switches to which it is connected, based on the NPA-NXX  
5 dialed). Calls that it recognizes as “toll” are routed to the caller’s presubscribed IXC.  
6 Older circuit switches have a limited geographic range within which it can serve end  
7 users and maintain its quality standards. Before Local Number Portability (“LNP”) and  
8 number block pooling, a process by which 10,000 number NPA-NXXs blocks are divided  
9 across multiple carriers and switches in increments of 1000 number blocks (NPA-NXX-  
10 X) to make more efficient use of numbering resources, each phone number assigned from  
11 a given circuit switch fairly reasonable correlated to the geographic location of the end  
12 user. This is simply because the phone number can only be assigned to end users within  
13 that limited geographic range from the circuit switch. With the introduction of newer  
14 technology switches, soft-switches and now VoIP those distance limitations are fading,  
15 phone numbers can be assigned to end users anywhere within the country or world, and  
16 switches have no way of knowing the geographic location of the end user.

17 **Q. How are calls routed in the PSTN?**

18 A. Local calls are routed between switches according to the routing tables in each switch.  
19 Depending on the number dialed (putting aside number portability), a switch either  
20 handles a call entirely on its own (such as a call between next-door neighbors); or it sends  
21 the call off to some other switch by routing it outbound on a particular trunk port. Toll  
22 calls — that is, calls carried by IXCs — are routed according to the Local Exchange  
23 Routing Guide (LERG). The LERG is a database that identifies switches and numbers  
24 associated with those switches, based on the NPA NXX codes of the North American  
25 Numbering Plan (NANP), as well as specific physical locations at which traffic bound for  
26 particular switches may be delivered. Thus, for example, in the normal course within the

1 PSTN, the LERG would indicate that a call to a number within the “515” NPA should be  
2 delivered to a particular carrier, at a particular location in Oregon. Which carrier and  
3 which location will depend on the “NXX” of the dialed number. Switches within a local  
4 calling area know which numbers are associated with the local calling area and which  
5 numbers are not.

6 **Q. So calls between two local numbers are treated as local calls?**

7 A. Yes. As noted above, each end office switch has a table of NPA-NXXs that the particular  
8 switch views as “local.” For all such NPA-NXXs, the switch has to make only one  
9 decision: “Is this call ‘mine’ or do I need to send it to some other switch?” If the dialed  
10 number “belongs” to the originating switch, as noted above, the call stays there. But if  
11 the dialed number “belongs” to some other switch, the only thing the originating switch  
12 needs to know is which trunk port to send the call out on.

13 Note that, from this network perspective, the only truly “local” calls are calls that  
14 begin and end in the same physical switching device. Long ago, however, retail local  
15 calling plans grew to include customers served by many different switches. As a result,  
16 what constitutes a “local” call for a retail customer is not really a technical matter at all.  
17 It is simply a retail, marketing decision by the originating carrier. From a technical  
18 perspective it is essentially an arbitrary decision which NPA-NXXs to include on the  
19 programmed list of “local” calls and which to exclude (which means, usually, that the  
20 customer has to dial a “1” before the NPA-NXX-XXXX in order to complete the call).

21 **Q. From a technical network perspective, is there any limitation on the distance that a**  
22 **“local” call can travel, the size of a “local” calling area, or the number of customers**  
23 **in a “local” calling area?**

24 A. None at all. And, in fact, the size and scope of “local calling areas” varies greatly from  
25 place to place around the country. Some states have large local calling areas; others have  
26 small local calling areas. Again, from this perspective, the technical network personnel

1 have no basis to care one way or another. The carrier's marketing and/or regulatory  
2 personnel just have to tell the engineers which NPA-NXXs to include on the "local" list  
3 for any given switch. The originating switch does not "care" (in the sense of doing  
4 anything at all technically different) where it is actually sending a "local" call to a  
5 number served by some other switch; and the terminating switch does "care" (in the same  
6 sense) where a "local" call is coming from. These are retail marketing questions, not  
7 technical questions.

8 **Q. How would switches implement the Qwest idea of using the geographic location as**  
9 **the determination for a local call?**

10 A. I have no idea. A switch has no way of storing information regarding the premises  
11 location associated with a phone number assigned to that switch, and no way of receiving  
12 or storing information about the premises location assigned to a phone number calling  
13 someone served by that switch. The SS7 protocol that sends information between  
14 switches for call set-up and billing purposes does not have any parameters to identify the  
15 premises locations of calling or called parties. I have asked engineers that have worked  
16 in switch design for 25 years and no one has ever heard of a feature that would store the  
17 geographic location associated with a phone number in the switch or in any peripheral  
18 that is accessible by a switch. If Qwest were to design such a feature in a peripheral  
19 device, it would no doubt be expensive to implement since each call would need to  
20 reference a database, and the database itself would need to be created and maintained.

21 As I pointed out above, moreover, the status of any given call as "local" or not is  
22 an arbitrary marketing-oriented retail choice, not anything that affects or is driven by any  
23 relevant network technology. So, from my network engineering perspective, it seems to  
24 me that Qwest, by pressing its premises-location-based notion of what constitutes a  
25 "local" call, is just trying to impose its own retail marketing choices onto Level 3. There  
26 is certainly no technical basis for Qwest's position that I can see.

1 **Q. Even if the switches, or an outboard database, could utilize customer location**  
2 **information, how would this information be updated and kept current?**

3 A. Today, local routing tables must be updated in the switches when a new NXX code is  
4 activated in a rate center. This updating is a labor-intensive process, but fortunately is  
5 only needed when new codes are required. The thought of managing and updating a  
6 database that would hold each customer's geographic location is daunting. Instead of  
7 dozens of changes per year there would be hundreds of thousands in a large LATA. Each  
8 time a customer moved in or out of a house or apartment the database would need to be  
9 changed, and each carrier would have changes for each of their customers who moved.

10 **Q. What is VNXX?**

11 A. As Mr. Gates explains in his testimony, ISP-bound traffic and "virtual NXX" issues have  
12 become very much intertwined. At the network level, VNXX is somewhat of a  
13 misnomer. This is because telephone switches route calls based upon assignments in the  
14 LERG, not upon how they may or may not be rated or later classified as a regulatory or  
15 legal matter. So, where Level 3 provides DID / DOD services for their ISP customers,  
16 Level 3 establishes one or more POIs in the LATA. The rules permit a single POI per  
17 LATA. So the calls route to Level 3. Qwest would have Level 3 establish a "physical  
18 presence" in every local calling area, but this is not required nor, as Mr. Gates explains,  
19 does it make economic sense for an interconnecting carrier to mirror its architecture  
20 according to its competitor's retail offerings. As a retail matter, Level 3 neither markets  
21 nor sells "long distance" services associated with "VNXX" traffic. This is a long winded  
22 way of saying that the definition of "VNXX" depends upon how you look at it. For  
23 purposes of interconnection at a single POI, it should not matter. Calls are exchange at  
24 the Single POI. Mr. Gates explains that for purposes of interconnection the LATA is the  
25 "local" calling area, as it should be. From an ILEC-centric viewpoint, however, VNXX  
26

1 allows the customers of ISPs to reach the internet without incurring “toll” charges – even  
2 if their ISP does not maintain equipment within the customers’ local calling areas.

3 **Q. How are these VNXX calls routed?**

4 A. VNXX calls are routed between the local switches as normal local calls, or as toll calls,  
5 depending on whether the NPA-NXX of the VNXX number being called is included in  
6 the calling switch’s table of “locally dialable” NPA-NXXs. Neither the originating nor  
7 terminating switch has any way to know where the end user with the VNXX service is  
8 actually located, nor does it matter for proper switching and delivery of the traffic. The  
9 switch that hosts the VNXX customer has a circuit coming in that it associates with  
10 phone service, providing dial tone and other local services. The switch has no way to  
11 know whether the customer loop is 500 yards, 2 miles, or 200 miles long.

12 **Q. How are these VNXX calls billed?**

13 A. Neither CLEC nor ILEC billing systems, nor the FCC for that matter, distinguishes  
14 between “local” ISP-bound traffic and “toll” ISP-bound traffic. Accordingly, carriers  
15 bill for ISP-bound traffic based upon billing records collected from the interconnection  
16 trunks and other factors that the parties have agreed to use. For example, assume that a  
17 person signs up for Qwest’s wireline (circuit-switched) telephone service. Assume  
18 further that this person decides to access the Internet via a dial-up account (perhaps DSL  
19 or cable modem are too expensive or not available) provided by an ISP that is a Level 3  
20 customer. The Qwest customer calls a telephone number that routes to Level 3’s  
21 network. When that person wishes to access the Internet, Qwest’s network routes that  
22 call to Level 3’s POI. As to how these calls might be rated according to traditional  
23 (largely pre-Act) methods, the originating and terminating phone numbers are assigned to  
24 switches. Those switches also have rate centers associated with them. Rate centers are  
25 geographic coordinates that carriers on circuit switched networks have traditionally used  
26 to apply distance sensitive charges to calls. In that sense, they are economic boundaries,

1 not network boundaries. Returning to our call flow, if the originating and terminating  
2 NPA-NXX appear as “local” to each other when the call record data is later examined,  
3 then the originating carrier would rate the call as “local” call and there is no toll charge.  
4 It does not matter if the calling or called party is 500 yards, 2 miles, or 200 miles from  
5 the end office out of which the number is assigned because in every instance the call is  
6 handed to Level 3 at the POI where Level 3 then carries this call.

7 **Q. Is Qwest’s interconnection trunking the same no matter where the Level 3 end user**  
8 **customer is located?**

9 A. Yes. Qwest’s trunking is always to the POI, no matter where the Level 3 end-user  
10 customer is located. It doesn’t matter if the Level 3 customer is 500 yards, 2 miles, or  
11 200 miles from the POI. Level 3 carries the traffic to its end-user customer, no matter  
12 where they are located. Qwest’s interconnection trunking to the POI is the same no  
13 matter where the Level 3 customer that they are calling is actually located.

14 **Q. So the distance Qwest transports traffic is the same whether the Level 3 customer is**  
15 **500 yards, 2 miles, or 200 miles from the POI?**

16 A. Yes. Qwest transports calls that it originates to the POI, regardless of where the Level 3  
17 customer is located. The location of the Level 3 customer or end user is immaterial to  
18 Qwest’s call transport or for Qwest’s costs for that matter. Mr. Gates will discuss in his  
19 testimony how Qwest’s costs are the same no matter where the Level 3 end user is  
20 located.

21 **XII. Conclusions**

22 **Q. Have you reviewed the contract language proposed by Level 3 and Qwest in this**  
23 **case?**

24 A. Yes, I have.

25 **Q. For the issues you have addressed, which language is more consistent with the**  
26 **points you have made in this testimony?**

1 A. Level 3's language is reasonable and balanced from a technical and engineering  
2 standpoint and is consistent with the FCC's orders from an engineering point of view.  
3 Adoption of Qwest's language, by contrast, would require the parties to degrade the  
4 efficiency of their networks, imposing substantial costs on Level 3 and possibly on Qwest  
5 as well, while at the same time potentially permitted Qwest to bill Level 3 for costs and  
6 charges for functions that Qwest itself should perform without a charge to Level 3.

7 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

8 A. Yes

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
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26






Exhibit RRD #2: Level 3 IP Network



### Exhibit RRD #3: Level 3 Facilities in Oregon



Level 3 Code Coverage in Qwest Territory within Oregon

Region

Level 3 Physical Facilities

Point

Level 3 Intercity Backbone

Line

Level 3 Metro Loops

Line

Level 3 POIs in Oregon

Point

Oregon

3



**Exhibit RRD #4: COMBINING TRAFFIC ON A SINGLE TRUNK GROUP**

Qwest Switch



All types of interconnection traffic except 911



Single, Efficient trunk group


Level 3 Switch



A single trunk group with combined traffic is much more efficient, requiring fewer facilities, fewer trunk ports and less equipment



**Exhibit RRD #5: QWEST DEMANDS SEPARATE TRUNK GROUPS**



Two trunk groups do the work of one efficient trunk group. Qwest's demand would force Level 3 to build two separate networks. This requires additional trunk terminations for Qwest as well. Qwest may actually be demanding additional trunk groups for Transit Traffic and IP Traffic.



### Exhibit RRD #6: VoIP Network Configurations





Exhibit RRD #7: ESP Exemption—Pre 1996






Exhibit RRD #8: ESP Exemption—post 1996



**Exhibit RRD #9: VoIP CALL FLOW**



VoIP terminals allow new features and functions and a host of data and network applications



**Exhibit RRD #10: Traditional FX Service (a)**

**Traditional FX Call  
From LCA 1 to LCA 2**






Exhibit RRD # 11 Traditional FX Service




Exhibit RRD #12: VNXX Service  
**TYPICAL VNXX CALL**  
From LCA 1 to LCA 2




Exhibit RRD # 13: Traditional Local Service








Exhibit RRD # 14: CLEC Local Service




Qwest Compensated for transport at  
TELRIC rates



Exhibit RRD #15: CLEC FX Service




**Exhibit RRD # 16: SPOI CONFIGURATION**



Each party is responsible for hauling their traffic to the SPOI. This is currently accepted practice.

**Exhibit RRD # 17: SPOI CONFIGURATION – QWEST PROPOSAL**



Qwest is demanding that Level 3 pay for transport within the Qwest network from the Qwest originating local calling area to the POI. Qwest would not pay Level 3 commensurate transport for transport to the POI from the Level 3 switch