



ALISHA TILL  
Direct (503) 290-3628  
alisha@mrg-law.com

June 4, 2018

**VIA ELECTRONIC FILING**

Attention: Filing Center  
Public Utility Commission of Oregon  
P.O. Box 1088  
Salem, Oregon 97308-1088

**Re: Docket UG 344: NW Natural Request for a General Rate Revision**

Attention Filing Center:

Attached for filing in the above-referenced docket is an electronic copy of NW Natural's Reply Testimony of Randolph S. Friedman (NW Natural//2400).

Please contact this office with any questions.

Sincerely,

Alisha Till  
Legal Assistant

Enclosure

BEFORE THE  
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

**UG 344**

**NW Natural**

**Reply Testimony of Randolph S. Friedman**

**ISS/OPTIMIZATION  
EXHIBIT 2400**

June 4, 2018

**EXHIBIT 2400 – REPLY TESTIMONY – ISS/OPTIMIZATION**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY**

2 **Q. Please state your name, business address, and present occupation.**

3 A. My name is Randolph S. Friedman and my business address is 220 NW Second  
4 Avenue, Portland, Oregon 97209. I am employed by NW Natural Gas Company  
5 (NW Natural or Company) as the Senior Director, Gas Supply.

6 **Q. Are you the same Randolph S. Friedman that previously provided Direct  
7 Testimony in this docket?**

8 A. Yes, I presented NW Natural/1300.

9 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?**

10 A. The purpose of my Reply Testimony is to present NW Natural's response to  
11 opening testimony filed on May 4, 2018, by the Public Utility Commission of  
12 Oregon (Commission) Staff (Staff), the Citizens' Utility Board (CUB), and Alliance  
13 of Western Energy Consumers (AWEC) regarding the recommendations made by  
14 the Liberty Consulting Group's (Liberty) Final Report on NW Natural's optimization  
15 activities (the Liberty Report).

16 **Q. How is your testimony organized?**

17 A. I have organized my testimony to first provide an overview of the Company's  
18 proposal and then the Company's response to the arguments raised by Staff, CUB  
19 and AWEC.

20 **II. The Liberty Report**

21 **Q. Please describe the basis for the Liberty Report and the information  
22 contained in the Liberty Report.**

23 A. The Company's revenue sharing arrangements for storage services and  
24 optimization activities (described below) were investigated as part of its 2011

1 general rate case, Docket No. UG 221.<sup>1</sup> The Commission determined that this  
2 investigation was more appropriate for a separate proceeding and opened Docket  
3 No. UM 1654.<sup>2</sup> The result of Docket No. UM 1654 was a Commission Order (Order  
4 No. 15-066) directing the parties in such proceeding to form a steering committee  
5 to hire a third-party for purposes of conducting a study that would examine the  
6 risks, costs and benefits for NW Natural's optimization activities, the assets being  
7 utilized for these activities, the allocation between regulated and non-regulated  
8 services, and the components of the Company's system that drive the costs and  
9 revenues associated with interstate storage.<sup>3</sup>

10 Consistent with the Commission's Order, Liberty was retained and issued the  
11 Liberty Report which includes recommendations regarding the Company's  
12 revenue sharing arrangements for its storage services and optimization activities.<sup>4</sup>

13 As part of this proceeding, the parties were afforded an opportunity to provide  
14 testimony in response to the Liberty Report and the recommendations contained  
15 therein.

### 16 **III. Interstate Storage Service**

17 **Q. Please explain the Company's Interstate and Intrastate Storage Services.**

18 A. The Company's Mist Storage Services are provided to interstate and intrastate  
19 markets at negotiated market prices, subject to a FERC-mandated maximum rate

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<sup>1</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/30.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.*

<sup>3</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/31 *citing In the Matter of Northwest Natural Gas Company, Investigation of Storage and Optimization Sharing*, Docket No. UM 1654, Order No. 15-066 at 5 (Mar. 5, 2015).

<sup>4</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/31; *see also* NW Natural/1301.

1 cap.<sup>5</sup> These services include injection, withdrawal, and underground storage of  
2 customer-owned gas at Mist, as well as the transportation of customer-owned gas  
3 to and from Mist Storage using NW Natural's high-pressure pipeline system.<sup>6</sup>

4 **Q. What is the current sharing arrangement for intrastate and interstate storage**  
5 **services?**

6 A. Pursuant to Schedule 185, NW Natural shares with eligible customers the net  
7 margin received from *non-utility* interstate and intrastate storage services on a  
8 20/80 basis.<sup>7,8</sup>

9 **Q. Please provide an overview of the Liberty Report recommendation regarding**  
10 **Interstate Storage.**

11 A. As detailed in my initial testimony and in the Liberty Report, Liberty determined  
12 that the current sharing arrangement for the Company's non-utility interstate and  
13 intrastate storage services is consistent with industry standards and is balanced  
14 and appropriate.<sup>9</sup> Liberty found that no adjustments to the current sharing  
15 arrangement were necessary.<sup>10</sup>

16 **Q. Please explain the positions of Staff and other parties regarding the Liberty**  
17 **Report recommendation.**

18 A. Staff, CUB and AWEC each commented regarding the Liberty Report  
19 recommendation to maintain the current sharing arrangement for non-utility

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<sup>5</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/8.

<sup>6</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/9-10.

<sup>7</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/24.

<sup>8</sup> Schedule 185 also applies to optimization revenues related to customer-owned assets at Mist, which are shared on a 67/33 basis.

<sup>9</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/32.

<sup>10</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/32; see also NW Natural/1301, Friedman/35.

1 interstate and intrastate storage services. Each of these parties agreed that,  
2 based on the Liberty Report, no changes in the cost sharing arrangement for these  
3 services are appropriate.<sup>11</sup>

4 **Q. What is the Company's response to these positions?**

5 A. The Company agrees with the recommendation of the Liberty Report, supported  
6 by Staff, CUB and AWEC, to maintain the status quo regarding the cost sharing  
7 arrangement for non-utility interstate and intrastate storage services. This position  
8 is consistent with my initial testimony.

9 **IV. Optimization Activities**

10 **Q. Please describe the Company's optimization activities.**

11 A. As set forth in greater detail in my initial testimony, the Company's optimization  
12 activities fall into five general categories: (1) Mist Storage optimization; (2) liquids  
13 extraction; (3) commodity contract (portfolio) optimization); (4) pipeline capacity  
14 optimization; and (5) off-system storage optimization.<sup>12</sup> The Company has  
15 engaged a third-party to manage these optimization activities through an asset  
16 management agreement (AMA).

17 **Q. Please explain how the Company works with the third-party asset manager  
18 to perform the optimization activities?**

19 A. The Company's Gas Supply Department is responsible for negotiating the terms  
20 of the AMA arrangement and developing strategies with the third-party optimization  
21 partner to maximize value while maintaining reliability standards for core utility and

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<sup>11</sup> Staff/13000, Glosser/12; CUB/200, Jenks/14; AWEC/400, Finklea/4-5.

<sup>12</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/13.

1 storage service customers.<sup>13</sup> At least one individual in the Gas Supply Department  
2 is involved on a daily basis in consultation with the optimization partner to review  
3 current positions, assess available resources, and determine new opportunities for  
4 optimization.<sup>14</sup> The Company maintains this close working relationship with its  
5 optimization partner because this allows the Company to adapt as needed to  
6 changing market conditions and customer requirements.<sup>15</sup> This ability to adapt  
7 allows the Company (together with the optimization partner) to undertake long-  
8 term strategies that result in higher values for customers.<sup>16</sup>

9 **Q. Do customers bear the costs of this utility involvement in the optimization**  
10 **process?**

11 A. No. The costs for this utility involvement are allocated to the separate, non-utility  
12 gas storage business segment where the costs and revenues of the storage  
13 services and optimization activities are recorded.<sup>17</sup>

14 **Q. Please explain how revenues associated with these optimization activities**  
15 **are shared with customers.**

16 A. Revenue sharing for the Company's optimization activities are governed by  
17 Schedule 186, "Special Annual Core Pipeline Capacity Optimization Credit." This  
18 schedule applies to firm and interruptible sales service customers whose rates  
19 include costs related to upstream pipeline capacity.<sup>18</sup> Schedule 186 provides that

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<sup>13</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/13.

<sup>14</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/13.

<sup>15</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/13.

<sup>16</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/13.

<sup>17</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/14.

<sup>18</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/25.



1 NW Natural will share with eligible customers the net margin attributable to third-  
2 party optimization for the entire portfolio of upstream capacity contracts.<sup>19</sup> Under  
3 Schedule 186, net revenues are shared with the Company's firm and interruptible  
4 sales customers on a 67/33 basis (67 percent credited to customers and 33  
5 percent retained by NW Natural).<sup>20</sup>

6 In addition, Schedule 185 applies to optimization revenues related to  
7 customer-owned assets at Mist (shared on a 67/33 basis) and non-customer  
8 owned assets at Mist (shared on a 20/80 basis).<sup>21</sup>

9 **Q. Please explain the Liberty Report recommendation regarding these**  
10 **optimization activities.**

11 A. Liberty did not make a specific recommendation regarding the revenue sharing  
12 associated with the Company's optimization activities. Instead, Liberty stated that  
13 there is room to reduce NW Natural's share of optimization margins, asserting that  
14 this reduction would bring the Company closer in line with sharing arrangements  
15 that exist in other jurisdictions.<sup>22</sup>

16 **Q. Please explain how Liberty reached this conclusion regarding the**  
17 **Company's revenue sharing associated with its optimization activities.**

18 A. Liberty determined that while the Company works diligently with its asset manager  
19 to promote the robust optimization of its portfolio assets and has produced  
20 substantial value for its customers, the efforts undertaken by NW Natural are not

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<sup>19</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/25.

<sup>20</sup> *Id.*

<sup>21</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/24.

<sup>22</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/32; see also NW Natural/1301, Friedman/65.

1 beyond those generally seen in the industry.<sup>23</sup> Liberty also presented the results  
2 of a survey regarding the sharing arrangements for optimization activities generally  
3 found in the industry, which found that the percentage of revenue shared with NW  
4 Natural customers falls at the low end of the observed range for jurisdictions that  
5 provide for sharing.<sup>24</sup> Based on these determinations, Liberty concluded that there  
6 is room to reduce the Company's sharing percentage for these activities.<sup>25</sup>

7 **Q. Please explain the positions of Staff and other parties regarding the Liberty**  
8 **Report recommendation for revenue sharing associated with optimization**  
9 **activities.**

10 A. Staff, CUB and AWEC have each provided their own recommendation regarding  
11 the Company's revenue sharing associated with optimization activities, as follows.

12 **Staff:** Staff is recommending that a 90/10 split be adopted based on the  
13 conclusions in the Liberty Report that optimization is a core responsibility of  
14 prudent utility management and that the Company's oversight of asset optimization  
15 does not rise to a level beyond standard industry practice. Staff also points to  
16 Liberty's conclusions that the Company does not bear any unusual risk associated  
17 with the optimization activities and that the current sharing arrangement provides  
18 a lower allocation to customers than most jurisdictions considered by Liberty.<sup>26</sup>  
19 Staff does acknowledge that some percentage of net revenue should be retained

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<sup>23</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/32; see also NW Natural/1301, Friedman/65.

<sup>24</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/32-33; see also NW Natural/1301, Friedman/52.

<sup>25</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/33; see also NW Natural/1301, Friedman/65.

<sup>26</sup> Staff/300, Glosser/13.

1 by NW Natural to provide the Company with an incentive to commit fully to asset  
2 optimization.<sup>27</sup>

3 **CUB:** CUB is also recommending that a 90/10 split be adopted in recognition  
4 of its assertion that asset optimization is a fundamental obligation of all utilities.<sup>28</sup>  
5 CUB argues that engaging in asset optimization is simply part of the Company's  
6 obligation to prudently operate its business. CUB is open to allowing some  
7 incentive to the Company to ensure that customer benefits are maximized but  
8 believes that a 90/10 split will provide this incentive.<sup>29</sup>

9 **AWEC:** AWEC is recommending that an 85/15 split be adopted for resources  
10 that are in customer rates based on AWEC's assertion that the Liberty Report has  
11 concluded that NW Natural's optimization activities do not create a "risky  
12 enterprise" for the Company and that these activities are not especially complex or  
13 out of line with normal utility practices.<sup>30</sup> AWEC argues that NW Natural's role is  
14 limited due to its retention of an experienced asset manager and that asset  
15 management has been standardized to a certain degree by FERC, further reducing  
16 the risks to the Company.<sup>31</sup> AWEC also argues that reducing the sharing  
17 allocation will not reduce the Company's incentive to maximize revenues; AWEC  
18 asserts that this conclusion is supported by the Liberty Report.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Staff/300, Glosser/15-16.

<sup>28</sup> CUB/200, Jenks/18.

<sup>29</sup> CUB/200, Jenks/18.

<sup>30</sup> AWEC/400, Finklea/5-6.

<sup>31</sup> AWEC/400, Finklea/6.

<sup>32</sup> AWEC/400, Finklea/7.

1           AWEC also argues that the Commission should “flip” the 20/80 split for  
2 resources that are not in customer rates (*i.e.*, customers should receive eighty  
3 percent of the revenues associated with these revenues).<sup>33</sup> AWEC argues that  
4 this recommendation is supported by the Liberty Report.<sup>34</sup> AWEC does not  
5 specifically address this recommendation other than to say that its proposal  
6 provides a higher sharing percentage to the Company (than 85/15) because these  
7 resources (resources not in customer rates) rely less on customers’ prior  
8 investment.<sup>35</sup>

9   **Q. Does the Company agree with these conclusions regarding the allocation of**  
10 **revenues that result from optimization activities?**

11   A. No. Contrary to the assertions of the parties, the Company believes that it has  
12 gone, and continues to go beyond the efforts typically expended by LDCs in the  
13 optimization of customer assets. The Company has actively engaged with its third-  
14 party asset manager to ensure that it achieves the best results (*i.e.*, value) for  
15 customers. As described above and in my initial testimony, this includes daily  
16 interactions with the asset manager to ensure that long-term plans are meeting  
17 their objectives and making changes to these plans when necessary. Our  
18 experience and information suggest that this level of involvement is unusual.

19           Moreover, over the past decade, NW Natural has attained very significant value  
20 for its utility customers flowing from these optimization activities. Specifically,  
21 customers have received a cumulative \$133.5 million in credits since 2000.<sup>36</sup> This

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<sup>33</sup> AWEC/400, Finklea/5.

<sup>34</sup> AWEC/400, Finklea/5.

<sup>35</sup> AWEC/400, Finklea/7.

<sup>36</sup> NW Natural/1300, Friedman/29.

1 success is proof that the current sharing percentages adequately incent the  
2 Company to engage in the active management of the optimization program that is  
3 required achieve these benefits.<sup>37</sup> If NW Natural's sharing percentage is  
4 substantially eroded—as advocated by the parties—basic economics would  
5 suggest that the Company's incentive to achieve the consistently favorable results  
6 enjoyed under the current framework would also be substantially altered. NW  
7 Natural believes that the current arrangement has worked well, that it provides  
8 adequate and reasonable incentives, that it has produced tremendous value for  
9 customers, and that it should be retained.

10 **Q. Does the Company have any other concerns with these recommendations to**  
11 **make significant adjustments to the revenue sharing allocation for**  
12 **optimization activities?**

13 A. Yes. While the parties are correct that the Liberty Report states that there is room  
14 to reduce NW Natural's share of revenues, the Liberty Report falls short of  
15 providing detailed information regarding the results of the peer utility companies it  
16 has used as the comparison group. As a result, the Liberty Report provides an  
17 overview of the revenue sharing arrangements for NW Natural's peer utilities but  
18 does not go so far as to provide a comparison of the *results* of each arrangement.  
19 Therefore, it is entirely possible that while NW Natural's sharing may provide  
20 customers with a relatively smaller sharing percentage, NW Natural's customers  
21 may well be receiving significantly larger revenues. Given this lack of detailed  
22 information, the Commission should be hesitant to impose a significant change to  
23 the Company's current revenue sharing framework because it *is* certain that the

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<sup>37</sup> NW Natural/1301, Friedman/45 (Confidential).

1 Company has provided significant benefits to customers through its optimization  
2 activities.

3 The Company is also concerned that AVEC has provided absolutely no  
4 support for its recommendation to flip the split between customers and the  
5 Company with respect to resources not in customer rates.<sup>38</sup> The Liberty Report  
6 does not support this recommendation and AVEC has similarly provided no  
7 support in its testimony. Such a significant change is therefore unwarranted and  
8 should not be considered.

9 **Q. Do the parties make any other recommendations regarding the revenue**  
10 **sharing allocation?**

11 A. Yes. CUB also makes a recommendation regarding how the asset manager costs  
12 are allocated. CUB states that under the current allocation, the asset manager's  
13 share is allocated to the non-Mist optimization revenues.<sup>39</sup> CUB asserts that the  
14 result of this arrangement is that the asset manager costs come out of the  
15 revenues that are shared on a 67/33 basis, instead of the 20/80 basis.<sup>40</sup> As a  
16 result, CUB argues that NW Natural's income from optimization is increased  
17 inappropriately because the asset manager is optimizing both the Mist and non-  
18 Mist portion of activities.<sup>41</sup> CUB argues that it would be more appropriate for  
19 customers and shareholders to contribute based on their share of revenues.<sup>42</sup> In  
20 order to achieve this result, CUB recommends that asset management costs be

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<sup>38</sup> AVEC/400, Finklea/5.

<sup>39</sup> CUB/200, Jenks/19.

<sup>40</sup> *Id.*

<sup>41</sup> *Id.*

<sup>42</sup> CUB/200, Jenks/20.

1 allocated across all functions, before applying any sharing.<sup>43</sup> The net income (that  
2 results after paying the asset manager) is the income that would be subject to the  
3 revenue sharing allocation.<sup>44</sup>

4 **Q. Does the Company agree with CUB's recommendation regarding payment of**  
5 **the asset manager costs?**

6 A. CUB's comments relate to the method through which NW Natural determines the  
7 share of its revenues, net of its AMA partner's share, that are allocated between  
8 the various revenue sharing percentages. NW Natural has accounted for the costs  
9 shared with its AMA partner consistently, and in a way that it believes is  
10 straightforward and appropriate. NW Natural is, however, open to seeking to  
11 determine a method for allocating its AMA partner's expenses across the various  
12 revenue streams, in order to alleviate CUB's concerns.

13 **V. Results of Operations Report**

14 **Q. Does the Company report its earnings related to optimization activities?**

15 A. Yes. The Company currently reports its optimization revenues annually to the  
16 Commission, as part of a confidential report.

17 **Q. Does the Liberty Report make any recommendation regarding the Company's**  
18 **reporting practice?**

19 A. No. The Liberty Report is silent on this issue.  
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<sup>43</sup> *Id.*

<sup>44</sup> *Id.*

1 **Q. Please explain CUB's recommendation regarding reporting of the Company's**  
2 **optimization activities earnings.**

3 A. CUB recommends that the Company be required to include all optimization  
4 revenues associated with rate-based, regulated activities in its Results of Operations  
5 Report (ROO) but to exclude optimization revenues associated with interstate  
6 storage.<sup>45</sup> Importantly, CUB is not arguing that optimization revenues be included  
7 in earnings tests associated with deferrals, or other mechanisms where earnings are  
8 examined, but rather that these revenues be included in the ROO for informational  
9 purposes.

10 **Q. Why does CUB believe that optimization revenues should be included in the**  
11 **ROO?**

12 A. CUB argues that the currently-used format for the ROO (*i.e.*, the version routinely  
13 filed by the Company) does not allow a reader to determine all of the earnings from  
14 NW Natural's regulated system.<sup>46</sup> CUB argues that this makes the ROO less  
15 accurate and transparent.<sup>47</sup> CUB argues that providing this additional information  
16 would be particularly helpful if Oregon transitions to incentive regulation because  
17 incentive regulation will require the Commission to evaluate the effectiveness of  
18 such regulation and evaluation of the revenues earned by the Company related to  
19 optimization activities revenue will be part of this analysis.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> CUB/200, Jenks/25.

<sup>46</sup> CUB/200, Jenks/21.

<sup>47</sup> CUB/200, Jenks/21.

<sup>48</sup> CUB/200, Jenks/22.



1 **Q. Does the Company agree that the best way to achieve this level of**  
2 **transparency is by including the revenues associated with the Company's**  
3 **optimization activities in the ROO?**

4 A. No. As an initial matter, CUB's recommendation is premature because it appears to  
5 be largely supported by an argument that the information would be needed to  
6 evaluate the impacts of incentive regulation. However, Oregon has not yet adopted  
7 incentive regulation. Moreover, CUB is correct in observing that NW Natural is  
8 reluctant to include optimization revenues in the ROO, because doing so would  
9 incorrectly imply that these revenues should be considered in the application of  
10 earnings reviews<sup>49</sup>—aside from the Company's Site Remediation and Recovery  
11 Mechanism (SRRM), where 50 percent of optimization revenues are already  
12 included, as ordered by the Commission in Order No. 15-049.<sup>50</sup>

13 Nevertheless, the Company does agree with CUB that transparency is  
14 important and is not averse to providing this additional data for informational  
15 purposes in the Company's annual Optimization Report. To this end, NW Natural  
16 would agree that, in addition to providing information about revenues, the Company  
17 could provide the impact on its earnings of its own sharing portion. Providing this  
18 information outside of the ROO would achieve CUB's goal of transparency while  
19 eliminating any suggestion that this revenue should be considered as part of the  
20 Company's earnings for other purposes.  
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<sup>49</sup> CUB/200, Jenks/23.

<sup>50</sup> *In the Matter of NW Natural Gas Company dba NW Natural, Mechanism for Recovery of Environmental Remediation Costs*, Docket No. UM 1635, Order No. 15 049 at 27 (Feb. 20, 2015).

1 **Q. What does AWEC argue regarding reporting of the Company's revenues**  
2 **derived from optimization activities?**

3 A. AWEC agrees with CUB that the Company should report its optimization activities  
4 revenue in the ROO.<sup>51</sup>

5 **Q. What rationale is offered by AWEC in support of this recommendation?**

6 A. AWEC refers to arguments made in Docket No. UM 1654 and states that the income  
7 should be included in the ROO because it is derived or made possible from  
8 customer-funded assets.<sup>52</sup>

9 **Q. Does the Company agree with AWEC's recommendation?**

10 A. No. As stated above, the Company is not averse to including these revenues for  
11 informational and transparency purposes as part of its Optimization Report.  
12 However, the Commission has already determined (in Docket No. UM 1654) that  
13 half of these revenues should be included in the Company's earnings sharing test  
14 and only for purposes of its SRRM.<sup>53</sup> AWEC has not set forth any new arguments  
15 that would support deviating from this practice and therefore, the Company's  
16 proposal to include this information as part of its Optimization Report should be  
17 adopted.

18 **VI. Conclusion**

19 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

20 A. Yes, it does.  
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<sup>51</sup> AWEC/400, Finklea/8.

<sup>52</sup> AWEC/400, Finklea/8.

<sup>53</sup> *In the Matter of NW Natural Gas Company dba NW Natural, Mechanism for Recovery of Environmental Remediation Costs*, Docket No. UM 1635, Order No. 15 049 at 27 (Feb. 20, 2015).